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CHAPTER I
METHODOLOGICAL BEARINGS ON HUME 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
To observe a method, and make that method 
conspicuous to the hearers . . . will 
retain a more thorough persuasion than 
can rise from the strongest reasons which 
are thrown together in confusion.
I am uneasy to think I approve of one 
object, and disapprove of another; call 
one thing beautiful, and another deform'd; 
decide concerning truth and falsehood, 
reason and folly, without knowing upon 
what principles I proceed.
David Hume
Subject-Matter and Approach 
In the opening chapter of any lengthy essay, it is 
only reasonable that a writer name the game before playing 
his cards, or to put the matter less metaphorically, provide 
some clues to the method and reasoning which is employed in 
the remainder of the essay. I say "clues" because, obviously, 
naming the game only supplies the background and rules, and 
not the play—by—play account of one's hand. It is analo­
gously the case with a philosopher's remarks on his subject- 
matter and approach; the actual "strokes" remain to be seen.
2Likewise, making some theoretical remarks on his subject- 
matter relieves the pain of being misunderstood. In dis­
cussing the issues and arguments that comprise a field of 
philosophy and a man's contribution to them, there are many 
equally valid and sound approaches; unless, of c urse, one 
wishes to embrace methodological monism and suffer its 
consequences. Of these various approaches, I remain silent; 
for I am interested in only one, which is, I thinlc, charac­
teristic of this type of philosophical reasoning, i.e., that 
kind of reasoning which deals with a field of philosophy 
(which is simply a group of related conceptual problems and 
proposed solutions) and a man's thought. I shall attempt 
to abide by the above prefatory remarks from Hume in the 
hope of obtaining "a more thorough persuasion." In other
1
Methodological monism entails a false, self­
contradictory premise which is analogous to the one expressed 
in censorship. It presupposes both fallibility and infalli­
bility within the same category; namely, that the monist (or 
censor) knows what errors (or evil) are and the pluralist 
(or society) does not. The censor must think of himself as 
infallible, for otherwise he must give up his claim to know 
what others do not. This position assumes that whoever 
disagrees is mistaken, and since he has made a mistake he 
is fallible. But if what is meant by "disagree" is "to be 
mistaken" then agreement must be exclusive of error and is 
held infallibly. However, one can obviously agree with 
another on mistaken grounds. Likewise, the absence of a 
mistake does not imply infallibility on the part of the 
knower. That which one agrees with is fallible and is de­
pendent upon theoretical assumptions that may not be ob­
served at a given time. Also, the monist exhibits no extra­
ordinary gift or capacity to recognize mistakes or errors; 
so his claim to privileged access is unwarranted. Hence, 
methodological pluralism is a more desirable position.
Without further ado, it suffices to say that I do not take 
my approach as the only one (as our monist would), but one 
of many.
3words, this preliminary section is a way of making my posi­
tion on these matters clear.
The approach I utilize here is not new in the sense 
that I have developed it or have even contributed to its 
development. Nor is it recent. In I9O3 , Henri Bergson
expressed the essential idea behind my approach. One should
2
"consider only that which is living in philosophers." The
substance of Bergson's remark was made clear later in the
century by Jonathan Bennett:
The commentator's dominant problem is to 
display the life below the surface: showing 
where an argument has an innocent analogue 
yielding the same conclusion, or a weaker 
but still untrivial one.3
As a commentary, this essay will attempt to do this with
Hume's philosophical and historical writings. I shall show
where Hume's arguments and theses have an analogue yielding
the same conclusions and opinions, or weaker, nontrivial
ones, all of which we are concerned with in contemporary
philosophy of history; and that Hume is, or can be, an
important contributor to our debate.
My sentiments on the treatment of a past figure in
philosophy have been amply expressed by R. M. Kydd in her
2An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme 
(2nd rev. ed.; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955)j P* 6 0 .
^"Strawson on Kant," Philosophical Review, LXXVII . 3  
(1 9 6 8), 3 4 0 . Ernest Hemingway once voiced the idea that 
fiction is like an iceburg, where one—tenth is above the 
surface. We can infer from this that the critic's job is 
to determine what that other nine-tenths below the surface 
is.
kanalysis of Hume's ethics. I am in agreement with Kydd on 
methodology in that the interest of the theses that consti­
tute this essay is not primarily historical, for the essay 
is not about Hume as a writer on philosophy of history, but 
about arguments and issues in philosophy of history insofar 
as they are considered by Hume. The principal concern with 
these problems is not because they were, among others, ones 
whiuh Hume discussed, but because they are in themselves 
problems of great philosophical interest, and Hume's contri­
bution to their solution is considerable. I am interested 
in Hume's statements only in light of what interests us, and 
not in terms of what primarily interested him. The latter is 
one of the jobs of the intellectual historian, the former 
that of the philosopher (if the two can be separated, and,
I believe, they can). The latter is also not as important 
to a philosopher, since he seeks assistance in developing 
current arguments from the insights of those thinkers who 
have preceded him.
Hence, this study will yield a composite portrait of 
Hume. I offer no apology for this, since a discussion of a 
historical figure is philosophically valueless without a 
contemporary assessment of his ideas and the ways in which 
they can contribute to today's interests and debates; if 
they cannot make such contributions, they they are of no
^Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (London: 
Oxford University Press, 19^), pp. v-vi.
5value for the philosopher, and accordingly, are for only 
Iho historian to assess. The philosopher, like the historian, 
however, interpolates and argues from certain committments 
and points of view.^ In virtue of working with a historical 
figure, my work necessarily vacillates between systematic 
and historical considerations, but within this there are pri­
orities (as I have indicated above). I have found this 
medium of interpretation the best to do justice to the spirit 
of my subject's letter, even though he does not explicitly 
treat certain philosophical questions and issues about history 
with which we are occupied today. For a great many con­
temporary developments are by no means incompatible with 
Hume's accounts. Contemporary ideas are to be found in Hume 
(some more explicit than others), but they are in need of 
interpolation and evaluation, and this is precisely my task 
in the remainder of the essay.
The placement of Hume in philosophy of history also 
requires interpolation in order to adequately form the judg­
ments necessary to assess his contribution. This shall be 
done in two ways. The problems, questions, and arguments 
selected here for treatment are ones that either (a) have
The idea of "interpolation," or of filling the gaps 
left in an account and done in perfectly good conscience for 
the sake of completeness and intelligibility, was first sys­
tematically worked out by R. G. Collingwood. See his The 
Idea of History (London and New York: Oxford Ur /ersity
Press, 194b), p. 240. For Collingwood's use of this idea 
and his illustration, see pp. 244—245« I am extending the 
idea of interpolation to the philosopher's activity and 
preoccupation with argumentative, conceptual discourse.
6their origin (historically) in Hume's philosophy and history, 
or (b) have models which are used in the field that from a 
systematic point of view— due to the concepts themselves-- 
can be labeled as Humean. With both of these, my interests 
are of a speculative nature in that I am interested in inter­
pretations and consequences that can be derived (logically) 
from the assumptions and positions that Hume would likely 
have taken on these matters; that is, what the Humean model 
would be on an issue that he did not explicitly treat, but 
that is important in understanding the possible solutions 
that can be put forth (logically) on a philosophic*! ques­
tion. In other words, I shall use Hume as a focal point in 
talking about the problems and issues in the philosophy of 
history.
At this point, let me give a brief characterization 
of what I understand models to be in a discussion of this 
sort. The term "model" has been used frequently in philo­
sophy of history, and the sense in which I use it does not 
deviate from its meaning in this context. "Model" has be­
come part of the standard vocabulary of philosophy of his­
tory since William Dray's use of the phrase "the 'covering' 
law model" to refer to the Popper-Hempel theory of causal 
explanation. And in turn, Carl Hempel uses the idea of
See his "Explanatory Narrative in History," Philo­
sophical Quarterly, IV,l4 (1954), 15—27; and Laws and 
Explanation in History (London and New York; Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1 9 5 7)» ch. I, passim.
model in reference to Dray's theory of rational explana-
7
tion. A glance at the literature shows that there are
8many other significant uses of "model." When I speak of 
Humean models of historical discourse, I am referring to 
"maps" or theories which account for some aspect of his­
torical discourse, and mean that these are Humean in origin
g
or characteristically so.
The commonly accepted characteristic of models which 
is pertinent to our examination is that they exhibit the 
given structure of whatever is under investigation. In
7
"Rational Action," Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association, XXXV (19^2), 5“23.
g
For openers, see A. C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy 
of History (Cambridge: The University Press, I9 6 5 ), p. l46-
147I 2 3 6 , passim; J. J. Leach, "The Logic of the Situation," 
Philosophy of Science, XXXV . 3 (1 9 6 8), 258-273; A. R. Louch, 
"History as Narrative," History and Theory, VIII.1 (I9 6 9 ), 
54—70 and Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley: University
of California Press, I9 6 6 ), esp. ch. Ill; Michael Oakeshott, 
"The Activity of being an Historian," in his Rationalism in 
Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd.,
1 9 6 2), p. 1 5 ;^ and Morton White, Foundations of Historical 
Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 19^5)> esp. ch. VI.
9
This use of "model" is obviously loose and ordinary; 
it is not to be taken in the technical sense, as in Tarski's 
use of it in mathematics, wherein "model" is interpreted as 
distinct from theory: "A possible realization in which all
valid sentences of a theory T are satisfied is called a 
model of T." Undecidable Theories, A. Tarski, ed. (Amster­
dam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1953)1 P* 11 « If
Tarski were literally used, there would be few (if any) 
models in philosophy that would satisfy this definition.
For a further discussion and sources on models, see Max 
Black, "Models and Archetypes," in Models and Metaphors 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, I9 6 2 ), pp.
219-243; and Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San 
Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 19&4), ch. VII,
"Models," pp. 2 5 8-2 9 3 .
8other words, the form of the model and the form of the 
subject-matter must be the same if it is to be a successful 
model. Structural properties of the subject are exhibited 
by its model; this is principally the function of models in 
philosophical discourse. One immediate observation which 
results from this chi :iCterization is that a model is sim­
pler than its subject-matter. This is both a virtue and a 
vice. It is a scholarly virtue in that the models allow us 
to focus our attention on certain formal properties of the 
subject-matter. As a heuristic device, they help us orga­
nize, interpret, and assess the subject-matter by way of the 
formal properties. But, in turn, models used in a "philo­
sophy of . . ." area, a philosophy which deals with content
in addition to form, such as philosophy of history, must be 
realistic; they must be capable of interpretation. The 
simplicity of models becomes a vice when it leads to over­
simplification and hence to an unrealistic distortion which 
fails to satisfy the interpretative criterion.
A model is then, above all else, a chosen idiom for 
interpreting an activity. However, it is not an ordinary 
idiom, but an idiom with a suppressed theory which is capable 
of explanatory power. In other words, models are the sorts 
of generalizations which enable us to observe and to judge 
certain particular activities or aspects of an activity 
more carefully, more appreciatively, than would be possible
without their d i r e c t i o n . T h e y  reflect, in condensed form, 
philosophical understanding. Moreover, they allow for dis­
criminating observations.and aid in the classificatory pro­
cedures of the philosopher.
The aim of this essay with regard to Hume in par­
ticular is twofold: first, it is a systematic venture
which is to demonstrate the predominance of Humean models 
and assumptions in some of the pror . -o. oultions to the
problems in philosophy of history. To study them in their 
earlier formulation allows us to isolate and evaluate as­
sumptions which are easily overlooked in their contemporary 
guise. By studying Hume in this way we learn a great deal 
about our own thinking on these problems. Where Hume's 
models are absent for other problems in this field, it would 
perhaps be fruitful to construct a Humean model for use 
there. Second, a portrait of Hume as a philosopher of 
history emerges from the discussion of topics which I have 
centered around his writings. Both of these concerns are 
notably different from what has been done previously with 
Hume and his writings. To accomplish what I shall in the 
forthcoming chapters, I have turned to Hume's History of 
England, in which he tacitly uses concepts such as narration 
and practical reasoning in history even though he fails to 
give a detailed philosophical discussion of these concepts
10W. B. Gallie, Philosophy, and the Historical Under­
standing (New York: Schocken Books, 19^4), p. 31.
10
in his other works. I will utilize such instances in fur­
ther developing the models.
The discussion which follows may be regarded as an 
attempt to "make sense" of what Hume, in particular, has to
i
say about the historian's activity. Although reference will 
be made to his dicta, I will not, in the main, offer any 
close textual discussion of his account, except in my se­
cond chapter. I shall try, rather, to bring out indepen­
dently by reference to examples, features which anti—Humean 
theorists seem to me to miss, going on thereafter to dis­
cuss likely misunderstandings of and objections to the 
logical points which appear to emerge from such an exercise.
Survey of Previous Literature on the Subject
This section covers (a) the work done on Hume which
borders on my discussion, and ways in which mine differs
from it; and (b) the recognized importance of Hume for the
philosophy of history by contemporary philosophers.
The work which has been done specifically on Hume
in relation to philosophy of history is limited and sketchy.
The most recent, extensive treatment of this topic is P. B.
Dobson's concluding chapter, "Hume and the Philosophy of
11History," in his David Hume's Theory of History. However, 
his discussion is principally historical; it concerns Hume's
11 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in modern history; 
New York University, I9 6 5 ), pp. 202-254.
11
theory of history and its relation to the Age of Enlighten­
ment. Consequently, his treatment of the topic and his 
selection of problems is different from mine. The major 
portion of my essay is on topics which Dobson does not treat 
or mention at all. Dobson has discussed the relationship 
between Hume's epistemology and theory of history, and 
questions (like consistency) pertaining to that relation­
ship. Since his treatment is generally adequate, I shall 
not dwell on this relationship in Hume. Ncr is my approach 
one which reflects preoccupation with this relationship. I 
am mainly interested in interpolating those things in Hume 
which are or would be of interest to the contemporary dis­
cussion of history. Nonetheless, where Dobson's thesis is . 
relevant, I shall discuss it briefly.
A similar treatment of Hume has been offered by
another historian of history and intellectual historian,
F. J. Teggart. He has a short essay, "The Method of Hume
12and Turgot," in his Theory and Processes of History 
which also treats Hume in terms of his age. The remaining 
scholarship on Hume on history was done at the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It is not 
as rewarding as that mentioned above, but it made contri­
butions by clarifying the relation of Hume's philosophy to 
his history. For example, Heinrich Goebel's dissertation.
(Berkeley; University of California Press ^1918,
1 9 2 ^  i960), pp. 180-197.
12
Das Philosophische in Humes Geschichte von England^^
relates Hume's History to his philosophical writings, and
Julius Goldstein-in his Die empiristische Geschichtessauf— 
14fassung Humes relates Hume's philosophy to his History 
and argues that the latter was derived from the former, 
whereas Goebel argued contrariwise. Such a debate as this 
one I have found adequately handled by Dobson, so I shall 
not enter this debate.
An early assessment of Hume for historiography was 
made by G. H. Sabine in his "Hume's Contribution to the
15
Historical Method," but it is of little value for my pur­
poses. The interpretative emphasis is upon human nature 
and history. Collingwood and Alfred Stern follow the same 
procedure as Sabine, and even Dobson, who criticizes this 
type of interpretation, follows it h i m s e l f . M y  own treat­
ment of the relationship between history and human nature 
is limited to the next chapter (II). However, I wish to 
point out that this relationship does not methodologically
13 (Published Ph.D. dissertation, Gottingen, Univer- 
sitat zu Gottingen, 1897)i 46 pp.
^^(Published Ph.D. dissertation, Leipzig, Verlag 
der Durr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903), 38 pp.
^^Philosophical Review. XV.1 (I906), 17-38.
16
Collingwood,op. cit., pp. 73-83, 203-231; Alfred 
Stern, Philosophy of History and the Problem of Values 
(S'—Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., 1962), pp. 60ff., l47ff; 
Dobson, op. cit.
13
govern the arguments and outlook of the other chapters in 
this essay;
The best of the early work done on Hume is by E. C . 
Mossner in his "An Apology for David Hume, Historian.
Mossner helped both to bring about a more adequate account 
of Hume as a historian and to dispel some of the serious 
misrepresentations of his writings that deal with history.
All of these works contribute to the study of Hume, but none 
to the philosophy of history. With the possible exception 
of Dobson's work, there has been no appraisal of Hume's 
contribution to the field, or more especially, a study of 
the relation of Hume to contemporary philosophers. Yet the 
above men's works have contributed to and made possible the 
study which I am adventuring upon, for they have accomplished 
some of the historical work that is always necessary for 
studies such as this to take place.
The relevance of Hume to the problems to which the 
contemporary philosopher of history addresses himself today 
is recognized. But this recognition has come only in a 
piecemeal fashion. For instance, Hume's ideas have been 
included in the arguments of many modern works on philosophy 
of history, but none of these writers has attempted to 
present an overall estimation of Hume's contribution to the 
field. The dominance of Hume's thinking here is evident
^^Proceedings of the Modern Language Association, 
LVI (1 9 4 1), 657-490.
I ' i
when we observe the literature. For example, Morton White
explicitly recognizes the use of a Humean model:
In a sense I have adopted__a quasi-Humean 
approach to the problem /I.e., explanatory 
statement^7 arguing that reference to more 
than law is required when we come to analyze 
an explanatory deductive argument and a 
singular explanatory statement, and that 
that extra something may well be custom.
There are countless other philosophers who make limited use 
of Hume's ideas and models in their arguments. But my 
çoint here is that his thinking is very much with us in the 
field today. (Chapters II through V show this in detail.) 
Since this is the case and since an overall estimation and 
evaluation has not been made, I hope that this essay will 
contribute to the filling of this important gap. No sys­
tematic account of Hume and solutions (via his models) to
18Op. cit., p. 77; White's italics. This statement 
and the problem White refers to are discussed in chapter V.
19 ^Some of the other philosophers who utilize Humean 
ideas are: M. R. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History (2nd
ed.; La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing CoTl I9 6 1 ), ch.
4; R. G. Collingwood, op^ . cit. , Pt. II, sec. 8-10, Pt. V,
Sec. 1; A. C. Danto, op^ . cit. ; W. H. Dray, Laws and Expla­
nation in History; Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical 
Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952); L%
J. Goldstein, "Theory in History," Philosophy of Science, 
XXXIV.1 (1 9 6 7), 23-40; C. G. Hempel, "The Function of General 
Laws in History," Journal of Philosophy, XXXIX (1942), 35- 
48 and a revision of this paper in his Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation (New York: The Free Press, 19^5), pp. 231-243;
A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action, esp. chs. 3 and 
4; Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge 
(New York: Harper and Row ^ 1930/ 1  19^7), ch. VII; W. H.
Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction (Rev. ed.;
New York: Harper and Row ^ 1951/, 1967); Peter Winch, The
Idea of a Social Science (New York; Humanities Press, 1958).
15
the problems which we today would label as those of philo­
sophy of history has been given. I shall attempt to pull 
together for the first time Hume's contribution to the 
philosophy of history, especially as the field is thought 
of today.
All the scholars I have cited directly above show in 
a fragmentary way that Hume is relevant and that he tacitly 
addresses himself to some of the issues, but none has tried 
to assess his overall contribution. Dobson gives merely a 
description of Hume's theory of history; and the majority 
of ideas I have found of interest are absent in Dobson's 
treatment. (Part of the reason for this is obviously the 
difference in point of view.) My work is significantly dif­
ferent from Dobson's in that (a) I am interested in analogues, 
(b) I am primarily interested in Hume as a philosopher of 
history and not as a historian, and (c) I am not interested 
in Hume's theory of history for its own sake as Dobson is, 
but only insofar as it has analogues. The discovery of 
analogues is my principle of selection. It must be pointed 
out that Hume was not only interested in speculative ques­
tions concerning history, such as those pertaining to "pro­
gress" which occupied eighteenth century thinkers as Dobson.
20has pointed out, but also addressed himself to issues that 
analytic philosophers of history are preoccupied with today.
20
Op. cit., pp. 211ff.
16
such as historical narration, point of view in history, 
causal explanation, and so on.
There is little philosophical criticism on this sub­
ject, for Hume is not generally recognized as a philosopher 
of history. Danto, Dray, Walsh and others have aclcnowledged, 
at least nominally, that Hume's thought is pertinent to 
philosophy of history. For example, Danto sees the value of
Hume's theory of causation for history and offers vindica- 
■ 21tion of it. Walsh finds that Hume's discussion of testi­
mony and miracles is tied up with the issues of historical
22objectivity and historical truth and fact. But all of 
these are piecemeal treatments and either entirely miss 
Hume's model or express.only a feature of it.
I have concluded that direct presentation, rather 
than close controversy, is the best approach to treating 
Hume. For this reason I have had little to say in what 
■follows of such works as Dobson's. What I do have to say 
about these works will be noted in chapter II. Most of 
what I have to say concerns contemporary use (and possible 
uëes) of Hume in arguments on the issues in philosophy of 
history. I shall rarely embark upon the questions of 
legitimacy and authenticity concerning that use. I have 
tried here and will attempt, below to point out my agreement 
with other philosophers and historians wherever possible
Blph. cit., ch. XI. cit., chs. 5 and 4.
17
when the continuity of my argument is not interrupted; but 
my primary aim is to present my argument rather than to 
defend it against Humean scholars. This sort of defense, 
to be adequate, would comprise what space there is for pre­
sentation. And I would hope that from this introduction, 
the need for a study such as this is evident.
Precursory Claim
It has been partially shown that Hume is a precursor
2 3of analytic philosophy, but nowhere has it been demon­
strated that he is a precursor cf analytical philosophy of
history. Walsh sensed that philosophers of the more pedes-
24trian style were suspicious of philosophy of history. My
essay may well be the object of the same suspicions, for it
is not generally recognized that Hume had anything of a
philosophical nature to say about history, much less enough
to warrant a lengthy essay. Walsh himself gives some reasons
25why the suspicion would be present in this case. Hume is 
associated with eighteenth—century British empiricism, which 
is usually thought of as either anti—historical or non— 
historical in outlook. However, the viewing of Hume in this 
commonplace philosophical classification is to miss some of 
the contributions he made in attempting to clarify the
^^Farhang Zabeeh, Hume, Precursor of Modern Empiricism 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I9 6 I).
^^Op. cit., ch. I. ^ ^Ibid.
18
foundations of historical knowledge. I shall not be con­
cerned with everything Hume has said on these foundations, 
but more with the insights and models which he devised in a 
rudimentary form, and which have become predominant today 
in our thinking about the foundations of history. It is 
mainly in this way that I shall argue the precursory claim.
In the History, Hume exhibits an awareness of the 
need for criteria in order to arrive at methodological de-
26cisions in history. Implicit in his role as narrator of 
historical events of Great Britain is Hume as philosopher of 
history. This particular avenue of interpretation can help 
one answer such questions as "In what sense is analytical 
philosophy of history a continuation of Hume's philosophy?" 
in instances in which the Treatise and Enquiries fail to pro­
vide sufficient premises for argument. The description of 
such a claim has been supplied by Dobson, Mossner, and 
others, but an analysis of it is lacking. Hume was concerned 
either implicitly or explicitly, with many of the questions 
of analytic philosophy of history while researching and 
writing the History of England. Hence, this work shall be
26This principally takes the form of notes or appen­
dices, the purpose of which he says was "to avoid as much 
as possible, the style of dissertation in the body of his 
history;" History of England (6 Vols; New York: R. Worth­
ington, i860), IV, 536 (cited in Mossner, p. 678). These 
notes he added after writing the History; see Dobson, p. 
ilOn; perhaps as guides and reflections on historical dis­
course , Hume's use of "his" with ". . . in the body of his 
j/i.e., the author'_s/ history" exhibits this reflective 
point of view.
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utilized along with the philosophical works in discussing 
Hume in this context. In his philosophical works, Hume 
does not raise and treat explicitly or in full detail cer­
tain problems that are treated today in philosophy of his­
tory, and this is probably why the precursory claim has not 
been shown. However, as a historian, he does make assump­
tions which may be explicated in such a way as to augment 
the clues and arguments he gives in his philosophical works 
and to provide fuller solutions to questions pertaining to 
the concepts and foundations of history.
Let me illustrate the precursory claim. This example 
is to serve as a miniature of the sort of procedure (minus 
the context of argument) which I shall employ in the fol­
lowing chapters to establish analogues. Danto comments on
the philosophical reflection which is stimulated by the
27reading of historical accounts. Likewise, Hume was stimu­
lated by history— written history— to think about philosoph­
ical problems connected with history. But how conscious 
was Hume of problems which we discuss under "philosophy of 
history?" One straightforward unequivocal example of phil­
osophy of history in Hume's writings comes from the Treatise, 
where he tells us that :
It does not belong to my present purpose to 
shew, that these general principles are
^Qp. cit., p. 6. In many of the following arguments 
I do not consciously cite the contemporary motivation at the 
beginning as I have done here with Danto. But my motivation 
becomes apparent later as the argument develops.
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applicable to the late /Englia^/ revolution; 
and that all the rights and privileges, which 
ought to be sacred to a free nation, were 
at that time threaten'd with the utmost dan­
ger. I am better pleas'd to leave this con­
troversial subject, if it really admits of 
. controversy; and to indulge myself in some 
philosophical reflections, which naturally 
arise from that important event.28
The location of this introductory remark is of conceptual
importance; it occurs in Book III, "Of Morals," Part II,
section x. It is in this book of the Treatise where Hume
makes most of his earliest remarks on history and it is
from here primarily that we shall take some of our clues for
Hume as a philosopher of history. Let us pause for a moment
and look at the above passage. Why of all the events in the
past is the English Revolution selected by historians to be
of the utmost importance? Hume's answer is that the rights
and privileges "which ought to be sacred to a free nation.
28A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Sèlby-Bigge, ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 8 8 8), pp^ $64-565; and in David
Hume ; Philosophical Historian, D. P. Norton and R. H.
Popkin, eds. (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co., I965), p.
3 2 . The italics are Hume's. It is worth noticing Hume's 
introductory remark, "It does not belong to my present pur­
pose to shew. . .," for it shows beyond doubt that Hume had 
plans to write the History at the time of writing the 
Treatise (_ca. 1739)» It also confirms Dobson's suspicions 
that Hume had a long-standing interest in history and that 
his History was not an "afterthought" pending the failure of 
the Treatise; op. cit., pp. v-vi, vii. Hence, this quota­
tion, among others, shows that Hume had an eye on history 
when writing the Treatise, and this overt interest also 
lends historical support to the treatment of Hume as a phil­
osopher of history. Hume's statement in "My Own Life" con­
cerning the plan of writing the History When at the Advocates
Library in__12^2 should be taken lightly (see source in
footnote P* 7)» In other words, Hume's use of "plan"
means the specifics of the History, rather than indicating 
when he first conceived of writing it.
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were at that time threaten'd with the utmost danger." So
the term "importance" is here, as it is for Whitehead, a
morally or value connotated word.
An analogue between Hume and Teggart on the notion
of "importance" is evident when Teggart states that "history
is concerned, not with everyday life of individuals, but
with happenings which affect the welfare of communities in
a higher sense than the vicissitudes of men's private for—
29
tunes." And White argues concerning the selectivity of
historians;
These are value-judgments even if they are 
generally shared. William James remarks 
that the preferences of sentient creatures 
are what create the importance of topics; 
and while there may be some uses of the 
word "importance" that are not linked to
such preferences, certainly some are, and
they underlie certain selections of his­
torians. 30
"Moral" (value) reasoning is involved in historical reason­
ing; the latter entails "moral" categories that are implicit 
in what men take as being important (or value-loaded) events 
in history. Here is an explanation of the problem of selec­
tion. Is this a plausible analysis of selection? (The 
analogues suggest that it is defensible.) I choose not to
answer this question in detail here, for the above example
^^Op. cit., p. l8 .
^^Op. cit., p. 2 6 1 . The reference to James is from 
"The Importance of Individuals," in The Will to Believe and 
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Pub­
lishing Co. /ÎF9 6/I 1 9 5 6 ), p. 261.
is simply to give the reader some idea of vdial is in Hume 
and what I shall do with what I find. Aside from the above 
passage, one finds further evidence for the procedure which 
I am adopting here, by observing that history is charac­
terized by Hume in the first Inquiry as "Moral reasoning"
31of "particular and general facts."
I will be interested in the course of this essay to 
develop in greater systematic detail this precursory claim, 
and many others, with an eye on contemporary philosophy of 
history. For I wish not only to show something historical 
about philosophy of history, but also that many of the 
field's writers use models of analysis which are not only 
Humean in origin, but are also conceptually so, and that 
these models have assumptions which are more clearly seen 
in their origin (in Hume) than in their contemporary make-up. 
I hope to show two things about Hume in this setting: (l)
that Hume is to be regarded as a major figure in the history 
of the philosophy of history; and (2 ) that he is of central 
importance in understanding the presently accepted issues 
and positions of today's philosophers in the field, for we 
share many of his assumptions and models, and have learned, 
or can learn, valuable lessons from his mistakes. So the 
present study is not solely a study on Hume, but rather a
31An Inquiry Coneerning Human Understanding, With ^  
Supplement, An Abstract of ^  Treatise of Human Nature, C. W. 
Hehdel, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs—Merrill Co., 1955), p. 172. 
The notion of "fact" is discussed in detail in Chapter II.
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study of Humean models that are used in philosophy of 
history. The importance of this inquiry is to expose some 
of the models and their assumptions in the field, and to a 
lessor extent, to attempt to weed out some of the misinter­
pretations of Hume on history as we go along.
By way of summary, this essay is occasioned by the 
evidence (as reviewed briefly in this chapter) of an in­
creasing interest in Hume in the philosophy of history. In 
fact, the relationship he saw between philosophy and history 
suggests a study such as this one. Hume thought of his
philosophy as an integral part of history: "The study of
32history confirms the reasonings of true philosophy." And
the converse (history as an integral part of philosophy) is
seen from the following remark from Hume's Inquiry, where
he mentions history in connection with the study of human
nature and philosophy:
Its chief use is only to discover the con­
stant and universal principles of human 
nature, by shewing men in all varieties of 
circumstances and situations, and furnish­
ing us with materials, from which we may 
form our observations, and become acquainted 
with the regular springs of human action 
and behaviour. These records of wars, 
intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are 
so many collections of experiments, by 
which the politician or moral philosopher 
fixes the principles of his science; in 
the same manner as the physician or natural 
philosopher becomes acquainted with the
^^Treatise, p. 5 6 2 .
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nature of plants, minerals, and other ex­
ternal objects, by the experiments, which 
he forms concerning them.33
Indeed, the reasoning in the passage suggests that Hume 
thought of philosophy as principally philosophy of history, 
for Hume is talking about the use of history which is (to 
some) definitely an issue in the field.
It is remarkable that Hume should have in the past 
gained such recognition as a historian, epistemologist, 
metaphysician, ethical theorist, philosophes, etc., but 
rarely as a philosopher of history. With the immense in­
terest in Hume and the philosophy of history in this century 
there will undoubtedly be alteration in this aspect of
  __  p. 93* Cited in Mossner, ££. cit. , p.
6 6 6 . Hume's analogy between the moral and the natural 
philosopher, in addition to the fact that he aspired to be 
the "Newton" of the "moral sciences," is well known (see 
the Introduction to the Treatise). The above analogy worK.*; 
because there is a^ least the commanality of references to 
past instances which are within the domain of history. 
However, there is obviously much more to it than this. At 
the beginning of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1953)>
we find_him saying that "It is full time they ^^moral philo­
sopher^/ should attempt a like reformation in all moral 
disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however 
subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and ob­
servation," p. 7- The initial data from history acts as a 
philosopher's guide to formulating generalizations, and 
those generalizations, in turn, are confirmed or discon— 
firmed by history. So, according to Hume, history lies at 
the beginning and at the end of philosophical reasoning.
34 /-For example, see W. B. Gallie, op. cit., ch. 6 ;
Pieter Geyl, Use and Abuse of History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1955); and Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use 
and Abuse of History, trans. A. Collins (Rev. ed.; Indian­
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1957).
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Hume's thought and its contribution to the philosophy of 
history today. The present essay is, then, also intended 
as a contribution to these ends.
Plan of the Essay
Thus far in this introductory chapter I have had a 
great deal to say about Hume, but little on historical dis­
course and philosophy of history. The term "historical 
discourse" in my title can be broadly construed as histor­
ical narration. My thesis is that if the task of the cri­
tical philosopher of history is to analyze historical con­
cepts via historical writing, then ^  fortiori, narration is 
the primary problem within and focus of his activity; and 
his other questions concerning history are connected, but 
logically subsidiary, to historical discourse or narration. 
In other words, what may be considered as typical of and 
perhaps distinctive about historical discourse is its use 
of the narrative mode or technique. The contributions which 
can be made to the understanding of the historian's activity 
by an analysis of narration will be the subject of the third 
chapter.
Although I have isolated the topic of narration from 
the other chapters, this is artificial and is mainly for 
convenience; for the whole essay is principally concerned 
with historical narration. My reason for this generali­
zation is that most (if not all) of the other philosophical
26
problems of history, such as explanation, causation, point
of view, practical reasoning, and many more, are within the
context of historical narration. The conceptual features
that the narrative exhibits usually affect or are reflected
in these other issues.
When we view historical narration by way of the
notion of point of view (as we do in Chapter IV), we go
beyond "stylistic considerations" and learn a great deal
about the conceptual foundations of historical research and 
35r e a s o n i n g . T h e  case is the same when we view historical 
narration via practical reasoning and via historical causa­
tion as we do in Chapter III. In Chapter II, I come to the 
conclusion that what Hume means by "the constant principles 
of human nature" has as its referent no eternally or abso­
lutely true set of laws, but carefully guarded generaliza­
tions prefixed with temporal or historical references.
These become the content of the historian's point of view, 
i.e., "general laws."
The concluding chapter (V) departs sharply from the 
others by treating their results and the problems in a
This is not to imply that the topic of historical 
narration is only one of "stylistic considerations." This 
would leave a serious gap in the historian's activity, e.g., 
research and reasoning, as will be observed in the third 
chapter. Maurice Mandelbaum thinks that this sort of gap 
in the historian's activity is created by the preoccupation 
with narration. See his "A Note on History as Narrative," 
History and Theory, VI.3 (1 9 6?), 412—419* However, Mandel— 
baum's conception of narrative leaves a great deal to be 
desired.
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systematic fashion without the specific appeals to Iliuno ' s 
work. It is in this chapter where I argue about the as­
sumptions and the details in the Humean models by way of 
the analogy between deductive arguments and historical dis­
course. In other words, the relevance of the ideas and 
positions developed from Hume in the preceding chapters to 
contemporary philosophy of history is shown by amending 
the arguments of the Humean theorists, and that these ideas 
make the models more defensible against anti-Humean theo­
rists. In this way, the present Humean position in philo­
sophy of history has been extended.
The next chapter (11) is synoptic in character and 
is intended to provide additional setting for the more 
specific problems handled in the remaining chapters.
CHAPTER II 
THE IDEA OF HISTORY AND HUME
The only certain means by which nations 
can indulge their curiosity in researches 
concerning their remote origin, is to con­
sider the language, manners, and customs 
of their ancestors, and to compare them 
with those of the neighbouring nations.
David Hume
Resume
In recent years there has been a great surge of 
interest among scholars in David Hume's writings. This 
interest, however, has been largely confined to his philo­
sophy proper, notably his epistemology and ethics. Never­
theless, it would not be true to say that other areas of 
his thought and writings have been totally ignored, for 
they have received considerable attention in J. B. Black's 
and E. C. Mossner's accounts of his history.^ With the 
exception of more contemporary and relatively shorter es­
says by D. P . Norton and H. R. Trever-Roper, there has been
"Hume," in The Art of History; A Study of Four 
Great Historians of the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1926), pp. 77-116; and "An Apology 
for David Hume, Historian," Proceedings of the Modern 
Language Association, LVI (1941), 657 790; respectively.
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no major philosophical treatment of Hume's reasoning on his­
tory, its use, and historiography since the early nineteen 
2
hundreds. It might well be argued that there is need for 
a philosophical examination of that aspect of Hume's thought 
which is devoted to history and to theoretical reflections 
on history. Specifically, this examination can be made from 
the perspective of philosophy of history. The purpose of 
this chapter is to contribute to that end.
One reason why this undertaking has been absent is 
that much of the material for such a study lies implicit in 
Hume's writings, and thus forces one into the history and 
historiography of his time besides into philosophy proper.
R. G. Collingwood has been an exception in treating these 
different aspects of Hume's writings; but unfortunately, he
3
devotes very little space to Hume.
2"History and Philosophy in Hume's Thought," in David 
Hume ; Philosophical Historian, D. F. Norton and R. H. Pop- 
kin, edsl (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1 9 6 5 )1 PP*
xxxii—1 ; and "David Hume as a Historian," The Listener, LXV 
( 2 8 December I96I), 1103, 1119i and the same essay revised 
and included in David Hume: A Symposium, D. F . Pears, ed.
(London: Macmillan Co., I963T, pp. 89-100; respectively.
The exception here is the last chapter of Paul Dobson's 
unpublished dissertation, David Hume's Theory of History 
(New York University, Modern History, 19^5), ch. VI. Al­
though we agree on a similar general conclusion (that Hume 
has been seriously misunderstood on human nature and his­
tory) , my argument is significantly different both in 
detail and consequences. For further details on the lit­
erature, see chapter I, survey of literature section.
Since many of the issues treated and presented in this 
chapter are ones which are fundamental to arguments in 
later chapters, I have discussed them here.
^The Idea of History (London and New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1946). The sections specifically devoted
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Hume spent little time writing reflections on his­
tory in the form of metaphysical speculations like those of 
G. W. F. Hegel. Instead, Hume primarily used reflections of 
a theoretical nature in formulating his philosophy, history, 
and essays. As is evidenced by his writings and his manner 
of presentation, his statements are based upon concepts 
which arose from the reflections of a working historian. 
Noticing this dimension provides an avenue of interpretation 
which has been ignored by previous examinations. Aspects of 
historiography and philosophy of history have been over­
looked because of an extreme use of the dichotomies of 
philosophy and history and those of periodization. These 
dichotomies specifically result in an artificial division 
of labor and blur many contributions made by Hume to the 
former areas, as well as hinder a better understanding of 
Hume in these neglected areas.
Because of thé expanse of material, this chapter will 
be primarily concerned with Hume's Treatise of Human Nature 
and his History of England. Certain commonplace interpre- . 
tations of Hume's History are derived from the Treatise, so 
a brief exposition of it will be necessary in order to put 
,in relief some of the ideas in the History. In the course 
of this chapter, some of these generally accepted concep­
tions will be shown to be textually inaccurate and
to Hume are pp. 7 3 - 7 6 and 81-85* The latter is a brief 
exposition, "The Science of Human Nature," of the Enlight­
enment .
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conceptually misleading. These conceptions form a common­
place view of Hume that may be seen most clearly in Black's 
4
account, and that for convenience, may be labeled as "the 
standard interpretation."
An extreme use of the dichotomy of "Hume the philo­
sopher" and "Hume the historian" is reflected in Black's 
method of interpretation and presentation. This method has 
become the source of much confusion about and debunking of 
Hume.^ Black's method rests upon a classification which is 
more formal than real and which results in a misleading 
exposition of Hume and history.
. . . It would be more profitable and prac­
ticable to investigate the extent to which 
Hume the philosopher guided the pen of Hume 
the historian. And this, incidentally, is 
the method we shall pursue.°
Black's ensuing analysis and criticisms— playing the two
"Humes" off one another— are fictional; this produces a
rather one-sided and misleading classificatory analysis.
4
Op. cit. The following historians also adopt the 
interpretation; H. E. Barnes, A History of Historical 
Writing (2nd ed.; New York: Dover Publishing Co., 19&3), 
pp. 148, 155“59i 1 6 7 ; J . W. Thompson, History of Historical 
Writing (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), II, 69—72; and
S. B. Barnes, "The Age of Enlightenment," in The Development 
of Historiography, M. A. Fitzsimmons and A. G. Pundt, eds. 
(Harrisburg, Penn.: The Stackpole Co., 1954), pp. 155-57.
^Traces of this interpretative method are present in 
Dobson's essay; but for the most part, he would agree with 
my argument.
^Op. cit., p. 7 9 . Black's two "Humes" imply that 
they are significantly different. Such a difference be­
comes an assumption rather than a claim to be demonstrated.
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Rather than create two mysterious Humes which lurk between 
the pages, I shall attempt to draw out concepts of similar­
ity and dissimilarity in Hume's writings without the aid of 
the ghosts. This is in the hope of being more attentive 
and faithful to the Humean idiom. At times ideas will be
n
uàed and mentioned which are unique to the History, and it 
will be interesting to see them in relief against his more 
philosophical writings. But this will not be done to the 
extent of forming classificatory preconceptions which make 
Hume an entitative ghost of each work. Thus the undesirable 
consequences that are indicative of such an approach will 
be avoided.
Problem of Interpretation 
Hume's originality in history extends itself in many 
directions. I shall attempt to disclose some of his in­
sights and techniques which I find relevant to a discussion 
of philosophy of history and philosophical historiography.
It is convenient to take the notion of human nature as a 
paradigm case by which to exhibit the claims made in the 
introduction of this chapter and to substantiate the par­
ticular interpretation which follows. In explicating the 
notion, it may be best to start with those particular con­
ceptions of human nature presented in the Treatise which
^This dimension of the present chapter and ones that 
follow is one that was left unexplored in Dobson's essay.
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contribute to the standard interpretation. Then I will 
examino whether these conceptions are used in the History, 
and, 11' so, to what extent they affect his History and other 
writings. The most severe criticisms of Hume are launched 
against his concept of human nature; and as a consequence, 
Hume is generally identified with the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment. Indeed, he has even been called a Ration—
g
alist in history by some historians. This ^  priori identi­
fication of a man with his Age is made so frequently that 
sometimes the individual's contributions are lost in the 
process. So it may perhaps be worthwhile to dwell on this 
point for a moment.
In his David Hume ; Prophet of the Count er-Revolut ion 
(wherein history is represented as a weapon of counter­
revolution for the social reformer and the historian), L. L.
Bongie has remarked: "He should consult Hume and Montesquieu,
9not the reason of the Age of Reason." The reason of the 
Age of Reason is a non—historical construction that has 
resulted in an identification of the reason of the Age 
(Aufklflrung) with Hume's particular conceptions of reason 
and human nature. To avoid misunderstanding, however, I
g
E. Fueter, Historié de 1'historiographie moderne, 
Traduit de l'allemand par Emile Jeanmaire avec notes et 
additions de 1'auteur (Paris, 191k), pp. 4$2-6. Cited in 
Mossner, p. 657-
^(London and New York: Oxford University Press,
1 9 6 5), p. 7 1 .
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should point out that I am not denying that the construction 
can provide an explanation. Rather, I question whethei' this 
provides the most tenable explanation of Hume, his views on 
human nature and the manner in which these relate to history. 
Black maintains that:
Hume did not grasp the elements of the 
problem /I.e., did not provide an adequate 
theory of historical explanation/, because 
he was dominated, as indeed were all the 
eighteenth century philosophes, by the 
belief that human nature was uniformly the 
same at all times and places.^®
Here again an a priori statement dwarfs Hume in the gener­
ality of a period. Perhaps we should be more cautious and 
consult Hume on human nature before we consult the nature 
of the Age. The latter is always fictional and is generally 
indicative of an ^  priori handling of. categories for periodi­
zation. The disciplinary classification, at the expense of 
description and textual analysis, and the results of such a 
classification can be clearly seen in Black's conclusion.
It is not difficult to read between the 
lines of. this analysis that Hume's concep­
tion of civilization is simply the ideal­
ized picture of the Age of Reason, with 
its salons, its humanitarianism, its hatred 
of the "brute facts of the spoiled universe." 
and its insistence on the doctrine, that 
virtue is simply a form of cultivated reason.
10Op. cit., p. 8 6 . D. F. Norton has a similar thesis 
which purports that Hume's "problem" was data for history 
rather than adequate historical explanation: o^» cit., pp.
l3çix-l. Conclusions arrived at in the next chapter on 
evidence or data tend to cast doubt on Norton's criticism 
of Hume on this point.
11^^Ibid.. p. 89.
35
From this passage it is evident that Black has a tacit cri­
terion operating which consists of ideas that exemplify the 
Age. Black's interest is more in the Age than in the indi­
viduals of the Age. The portrait of Hume as a philosophical 
historian struggling with problems and attempting to find 
solutions is absent. The themes of his essay do not pertain 
to individual merits, but to the Age. This is hazardous for 
one tends to read deductively or categorically instead of 
hypothetically. Because of this procedure, Black's charac­
terization of "enlightenment" or "cultivated reason" lacks 
essential elements which are central in Hume's idea. This 
will be a theme for a subsequent discussion.
In his essay, R. G. Collingwood maintains a Weltan­
schauung identification which echoes some of the implica-
12tions of the standard interpretation. In The Idea of
History, he concludes that Hume, like other men of the
Enlightenment, was barred "from scientific history by a sub-
13stantialistic view of human nature ;" but Collingwood adds 
à qualifying clause which exhibits less of a Weltanschauung 
identification than Black's: This view of human nature
"was really inconsistent with his philosophical principles." 
Collingwood's qualifying clause is symptomatic of the pro­
blems of interpretation involved in the Weltanschauung 
identification discussed earlier. The "inconsistency" he
^^Op. cit. , pp. 81-85*, 73-76. '^ I^bid., p. 76.
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speaks of above is between the period and the individual 
rather than among Hume's philosophical principles. The 
attempt to subsume Hume under the period discloses an error 
in the scholar's method. It is because of his philosophical 
principles that one should be cautious in making periodi­
zation remarks which purport to offer an explanation of 
Hume's philosophy of history. Furthermore, Collingwood's 
statement is misleading on its own basis. The criterion 
which he sets forth at the beginning of his essay is for 
judging whether an individual is a historian or not. One 
of the components of the criterion for history is that it 
be "scientific;" in other words that it begin with the 
author's questions about the human past. Obviously Hume 
does make inquiries of this sort, and the question arises 
whether Collingwood meant more than this. It is reasonably 
safe to assume that he did. But what he meant by the sub-
stantialistic claim, (viz. the treatment of the knowable as
15an unchanging substance), that Hume was not "scientific," 
is unclear and remains to be clarified. In any event, 
Collingwood's general idea of an inconsistency suggests that 
something peculiar is implied by the Weltanschauung identi­
fication with the individual to which it is applied in this 
case. This methodological inconsistency marks the recogni­
tion and beginning of a need for a different approach. The
^^Ibid., pp. 9-1 0 , 18- 1 9 . ^^Ibid., p. 42.
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playing of one level, the classificatory, against another 
level, the individual, is suspect; for the force of an
individual's reasoning or line of argument is lost when it
16is identified with the general classification. With these 
procedural remarks in mind we may now turn to Hume.
The 'Treatise' and Human Nature
In order to make a better evaluation of the claims
just reviewed, it may well be best to discuss the work which
preceded the History to see if the standard interpretation
has formed an adequate appraisal of the Treatise which, in
turn, has been applied to the History.
The full title of the early work is indicative of its
subject-matter: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt
to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral
Subjects. This work is divided into three books, "Of the
Understanding," "Of the Passions," and "Of Morals." Hume
remarks about the Treatise and the divisions that:
What is principally remarkable in this whole 
affair is the strong confirmation these 
phaenomena give to the foregoing system 
concerning the understanding, and conse­
quently to the present one concerning the 
passions; since these are analogous to each 
other. 'Tis indeed evident, that when we 
sympathize with the passions and sentiments 
of others, these movements appear at first 
in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd
For a more thorough discussion of various ap­
proaches, see John Passmore, "The Idea of a History of 
Philosophy," History and Theory, IV (I9 6 5 , Beiheft 5)» 1-32.
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to belong to another person, as we conceive 
any other matter of fact. 'Tis also evident, 
that the ideas of the affections of others 
are converted into the very impressions 
they represent, and that the passions arise 
in conformity to the images we form of 
them . 17
Together, this passage and the full title of the Treatise 
contain perhaps the best summation, in Hume's own words, of 
his early work. Furthermore, they are rich with implica­
tions of his ideas which will contribute to the formation 
of the view of human nature that is reflected in the epis— 
temology of the History. The most conspicuous item in the 
title is, of course, the reference to the experimental 
method of reasoning. The method proclaimed by Hume is 
nothing new, for Hume was living in a period conscious o f '
Sir Issac Newton's achievements in "natural philosophy." 
Indeed, Hume aspired to make an application of this method 
which would in results equal Newton's achievements. The 
method served as a criterion; "The only solid foundation
we can give to this science ^ i .e., science of man/ itself
19must be laid on experience and observation." The founda­
tion is constructed on the idea that the understanding and 
the passions are analogous to each other. But the application
17A Treatise of Human N a t w e , L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Pressl I8 8 8 ), p. 319-
^®For a discussion of Newton's influence on Hume's 
methodology, see J . A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cam­
bridge: The University Press, 1952), ch. 3*
19Treatise, p. xx.
39
of this criterion as a method is radically different from
Newton's as is evidenced by the passage above, and I shall
attempt to demonstrate this in this section.
"The science of man" is premised on principles which
stress or emphasize man in such a way as to make a science
of man, in the Newtonian sense, virtually impossible! The
principles appealed to in the above passage are derived, in
20part, from custom instead of logical necessity, and more 
importantly, they are inferences drawn in part from Hume's 
initial experiences. For example, Hume's idea of our know­
ledge of other minds is composed of matters of fact. This 
idea is used throughout the History. His characterizations 
of historical figures exhibit that he thought of the esti­
mations of various human qualities as facts for history.
For Hume to allow these as factual considerations he must
utilize principles which cover the inferences he makes in
21the above passage. It is obvious from Hume's statements 
and procedure that he is not using a strict Newtonian 
scheme for human nature, even though he nominally suggests 
that he is. Such a scheme demands observation and experience 
in the public sense of the terms, and these are accounted 
for only by custom in Hume's analysis. When Hume is writing
20Passmore, oj^ . cit. , p. 4l. As an example, see this 
chapter's prefatory note which is taken from the opening 
page of the first volume of the History.
21These, in brief, take the form of "conjectures," 
which are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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about a period which had a scarcity of documents, his ini­
tial inferences indicate that the evidence which he used 
was not only the documents of the past, but his own exper­
iences as well. The way he utilized himself, and the way 
this utilization is a part of his concept of "fact" or
"evidence," are seen in what he refers to as "sympathy" and 
22"resemblance."
Concerning the nature of sympathy Hume states that:
No quality of human nature is more remark­
able, both in itself and in its consequences, 
than that propensity we have to sympathize 
with others, and to receive by communication 
their inclinations and sentiments, however 
different from, or even contrary to our own.
The statement I emphasize here is an example of an inference 
from an initial experience, wherein the notion of sympathy 
covers or allows the inference from similarity to dissimi­
larity with regard to the inclinations and sentiments of 
others. One might argue that history provides evidence for 
this inference, and if this is the case, then the scheme 
for human nature is not strictly speaking Newtonian; for 
history accounts for the variety of human actions from which 
one may infer further information about human nature. Is 
this a plausible account of Hume's reasoning? Possibly, for
22Norton sees this only as prejudice and mere opinion; 
op. cit. This concept of evidence is one which has affinity 
with Collingwood's idea that the only real evidence or 
authority that a critical historian has is himself.
2 3Treatise, p. 3 1 6 ; my italics.
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there is an interesting feature in Hume's use.of the terms 
"inclinations" and "sentiments." These words are notoriously 
ambiguous; and the entries for these words in the Oxford 
English Dictionary make it quite clear that in ordinary 
eighteenth century usage they were likely to connote human 
action as well as human nature.
The overlooking of this distinction between human 
action and human nature has perhaps led to some of the con­
fusions over Hume's view of human nature. Not all human 
actions are explained by human nature; this is attested to 
by a prima facie look at Hume's History. The principles 
which make up what we label as "human nature" are generaliza­
tions of our most common actions or experiences. By placing 
Nature into the scheme, we can represent the interrelation­
ships among these ideas in the following way:
human action human nature Nature
There is only an overlapping of these domains, and not a 
complete identification among them. This distinction be­
comes important when Hume's theory of human nature is viewed 
mechanistically.
In the above passage from the Treatise, there is no 
way of deciding which connotation is implied by the use of
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the terms "inclinations” and "sentiments." Whether this 
may be decided in the History will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Furthermore, the entries in the Oxford 
English Dictionary for "nature" and "sympathy" indicate that 
these words also connote action and were used at times in a 
semi-technical fashion by eighteenth century writers. That 
these words connote action cannot be ruled out, for the 
phrase, "to receive by communication," in the above passage 
would be unintelligible if this use were prohibited. So the 
phrase, "quality of human nature," is ambiguous; and, at 
best, an inference has been drawn from it which is unac­
counted for. Thus the uniformity of human nature which is 
couched in the standard interpretation is based upon an 
inference that Hume's system or model is the product of a 
thoroughgoing mechanistic method. For instance. Black 
maintains:
If this /Hume'^ theory of knowledge is to 
be valid it must apply to the domain of 
human action as well as to nature- There 
must be discernible in history a uniformity 
and regularity of recurring phenomena similar 
to that observable in the natural world, and 
this, again, implies two important supposi­
tions: (l) that mind of man is the scene
of a uniform play of motive; and (2) that 
motives of men in the mass are quantita­
tively and qualitatively the same for all 
times and all countries.
24Op. cit., p. 95; my italics. See also pp. 9 6 , 9 8 , 
101. Perhaps Black has been misled by the notion of validity 
here. Hume's theory of knowledge does not at all require 
that determinism apply to human actions as well as to nature. 
Such a demand as this is completely out of place, for Hume
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To begin with, Black's use of "must" between human 
action and nature would hold only on a mechanistic model 
which is deterministic and which utilizes logical entailment 
among the statements in the scheme. In addition, this re­
strictive use of "must" is wholly unrealistic in accounting 
for the historian's discourse. Needless to say. Black has 
overstated his case. It has already been pointed out that 
Hume's argument rests on custom and analogical reasoning. 
Black has set up a criticism of Hume which enhances the 
former's discussion of "inconsistencies." But to assume 
that Hume conceived of method as being infallible is to rule 
out any aetiological suggestions. This would be contrary to 
the Humean idiom, in addition to posing standards which are
foreign to Hume's empiricism and History— both of which
25utilize a principle of sympathy. From his conviction of 
the importance of sympathy in his inquiry and the high num­
ber of instances of it in human affairs, Hume generalizes 
to make sympathy part of his criterion. Thus we find him
is re-enforced by his distinction between moral and physical 
causes, which applies to the respective domains above.
Human actions, and specifically moral causes, form the gen­
eral subject-matter of historical discourse. Black's 
"similar" should mean analogous and not identical. Analo­
gies always contain a significant disanalogy or difference; 
otherwise, there would be no point in calling it an analogy; 
but rather an identity or something of the sort.
25See Passmore, 0£_. cit. , chs. 2 and 3; and Antony 
Flew, "On the Interpretation of Hume," in Hume: A Col­
lection of Critical Essays, V. C. Chappell, ed. (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., I9 6 6 ), especially, pp.
2 8 0-2 8 1 .
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going from a quality of human nature to a principle of human 
nature. In other words, Hume is attributing characteristics 
to human action that are not attributable to nature. The 
"method" for understanding human action is decidely analo­
gical; but nature, Hume contends, is to be understood by way 
of the Newtonian scheme. His application of the Newtonian 
philosophy to moral subjects is to be found in the "experi­
ments" and in the rules for philosophizing. Hume's distinc­
tion between moral and physical causes rests upon reasoning 
like that we have found thus far in the Treatise.
In a passage which has theoretical implications for 
history and which is contrary to Black's second supposition 
in the above passage, we find Hume stating;
To this principle we ought to ascribe the 
great uniformity we may observe in the 
humours and turn of thinking of those of 
the same nation; and 'tis much more pro­
bable, that this resemblance arises from 
sympathy, than from any influence of the 
soil and climate, which, tho' they continue 
invariably the same, are not able to pre­
serve the character of a nation the same 
for a century together.
What Hume is asserting here is that the resemblance among
the people of a nation is to be attributed to sympathy
rather than to the influences of soil and climate. Hume's
use of "character" in the above passage illustrates that he
means a great deal more by the word "nation" than simply
geographical location. In assuming social and cultural
^^Treatise, pp. 316-7»
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connotations of historical categories, he is close to his
contemporary, Voltaire. In short, what I wish to emphasize
here is that in Hume's theory of knowledge, a distinction
is drawn between human action and human nature, and that his
conception of law-like uniformity varies according to the
domain he is talking about. Because of his emphasis upon
the diversity of human actions, the conception of uniformity
of human nature is much less rigid than what critics have
suggested. What is attributable to human actions is not
27always attributable to human nature and conversely.
Nonetheless, there is sufficient resemblance between these
to make the formation of principles (and a science) possible,
I stress this point, because the reasoning in the History is
accountable for only on the basis of such a distinction.
Hume identifies the uniformity of "the humours and
turn of thinking" with "the character of a nation." Now, we
might ask, what further description can be given of sympathy?
To this Hume remarks:
To me it seems evident, that the essence 
of the mind being equally unknown to us 
with that of external bodies, it must be 
equally impossible to form any notion of 
its powers and qualities otherwise than
27As Hume says in the Inquiry Concerning Human Under­
standing , C. W. Hendel, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 1955), p. 97: "When an action, as sometimes happens,
cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person 
himself or by others, we know, in general, that the charac­
ters of men are to a certain degree inconstant and irregu­
lar." When this happens the historian forms conjectures 
(to anticipate ideas presented later in this essay).
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from careful and exact experiments, and 
the observation of those particular effects, 
which result from its different circum­
stances and situations. 2 8
Although "sympathy” is essentially a primitive term in
Hume's writings, the above passage indicates what he thought
was involved when one makes statements about principles.
Hume's historical mindedness is exhibited in the last
clause, . . its different circumstances and situations.”
Only the history of man discloses appreciable differences
in circumstances and situations.
This point is made clear by Hume's argument in the
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where he says:
The mutual dependence of men is so great 
in all societies that scarce any human 
action is entirely complete in itself or 
is performed without some reference to 
the actions of others, which are requisite 
to make it answer fully the intention of 
the agent. . . .  In proportion as men ex­
tend their dealings and render their inter­
course with others more complicated, they 
always comprehend in their schemes of life 
a greater variety of voluntary actions 
which they expect, from the proper motives, 
to co-operate with their own. In all these 
conclusions they take their measures from
past experiences. 2 9
When Hume adds that "men. . . are to continue in their 
operations the same that they have ever found them,” he has 
in mind:
p. 9 8 .
28Treatise, p. xxi.
^^Section vii, "Of Liberty and Necessity,” Part I,
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He /^an artisan/ also expects that when he 
carries his goods to market and offers 
them at a reasonable price, he shall find 
purchasers and shall be able, by the money 
he acquires, to engage others to supply 
him with those commodities which are requi­
site for his subsistence. 30
Hume does not have in mind, as many have suggested, the spe­
cific actions of the artisan in this economic-socio-political 
framework, such as what the artisan was thinking about along 
the way, why he must sell on this particular day, that he 
chose this market rather than that one because his relatives 
were there, and so on. Hume makes this perfectly clear in 
the following passage:
The philosopher, if he be consistent, must 
apply the same reasonings to the actions 
and volitions of intelligent agents. The 
most irregular and unexpected resolutions 
of men may frequently be accounted for by 
those /i.e., historian and/or biographer/ 
who know every particular circumstance of 
their character and situation.31
The appearance of scientific rigor must not be over­
looked when evaluating Hume's contribution to philosophical 
historiography and the philosophy of history.  ^The Newtonian 
influence and Hume's success in employing the conceptual 
achievements of the "new science" in a study of man separates 
him from previous British historians. The "uniformity" Hume 
sought was one which would make of a study of man, including 
history, a discipline comparable to the "new science." His
^^Ibid., pp. 98-9 9 ; my italics. 
^^Ibid., p. 97; my italics.
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early work marks a step towards laying a theoretical founda­
tion which would implicitly make history a respectable 
inquiry, since the science of man has to utilize concepts 
and techniques which are essentially historical in charac—
32
ter. Some, of the techniques which are judiciously used in 
the History are first perfected in the Treatise. As he con­
cludes in his Introduction;
We must therefore glean up our experiments 
in this scienc0_fjrom a cautious observation 
of human life /hwcnan action^/, and take 
them as they appear in the common course 
of the world, by men's behaviour in company, 
in affairs, and in their pleasures.. Where 
experiments of this kind are judiciously 
collected and compared, we may hope to es—_  
tablish on them a science ^of human natur_e/, 
which will not be inferior in certainty, 
and will be much superior in utility to 
any other of human comprehension.33
As is evidenced in this passage, Hume's "experiments" 
have a historical character to them. As a basis of his psy­
chology and episteraology these experiments also take on an 
analytical quality descriptive of the everyday life that 
Hume so admirably embraced. Furthermore, Hume's assertions 
about the uniformity which is in human action and which com­
prises the principles of human nature were based on the
"^2There is a noticeable parallel with Francis Bacon 
on this point, and more recently, with Karl Popper's idea 
of historical sciences and the theoretical sciences in which 
the latter are built upon the former. See Popper's The 
Poverty of Historicism (2nd ed.; London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, I96O), ch. IV, see. 3 0 .
3 3-^ Treatise, p. xxii.
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experiments that he drew from everyday life. Hume's empha­
sis upon uniformity can be better understood from the 
Introduction to the Treatise in which he argues that a
science of man is not only superior to the other sciences
34but is also the basis for the others. There is a depen­
dence of the sciences on the science of man because the con­
nection with human nature is "more close and intimate;" and 
this connection is, of course, sympathy. As Hume states in 
Book Two: "Every human creature resembles ourselves, and
by that means has an advantage above any other object, in
3 5operating on the imagination." Because of this "fact"
(in the Humean sense), inquiries that have as their pheno­
mena human action and human nature are the only ones where 
we can expect assurance and conviction. (This assurance and 
conviction is reflected in Hume's manner of presentation in 
the History.) Hume's expectations would be viewed today as 
an oversimplification of man's psychology, if not indeed a 
falsehood. Nonetheless, his expectations are premised on 
the discovery he thought he had made in finding sympathy and 
sensitivity as the keys to understanding man's behavior in 
the present and the past. These ideas are reflected in 
his positive view of causation: "All our reasonings con­
cerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but
^^Ibid., p. xix. ^^Ibid., p. 359.
No doubt here, there is an unnoticed parallel be­
tween Collingwood and Hume on this point of historical epis- 
temologyo
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custom; and. . . belief is more properly an act of the 
sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures."^'
He supports this stipulative definition of cause as custom 
by psychological and historical statements. The latter 
served as a basis for his generalities, and the necessities 
he sees among things are witnessed in such passages as the 
following:
This /yie^lding to the solicitations of our 
passion^/ is the reason why men so often act 
in contradiction to their known interest; 
and in particular why they prefer any tri­
vial advantage, that is present, to the 
maintenance of order in society, which so 
much depends on the observance of justice.
The consequences of every breach of equity 
seem to lie very remote, and are not able 
to counterballance any immediate advantage, 
that may be reap'd from it. They are, how­
ever, never the less real for being remote; 
and as all men are, in some degree, subject 
to the same weakness, it necessarily happens, 
that the violations of equity must become 
very frequent in society, and the commerce 
of men, by that means, be render'd very
dangerous and uncertain.
Before leaving the Treatise, the claims of the stan­
dard interpretation need special attention, especially to 
the extent that Hume held to the uniformity of human nature. 
I have already given some indication as to what kind of 
uniformity was sought and what was presupposed by the view. 
To the critics, Hume can speak for himself:
o *7
Treatise, p. I8 3 . Hume's italics removed.
^®Ibid., p. 5 3 5 .
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To this I reply, that in judging of the 
actions of men we must proceed upon the 
same maxims, as when we reason concerning 
external objects. When any phaenomena 
are constantly and invariably conjoined 
together, they acquire such a connexion in 
the imagination, that it passes from one to 
the other, without any doubt or hesitation.
But below this there are many inferior 
degrees of evidence and probability, nor 
does one single contrariety of experiment 
entirely destroy all our reasoning. The 
mind ballances the contrary experiments, 
and deducting the inferior from the super­
ior, proceeds with that degree of assurance, 
which remains. Even when these contrary 
experiments are entirely equal, we remove 
not the notion of cause and necessity; but 
supposing that the usual contrariety pro­
ceeds from the operation of contrary and 
conceal’d causes, we conclude, that the 
chance or indifference lies only in our 
judgment on account of our imperfect know­
ledge, not in the things themselves, which 
are in every case qually necessary, tho' 
to appearance not equally constant or cer­
tain. No union can be more constant and 
certain, than that of some actions with 
some motives and characters; and if in 
other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no 
more than what happens in the operations 
of body, nor can we conclude any thing from 
the one irregularity, which will not follow 
equally from the other.39
In the passage above one finds, among other things, 
Hume’s emphasis upon ’’uniformity.” But the uniformity Hume
Ibid., pp. 4 0 3—4o4. Another passage which bears 
out this point is: "We must certainly allow, that the
cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and 
necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in 
explaining them: And for a like reason we must allow, thac
human society is founded on like principles; and our reason 
in the latter case, is better than even that in the former; 
because we not only observe, that men always seek society, 
but can also explain the principles, on which this univer­
sal propensity is founded.” Pp. 401—402. Hume's italics.
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speaks of is not the same as the standard interpretation 
suggests. The claims brought against Hume blur the dif­
ferent meanings of the word "uniformity." If one subsumes 
Hume under the characteristics of the Age, one tends to 
overlook one of his major contributions; namely, an intro­
duction of reasoning from probabilities. In a definite 
sense, then uniformities are probabilities. First of all, 
to exhibit the variety of meanings of the word "uniformity," 
one may observe the reasoning of the following passage. It 
is also an excellent statement of the philosophy of history 
that is reflected in Hume's other writings:
The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a 
day-labourer are different from those of 
a man of quality: So are his sentiments,
actions and manners. The different sta­
tions of life influence the whole fabric, 
external and internal; and these different 
stations arise necessarily, because uni­
formly, from the necessary and uniform 
principles of human nature. Men cannot 
live without society, and cannot be asso­
ciated without government. Government 
makes a distinction of property, and es­
tablishes the different ranks of men.
This produces industry, traffic, manufac­
tures, lawsuits, war, leagues, alliances, 
voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, 
and all those other actions and ob.i ects, 
which cause such a^  diversity, and at the 
same time mg. int a in such an uniformity in 
human lifel^^
A careful reading of the above passages indicates 
what Hume means by the uniform principle of human nature 
and uniformity in human action. (The only necessity is in
4o
Ibid., p. 402; my italics.
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the uniformity.) Suppose that Don talks with Charlie and 
he communicates. We would say that their thoughts are uni­
form if communication takes place. This is one sense or 
use of "uniform." However, this does not imply that their 
thoughts are identical in every respect. The sense in 
which the standard interpretation uses the word "uniformity" 
is assumed to be the Humean use. But the passages above 
clearly indicate that Hume makes an allowance for diversity. 
His belief is in the uniformity of "the whole fabric" of 
human life. For example, for one to understand Plato or a 
Greek tragedy (or indeed Hume for that matter!), there must 
be some uniformity between the author and reader, if one is 
to understand the motives of characters, ideas, etc. Now, 
how does Hume think it is possible for "actions and objects 
. . •/to/ cause such a diversity, and at the same time main­
tain such an uniformity in human life"? Hume's best rea­
soning for this assertion is in the following argument;
I grant it possible to find some actions 
which seem to have no regular connection 
with any known motives and are exceptions 
to all the measures of conduct which have 
ever been established for the government 
of men. But i£ we could willingly know 
what judgment should be formed of such 
irregular and extraordinary actions, we 
may consider the sentiments commonly en­
tertained with regard to those irregular 
events which appear in the course of nature 
and the operations of external objects.
All causes are not conjoined to their usual 
effects with like uniformity. An artificer 
who handles only dead matter may be
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disappointed of his aim, as well as the 
politician who directs the conduct of sen­
sible and intelligent agents.
This is the context of the question that Hume raises in the
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding; "What would become
of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of the
historian according to the experience which we have had of 
42mankind?" To this potent rhetorical question, Hume suc­
cinctly adds:
It seems almost impossible, therefore, to 
engage either in science or action of any 
kind without acknowledging the doctrine 
of necessity, and this ^include^/ inference 
from motives to voluntary action, from . 
characters to conduct.
This statement is one which leads Hume to affirm uni­
formity. But his concept is markedly different from previous 
thinkers on this point in that tne inferences he speaks of 
in the above passage are based upon an appeal to analogical 
reasoning from probabilities. Here the inference is from 
human action. The statement never has the certainty of an 
a priori statement, so that sort of uniformity is ruled out. 
Words in Hume's writings like "necessity," "contradiction," 
and "certainty" are highly misleading (if they are read in 
a literal way) and probably have enhanced misunderstanding.
An example of this is: "This possibility is converted into
^^Inquiry, p. 96; my italics.
42Ibid., p. 99» Hume's italics. 
^^Ibid. Hume's italics.
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44certainty by further observation. . . . "  Probabilities 
are confirmed by observations, but possibilities are ob­
viously not, since these are ^  priori modal considerations 
of logic. Furthermore, Hume almost always adds qualifica­
tions to his statements (such as the above) in the Treatise 
as he does in the Inquiry. It seems to be the case that 
these qualifications, like the following one, are left out 
in the standard interpretation:
This j^the manners of men different in dif­
ferent ages and countries/ affords room 
for many general observations coneerning 
the gradual change of our sentiments and 
inclinations, and the different maxims 
which prevail in the different ages of 
human creatures.^5
So it seems from the above passages that Hume did
46recognize or grasp the elements of the problem, at least
theoretically. Black oversteps himself when he charges Hume
with seeing only similarities and overlooking important dif-
47ferences among people and nations. Indeed, the first 
italics I supplied in the last passage quoted are such that 
if the statement were out of context, one could suppose that
44Ibid., p. 96; my italics.
45Ibid., p. 95; my italics. The inserted clause is 
from Hume. Alfred Stern, Philosophy of History and the 
Problem of Values ('S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Co., I962),
maintains the standard interpretation, which would have to 
de-emphasize passages like the above. Indeed, Stern offers 
no explanation of the statement, "Hume maintained the thesis 
of an invariable human nature." P. 14?» And Collingwood 
makes the same sort of assertions; see The Idea of History,
pp. 7 7-7 8 ; 8 3-8 5 .
^^Supra., p. 34. ^^Op. cit., p. 86.
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a historical materialist or relativist had made the state­
ment. In any event, Hume's insistence on uniformity in 
human nature is to provide a basis for history— or, for 
that matter, a basis for any discipline whatsoever.
The 'History* and Human Nature
Keeping in mind the claims of the critics and what
has briefly been shown in the Treatise (and to some extent
in the Inquiry), we may proceed to the History to see
whether Hume applied his ideas concerning human nature to
history. The question concerning the uniformity of human
nature in the History is a complex one, and to answer the
question we may continue distinguishing the senses of the
word "uniformly" or "uniformity" as used in the History.
We have seen what Hume takes this to mean in the Treatise.
As before, there may be exhibited passages that suggest that
what Hume meant by "uniformly" does not exclude contingency
in human affairs. A possible counter-example of this from
Hume is: "We may change the names of things; but their
nature and their operation on the understanding never 
48change." The kind of uniformity to which Hume is refer­
ring here is physical (rather than moral) necessity; e.g., 
a chain of events which are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for the existence or occurrence of an event.
Hume's example makes this clear: ". . . if he throw himself
48Treatise, p. 407; and Inquiry, p. 100.
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out of the window and meet with no obstruction, he will not 
remain a moment suspended in the air.” However, Hume thinks 
an analogous type of necessity is present in moral subjects 
too:
Were a man whom I know to be honest and 
opulent, and. . . with whom I lived in 
intimate friendship, to come into my house, 
where I am surrounded with my servants,
I rest assured that he is not to stab me 
before he leaves it in order to rob me 
of my silver standish.
Hume adds unless he be seized with a frenzy, but this is to
49"change the suppositions.” The disanalogy here is in the
50idea that morals change gradually.
"Nature” is another misleading word in Hume's writ­
ings and has perhaps led to the adoption of the standard 
interpretation. However, the term not only refers to the 
physical necessities of man, but also to his actions within 
this necessity. Hume attributes "moral necessity” to such 
actions. It is here where Hume allows for contingency. For 
example, when a historian reads in a document about the exe­
cution of a prisoner who resists, the historian, through an 
imaginative effort of what Hume referred to as "physical
necessity,” can consider what that event was like for that
51particular individual. Thus, the uniformity Hume speaks
49Inquiry, p. 100; my italics.
^^Ibid., p. 95; quoted earlier (p. 55)*
51The role of the historian's imagination is dis­
cussed in greater detail in the next chapter (III).
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of is inferred from the principles of sympathy and resem­
blance to statements about the uniformity of human nature.
No understanding of the past would be possible without 
these presuppositions. Hume's example clarifies this:
The same prisoner, when conducted to the 
scaffold, forsees his death as certainly 
from the constancy and fidelity of his 
guards as from the operation of the wax 
or wheel. His mind runs along a certain 
train of ideas: The refusal of the sol­
diers to consent to his escape, the action
of the executioner; the separation of the 
head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions,
and death.52
According to Hume, the historian can imagine this train of 
ideas and use them in his narrative as "fact" (soft data).
The events are molded together by their physical (and moral) 
necessity. On this basis, Hume allows for the notion of 
fact to include imagination, but only insofar as it follows
a chain such as is evidenced by nature. It is from this
basis and its reasoning that we find Hume writing the History 
as he does and the many passages which suggest the interpre­
tative approach. An example is the execution of Queen Anne, 
in which Hume uses only one secondary source, and in which 
the narrative follows the above pattern of reasoning and 
interpretation of the event:
The queen now prepared for suffering the 
death to which she was sentenced. She sent 
her last message to the king, and acknow­
ledged the obligations which she owed him 
in thus uniformly continuing his endeavour
52Treatise, p. 406; and Inquiry, p. 100.
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for her advancement. From a private gentle­
woman, she said, he had first made her a 
marchioness, then queen, and now, since he 
could raise her no higher in this world, 
he was sending her to be a saint in heaven.
She then renewed the protestations of her 
innocence, and recommended her daughter to 
his care. Before the lieutenant of the 
Tower, and all who approached her, she made 
the like declarations; and continued to 
behave herself with her usual serenity, and 
even with cheerfulness. "The executioner," 
she said to the lieutenant, "is, I hear, 
very expert, and my neck is very slender:" 
upon which she grasped it in her hand, and 
smiled. When brought, however, to the 
scaffold, she softened her tone a little 
with regard to her protestations of inno­
cence. She probably reflected that the 
obstinacy of Queen Catherine, and her opposi­
tion to the King's will, had much alienated 
him from the Lady Mary. Her own maternal 
concern, therefore, for Elizabeth, prevailed, 
in these last moments, over that indignation 
which the unjust sentence, by which she 
suffered, naturally excited in her. She 
said that she was come to die, as she was 
sentenced by the law: She would accuse none,
nor say anything of the ground upon which 
she was judged. She prayed heartily for the 
king, called him a most merciful and gentle 
prince, and acknowledged that he had always 
been to her a good and gracious sovereign; 
and if any one should think proper to canvass 
for cause, she desired him to judge the best.*
She was beheaded by the executioner of 
Calais, who was sent for as more expert 
than any in England. Her body was negli­
gently thrown into a common chest of elm— 
tree, made to hold arrows, and was buried 
in the Tower.53
In this passage, statements like "When brought, how­
ever, to the scaffold, she softened her tone. . ." and "She
History of England (6 Vols.; New York: R. Worth­
ington CoTl 1880), III, 1 3 3- 1 3 4. Hume's source in this 
passage, indicated by the asterisk, is Gilbert Burnet, 
Memoirs of. . . James and Williams, Dukes of Hamilton, I,
205.
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probably reflected that the obstinacy of Queen Catherine 
. . and "Her own maternal concern. . are difficult tn 
explain in terms of hard data (documents and monuments). 
However, according to what Hume means by physical necessity 
and moral evidence (and necessity) in the Treatise, there is 
a basis or justification for the above psychological asser­
tions about Queen Anne. Also, there is a pragmatic element
in statements like these; they make the narrative interesting
5kand supply connections among the hard data. Character 
analysis of historical figures is indicative of the his­
torian's understanding of human nature; and in Hume, the 
above statements and ones like " . . .  the unjust sentence, 
by which she suffered, naturally excited in her" utilize his 
notions of sympathy and resemblance in historical under­
standing. The statement "She probably reflected that the 
obstinacy of Queen Catherine. . ." ending with the "conclu­
sion," "Her own maternal concern, therefore, for Elizabeth, 
prevailed, in these last moments. . .", is based upon two 
principles. One is the analogy between Queen Anne and 
Elizabeth which Hume draws in light of his position on the 
knowledge of other minds. Secondly, Hume invokes the prin­
ciple of resemblance: there is the "similar station in
life" between the two women. Hume utilizes this principle
54The distinction between hard and soft data was one 
of Bertrand Russell's. See his Our Knowledge of the Ex­
ternal World (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. éof.
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to such an extent that he will premise character analyses
on statements like "The method in which we find they ^the
nobilit^ 7  treated the king's favourites and ministers is
55proof of their usual way of dealing with each other."
From the context one may say that this statement is 
a general law or methodological principle and that the par­
ticulars are subsumeJ under it. But there is considerable 
doubt whether these passages and others suggest that a 
belief, a methodological one at that, in the constancy of 
human nature entails that " . . .  history is simply a re­
peating d e c i m a l . Constancy of human nature, for Hume, 
is a^ methodological principle which makes history possible ; 
that is, possible for there to be any consistency and cred­
ibility in what the historian says. As Collingwood says,
". . . history never repeating itself but human nature
c o n s t a n t . A p p a r e n t l y  Black incorrectly identifies human 
nature with history, but this identification is not sug­
gested by Hume. For instance, "No people could undergo a 
change more sudden and entire in their manners, than did
c O
the English nation during this period." Hume makes state­
ments in the History which answer Black's decimal-theory 
charge and come close to supporting Collingwood's inter­
pretation:
^^History, II, 113- ^^Black, p. 98.
^^Op. cit., p. 8 2 . ^^History, V, 426; my italics.
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It is needless to be particular in enumerat­
ing all the cruelties practised in England 
during tho course of three years that these 
persecutions lasted: the savage barbarity
on the one hand, and the patient constancy 
on the other, are so similar in all those 
martyrdoms, that the narrative, little 
agreeable in itself, would never be relieved 
by any variety. Human nature appears not, 
on any occasion, so detestable, and at the 
same time so absurd, as in these religious 
persecutions, which sink men below infernal 
spirits in wickedness, and below the beasts 
in folly.59
This passage illustrates, among other things, two 
important ideas. First, the emphasis Hume puts on the nar­
rative being relieved by variety shows that dissimilarity 
was considered important to Hume not only in the structure 
of a historical narrative, but also in the presentation of 
an adequate, well-rounded picture of the past.^^ Secondly, 
Hume's use of the metaphor, "which sink men below," with 
human nature suggests that he did not think of the notion 
of human nature as an absolute, unchanging one.^^ Hume's
^^Ibid., 1 1 1 , 341; my italics.
^^The idea of "relief by variety" reminds one of 
Aristotle’s Poetics, in which he says that some "episodes 
. . . relieve the uniformity of his narrative," in The Basic 
Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed. (New York: Random
House, 1941), p. Ï480.
^^It is interesting to note that Hume has a criticism 
of the sort of speculation which Hegel represents: "The
frailties of our nature mingle themselves with everything 
in which we are employed, and no human institution will 
ever reach perfection— the idea of an infinite mind."
Quoted from a proposed preface to one of the volumes of his 
History. See J. H. Burton, Life and Correspondence of.
David Hume (2 Vols.; Edinburgh: William Tait, 1846), II,
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thoughts and use of language are reflepted by his manipula­
tion of the notion of human nature. His discussion of 
Queen Elizabeth, which illustrates the myth of absolute 
constancy of human nature in history, perhaps better ex­
hibits this point; . . she knew the inconstant nature
of the people. . . " , which probably means that she knew
that the behavior of people is in a sense unpredictable. 
Novelty in history seems to be relative to individual human 
action. With reference to the status of events in history, 
Hume says that "These events passed with such rapidity, that
men had no leisure to admire sufficiently one incident, when
they were surprised with a^ new one, equally rare and uncom­
mon.
With regard to passion and reason in human nature,
Hume remarks about Mary, Queen of Scots:
In order to form a just idea of her charac­
ter, we must set aside one part of her con­
duct, while she abandoned herself to the 
guidance of a profligate man; and must con­
sider these faults, whether we admit them 
to be imprudences or crimes, as the result 
of an inexplicable, though not uncommon, 
inconstancy in the human mind, of the frailty
of our nature, of the violence of passion,
and of the influence which situations, and 
sometimes momentary incidents, have on
12— 13; also cited in William Knight, Hume (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott Co. and Edinburgh: William Blackwood and
Sons, 1 8 8 6), p. 6 8 .
G^History, III, 4l6.
^^Ibid, III, 46l; my italics.
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persons whose principles are not thoroughly 
confirmed by experience and reflection.
In this passage, the reference to persons and their "prin­
ciples" is a methodological technique for evaluating the 
historical figures within his narrative. (These usually 
take the form of conjecture sentences.) Also, it appears 
from this passage that Hume would assert that what seems to 
be an inconstancy in human nature for one person or group 
may not be so for another. This is because the question of 
the constancy or inconstancy of human nature is couched in 
light of principles which are premised on the historian's 
understanding, or in this case, on Hume's understanding.
This position, as we have seen, is consistent with the po­
sition he offers in the Treatise concerning the passions. 
Also, Hume's idea of historical explanation includes the in­
constancy of human nature (in the relative sense) and the 
exceptional. The individual events are not sacrificed; 
rather :
We must here, as in many other instances, 
lament the inconstancy of human nature, 
that a person endowed with so many noble 
virtues, generosity, sincerity, friendship, 
valour, eloquence, and industry, should, in 
the latter period of his life, have given 
reins to his ungovernable passions, and 
involved not only himself but many of his 
friends in utter ruin. °5
64Ibid., IV, 75; my italics. 
^^Ibid., IV, l67; my italics.
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This passage is at the locus of Hume's concept of 
history. If there are many instances, or memorable events 
and characters, that lament the inconstancy of human nature, 
and if man is subjected to ungovernable passions which af­
fect his life and others, then there are instances which 
fall outside the uniformity which Newtonian science and 
philosophy demand. So Collingwood is right in claiming that 
Hume is not scientific in the Newtonian sense. For example: 
"/Charles'_s/ attachment to France, after all the pains which 
we have taken, by inquiry and conjecture, to fathom it, con­
tains still something, it must be confessed, mysterious and 
inexplicable."^^ Because there are instances like these 
(ones where not all the particulars are known), and because 
they are memorable to man, history is of the utmost impor­
tance to Hume. Accordingly, historians should be chall 
to provide an explanation of such instances. According to 
Humean thought, the significant contribution that is achieved 
by history is that it discloses the consequences or changes 
that affect human life. This can be seen in the following 
passage:
This event /the rise and__eventual political 
power of Sir John Savil_e/ memorable, as 
being the first instance, perhaps, in the 
history of England, of any king's advancing 
a man on account of Parliamentary interest, 
and of opposition to his measures. However 
irregular this practice, it will be regarded
G^Ibid., VI, 229.
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by political reasoners as one of the most 
early and most infallible symptoms of a 
regular established liberty.
If all these passages exemplify the subject-matter
of history, then the principle of sympathy may be seen as
the conerstone of Hume's History. For sympathy, and what
Hume refers to as "conjecture" (viz. supplying the missing
particulars) are the only means to an understanding of the
data of history. The consulting of common experience
creates the standard or criterion. Hume's slogan in the
68Treatise, "Consult common experience," operates as a dis­
ciplinary guide for the historian's imaginative or conjec­
tural use of his data. In detail:
By means of this guide ^the principles of 
human natur^^ we mount up to the knowledge 
of men's inclinations and motives from 
their actions, expressions, and even ges­
tures, and again descend to the interpreta­
tion of their actions from our knowledge of 
their motives and inclinations. The gen­
eral observations, treasured up by a course 
of experience, give us the clue of human 
nature and teach us to unravel all its in­
tricacies.&9
This passage gives a reasonable account of the activity of 
a critical historian who is in the process of assessing evi­
dence. Thus we see that erudition has a minor (yet funda­
mental) role in Hume's concept of history.
^^Ibid., IV, 312-313; my italics. ^^Op. cit., p. 48?.
^^Inquiry, p. 94; my italics. This passage also 
supplies evidence for the interpretation I give of "human 
nature" in the next paragraph.
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The idea of the inconstancy or diversity in human 
action may be seen in some of the passages in the History.
At times, Hume analogically uses the phrase "human nature" 
to refer both to man's nature and to the actions which pro­
ceed from his nature. This analogical diversity, as a tacit 
historical criterion, is seen in the following passages:
^Elizabetli/ had established her credit on 
such a footing, that no sovereign in Europe 
could more readily command any sum, which 
the public exigencies might at any time re­
quire. During this peaceable and uniform 
government, England furnishes few materials 
for history; and except the small part which 
Elizabeth took in foreign transactions, 
there scarcely passed any occurrence which 
requires a^ particular detail.
And :
The great popularity which she ^Elizabetli/ 
enjoyed proves that she did not infringe 
any established liberties of the people: 
there remains evidence sufficient to as­
certain the most noted acts of her admin­
istration; and though that evidence must 
be drawn from a source wide of the ordinary 
historians, it becomes only the more authen­
tic on that account, and serves as a stronger 
proof that her particular exertions of power 
were conceived to be nothing but the ordinary 
course of administration, since they were 
not thought remarkable enough to be recorded 
even by contemporary writers. If there was 
any difference in this particular, the peo­
ple in former reigns seem rather to have 
been more submissive than even during the
age of Elizabeth . 70
The above passages indicate that what is most central to
^^History. III, 55^j and IV, I8 5 , respectively. The 
italics are mine.
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Hume's concept of history is not the similarity among events 
or persons in different periods; rather, the novel, the 
extraordinary, or the remarkable, which record change, make 
lip the data of history. Part of this is obviously for 
stylistic reasons. Utilization of the novel or the extra­
ordinary makes the narrative more interesting to the reader 
and represents a more complete picture of that period of the 
past which is under investigation, for it approximates how 
we experience and comprehend the present. The latter of the 
above quotations illustrates a technique which Hume uses 
throughout the History. Whenever Hume feels that documen­
tation is necessary to substantiate a particular fact in his 
narrative, he will cite as many primary and/or secondary
sources as agree on that point. Hume draws the authenticity
71of the evidence from this consensus. Hume's slogan, 
"consult common experience," means in the History "consult 
the consensus of data." This procedure also enables Hume 
to make inferences from the absence of such consensuses as
71History, e.g., II, 4l6. Hume's procedure in docu­
mentation is perhaps best seen in volume one in a note at 
the beginning in which he discusses the difficulty of writ­
ing a history of remote ages. Hume uses the similarities 
and dissimilarities of language as a means of historical 
dating and of inferring what happened among the ancient 
Britons. Guided by the inferences of earlier historians, 
Hume says that ; "We may infer from two passages in Clau- 
dian, and from one in Orosius and another in Isidore, that 
the chief seat of these Scots was in Ireland." This quote 
is from David Hume : Philosophical Historian, p. Il6n. The
italics are mine. We shall return to this interesting note 
in the next chapter.
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he does in the above passages. (Obviously such a proce­
dure concerning contingent information is not foolproof, 
but then such procedures are not meant to be.) For instance, 
the argument from the absence of consensus is recognizable 
in the following synoptic remark;
At this era, it may be proper to stop a 
moment, and take a general survey of the 
age, so far as regards manners, finances, 
arms, commerce, arts, and sciences. The 
chief use of history is, that it affords 
materials for disquisitions of this nature; 
and seems the duty of an historian to 
point out the proper inferences and con­
clusions . /id
The foregoing analysis of Hume on human nature has 
suggested conclusions which are contrary to Black's. The 
result of this is that Hume's view of human nature and its 
use in historical inquiry is more diversified and complex
72G. J. Warnock, "Hume on Causation," in David Hume : 
A Symposium, p. 55> suggests that Hume gave no account in 
which the variety of items of inferences from the non- 
occurrences or the absence of occurrences may be cited as 
causes and effects. However, the passages cited thus far 
and Hume's idea of conjectures suggest the contrary of 
Warnock's claim. E.g., History, III, 5&9: "The very dis­
appearance of these letters is a presumption ^conjecturée/ 
of their authenticity. That event can be accounted for no 
way but from the care of King James's friends, who were de­
sirous to destroy every proof of his mother's crimes. The 
disappearance of Morton's narrative, and of Crawford's evi­
dence from the Cotton library, Calig. c. 1. must have pro­
ceeded from a like cause." By "cause" here, Hume obviously 
means reason.
^^Histo T, V, 426; my italics. An example of a pro­
per inference r ,or a historian would be determining the 
origin of an event which later ha^ significant consequences; 
ibid., III, 3 6 9 : "This /ca. 135§/ seems to_have been the
first intercourse which that empire ^/Russia/ had with any 
of the western potentates of Europe."
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than the commonplace conceptions have made it out to be.
Any failure on Hume's part to provide an adequate concep­
tion of history and theory of historical explanation will 
not be found in the critical arguments just discussed. In 
the History we see a definite departure from the mechanistic 
model that most eighteenth century thinkers used; and, this 
characteristic of the Age is what has suggested to many the 
standard interpretation. With Hume's emphasis on passion 
and its importance in human nature, we find him working 
more with a functional model of human nature. What I mean 
by "functional" here is to be taken in a teleological 
sense; e.g., "The action x was (or is) a function of the 
passion (or end) c_. " This is suggested by many passages, 
but probably the most interesting one is his discussion of 
Newton in which Hume tacitly doubts that the mechanistic 
model can provide all the solutions:
While Newton seemed to draw off the veil 
from some of the mysteries of nature, he 
showed at the same time the imperfections 
of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby 
restored her ultimate secrets to that ob­
scurity in which they ever did and ever 
will remain.
With the admission of statements like these, one wonders
whether Hume is consistent when he rules out the logical
75possibility of miracles. In his discussion of Joan of
^^History, VI, 3 2 9 .
^^See C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1 9 4 7), especially pp. 121-126 on Hume for a critical 
discussion, and the Treatise, pp. 118-155-
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Arc Hume says :
It is the business of history to distinguish 
between the miraculous and the marvellous ; 
to reject the first in all narrations merely 
profane and human; to doubt the second; and 
when obliged by unquestionable testimony, 
as in the present case, to admit of something 
extraordinary, to receive as little of it 
as is consistent with the known facts and 
circumstances.'”
Of course with this remark and his statement on Newton, the 
difference between "miraculous" and "marvellous" may be 
verbal. The alternative Hume chooses, "to admit of something 
extraordinary," is by reason of the commonality of situa­
tions or by his "common consensus" criterion. Since certain 
events are novel or "marvellous," they should be recorded 
if they are "consistent with the known facts and circum­
stances." Two centuries later Collingwood said the same 
thing:
The web o_f imaginative construction /of the 
historian/ is something far more solid and 
powerful than we have hitherto realized.
So far from relying for its validity upon 
the support of given facts, it actually 
serves as the touchstone by which we decide 
whether alleged facts are genuine. Suetonius 
tells me that Nero at one time intended to 
evacuate Britain. I reject his statement, 
not because any better authority flatly 
contradicts it, for of course none does; 
but because my reconstruction of Nero's 
policy based on Tacitus will not allow me 
to think that Suetonius is right. And if 
I am told that this is merely to say I pre­
fer Tacitus to Suetonius, I confess that 
I do: but I do so just because I find
^^History, II, 3^5? the last italics are mine.
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myself able to incorporate what Tacitus 
tells me into a coherent and continuous 
picture of my own, and cannot do this for
Suetonius.77
The common consensus criterion also explains why 
Hume's treatment of the ancient and medieval periods is 
weak; for known facts, source material and techniques for 
handling data were of small measure during his time, in 
addition to there being a certain lack of interest on Hume's 
part. But even this is not wholly true, for he does give 
an excellent, unprecedented account of the plight of the 
Jews in Medieval'England. The next section discusses these 
various techniques and the way in which Hume utilized them 
in the History of England.
Concepts and Reasoning in the 'History'
As we have seen from the earlier sections, Hume's 
notion of history is a complex one with many ideas contri­
buted from writings earlier than the History. Indeed, the 
subtlety and complexity are greater than his commentators 
have portrayed either by the standard interpretation or the 
Weltanschauung identification, or sometimes by both. Hume 
first displayed his historical-mindedness in a juvenile 
essay which he wrote when he was about fourteen years old. 
The year was approximately 1725, and he was then attending 
the University of Edinburgh. The essay is entitled "An
^^Op. cit., pp. 244—245"
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7 A
Historical Essay on Modern Honour and Chivalry.” Hume's
use of honor and chivalry as historiographical categories
and as subject-matter for the essay seems to reflect an
79influence of Sir John Froissart's work. The essay is a 
commentary on the Greaco-Roman and Medieval ideas of honor 
and chivalry, and in it Hume makes comparisons to his own 
time. This explanatory procedure in part shows how past 
ideas are prevalent in the social thinking of his time and 
vice versa. Furthermore, the procedure is retained by Hume 
in his Treatise and the History. His adept historical 
thinking is evident at this early age, for the essay exhi­
bits the beginnings of the technique of comparison which he 
developed in the History many years later. Hence, one 
should be cautious in accepting Trever-Roper's remark:
"Yet Hume, unlike Gibbon, became a historian almost by
8oaccident.”
E. C. Mossner, "David Hume's 'An Historical Essay 
on Chivalry and Modern Honour',” Modern Philology, XLV 
(1 9 4 7), 5 4-6 0 . This article is an annotated reprinting of 
the original manuscript.
^^The Chronicles of England, France, and Spain (New 
York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., I9 6 1 ), H. P. Dunster's
condensation of the Thomas Johnes translation with an in­
troduction by C. W. Dunn. Hume's treatment of the four­
teenth century in the History shows that he was more than 
just casually acquainted with Froissart's Chronicles, 
especially as to style and quotational precision from the 
work. See, e.g., History, III, 5 6 5 .
p. 89.
Ao"Hume as a Historian" in David Hume: A Symposium,
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Hume's ideas about history and his use of historical 
categories that are of theoretical merit are, in the main, 
seen in the first three volumes of the History. These were 
written after the volumes on the Stuarts and Tudors, the 
latter of which were to make up the last three volumes in 
the History. Many of the passages containing comments of 
a theoretical nature are suggestive of many sophisticated 
notions about history which are discussed today by philo­
sophers of history and historians. Whether Hume was aware 
of their theoretical import is an unanswerable question. 
However, it cannot be doubted that he used them, and to that 
extent he must have had some awareness of their theoretical 
value. He obviously used such notions because his narrative 
is organized and structured around them, in addition to his 
justifying them in the Treatise and Enquiries.
The thesis of the History as a whole is perhaps best
seen in the synoptic "conclusion" to volume six (the first
tome written) which reflects his point of view throughout
the work; "Thus have we seen, through the whole course of
four reigns, ^  continual struggle maintained between the
crown and the people ; privilege and prerogative were ever
8lat variance. . . . "  Most of the critics of the History 
emphasize Hume's use of reigns as the most important his­
torical category and hastily conclude that by so doing he
^^History, VI, 3 1 6 ; my italics.
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overlooks important aspects of history, namely, the people. 
However, in the lines above, the general principle which is 
used and which constitutes his point of view is the "con­
tinual struggle maintained between the crown and the people." 
It is this "variance" or "struggle" which Hume wishes to 
capture in his history, and which implies change as a basic
82assumption. In a review for the Annual Register (I7 6 1 ), 
Edmund Burke used the metaphor "The idea of growth" to 
describe what rightfully seemed to him to be "the principle 
of the whole work completed by the part now published /^the 
third volum^."®^ With the publication of the following 
three volumes, Burke would probably have hesitated to call 
the History, as he had previously done, merely a constitu­
tional history. In the sentence following the one quoted 
above, Hume adds that "Governments too steady and uniform 
. . . abate the active powers of men; depress courage, in­
vention, and genius; and produce an universal lethargy in 
84the people." It is the struggle between the people and
82The "opposition" between the two categories, i.e., 
the crown and the people, interpreted by Hume as "variance" 
or "struggle" is conceptually the same as the diversity and 
inconstancy in human nature and action which were argued in
the earlier sections of this chapter. This also reminds the
contemporary reader of class struggle in Marxist history, 
and shows that the metaphors were used long before Hegel or
Marx made them theoretically explicit.
^^Printed in Edmund Burke : Selected Writings and
Speeches, P. J. Stanlis, ed. (Garden City, N. Y .: Double­
day and Co., Inc., 1 9 6 3), p. 93» my italics.
G^Historv, VI, 3 1 7 .
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the crown which interests Hume, and not government in it­
self.
In addition to government, a second historical cate­
gory is couched in various linguistic forms and is suggested
by phrases like "the people d i s p l e a s e d ; " s a t i s f y  the 
86people;" "a disposition of the English which in general
87contributed extremely to increase the queen's popularity;"
"Such was the disposition now beginning to prevail among 
88the English;" "the people in former reigns seem rather to 
have been more submissive than even during the age of
89Elizabeth;" and so on. As can be seen from the above re­
marks, Hume attributes emotional (rarely is there implied
the purely cognitive) states, which are ordinarily used by
90Hume to characterize individuals, to "the people." Per­
haps he thought that the emotive is a better clue to human 
nature than the cognitive; this is also implied by his re- 
liamce on sympathy. Another good example of this is:
The terror of the emperor's ^Henry VLJ.1J 
greatness had extinguished the ancient 
animosity between the nations; and Spain,
G^Ibid., III, 5 1 . ®^Ibid.
G^Ibid., III, 5 1 1 . ®®Ibid., IV, 1 5 8.
G^Ibid., IV, 1 8 5 .
90This suggests, along with his use of "character" 
with "nation" (which we discussed earlier), that Hume would 
nowadays be labeled as a methodological individualist 
rather than a methodological socialist, since he speaks of 
social concepts, such as "people," in terms of individuals 
and without any meta—individual characteristics.
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during more than a century, became, though 
a more distant power, the chief object of 
jealousy to the English.91
The personification of this category (the English) reflects 
the more theoretical ideas of human nature, especially of 
the passions. The imaginative use of this category indi­
cates that Hume is using it at times as the object of his­
torical explanation. Most of the examples supplied above 
behave linguistically as "synoptic conclusions" or as state­
ments of summation. They bring a discussion together and
92act as "a grand swoop of synthesis." This brings the in­
ferences of the historian together after the detailed de­
scription of the event. Hume's use of "the people" as the 
object of such a process indicates a sophistication which 
was not seen in history until the eighteenth century, and 
his is probably the most effective use of the technique 
during the age.
To illustrate one of Hume's interpretative categories, 
we may observe two judgments he makes: one, concerning
Elizabeth and another, concerning the Puritans. The latter
91Ibid. -, III, 60; my italics.
See L. 0. Mink, "The Autonomy of Historical Under­
standing," in Philosophical Analysis and History, W. H. 
Dray, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 196^71 especially pp.
l8.5f. I am also indebted to this essay for the useful word
"synoptic" which has aided in describing historical narra­
tion. The idea of summation as a class of historical sen­
tences was first observed by Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, "Are
Historical Events Unique?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, LVII (1956/7), sec. IV, pp. 123ff.
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example also brings the other interpretative category, re­
ligion, into play in the narration:
It will be curious also to observe the 
faint dawn of the spirit of liberty among 
the English, the jealousy with which that 
spirit was repressed by the sovereign, the 
imperious conduct which was maintained in 
opposition to it, and the ease with which 
it was subdued by this arbitrary princess;
and:
So absolute, indeed was the authority of 
the crown, that the precious spark of lib­
erty had been kindled, and was preserved, 
by the puritans alone; and it was to this 
sect, whose principles appear so frivolous, 
and habits so ridiculous, that the English
owe the whole freedom of their constitu­
tion. 93
In concluding this chapter we may say that Hume has 
received his due— perhaps more than his due— as a moral 
philosopher or as an epistemologist. As a philosophical 
historian and as a philosopher of history less than justice 
has been done to him. In ei sense, it is difficult to ex­
plain why this is so, for he spent as much time and thought
(and perhaps more) on history and historical problems as on 
theory of knowledge or ethics. Indeed, his writings show a 
progressive search for data and its justification, and his 
thoughts were couched in language which is essentially his­
torical. In this chapter, I have attempted a brief textual 
exposition to show that the above is the case, while lib­
erating Hume from the Weltanschauung identification and the
^^History, III, $11 and $20, respectively.
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standard interpretation. This will enable us to work more 
freely with Hume in the subsequent chapters. If one sup­
ports these suspect points of view, then the greatest con­
tributions of the man are lost and swept out amongst the 
generalities. Passmore remarks that "He ^Hum^/ is pre­
eminently a breaker of new ground: a philosopher who opens
up new lines of thought, who suggests to us an endless
94variety of philosophical explorations." Hume broke new
ground by providing a theoretical foundation for history at
a time when it was greatly needed. And his extension of
the techniques of philosophy into history and of history
into philosophy were indicative of his new lines of thought.
To say that "Hume did very little to improve the methods of
95historical research" is to miss what I have discussed in
this chapter, if not in the remaining chapters as well.
In the History Hume explored a variety of avenues in
history; historians, like Fox and Mackintosh, had to follow
96where Hume led. However, these achievements were quickly 
overshadowed in the philosophy of history by the dominance 
of Hegelian thought. Perhaps the propensity or association 
of this type of thought with the area is what has impared 
the philosopher from treating Hume as a philosophical his­
torian or as a philosopher of history. This is unfortunate
^^Op« cit., p. 159» ^^Collingwood, p. 77* 
96Trevor-Roper, p. 99•
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because Hume is an excellent figure for the philosophy of 
history. Like Collingwood, he is one of the very few ac­
complished philosophers who was also an accomplished his­
torian. And with the emphasis today on analysis, the philo­
sopher has a great deal of room for conceptual and linguis­
tic inquiry in Hume's writings, especially in the History. 
The philosopher of history needs to follow where Hume leads 
us in history. As W. H. Walsh once rightfully remarked in 
a review, "It seems to me that Dray has set out to discuss
the theory of history without enought attention to the
97history of history." The same sentiments are expressed
by Stephen Toulmin in other subjects such as political
philosophy, ethics, and philosophy (-ies) of religion and
science. However, he would equally agree with Walsh's
comment on philosophy of history:
Even /.in/ the philosophy of . . . /history/,
more attention needs to be paid, both to 
the actual state of the substantive subject 
at the present time, and to the course of
its historical development.98
The intent of this chapter is to contribute to the latter 
end.
"Review Essay of William H. Dray's Philosophy of 
History," History and Theory, V.2 (I9 6 6 ), I9 0 . Walsh in­
cludes himself in this group.
^®The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1 9 6(1) , p. 259*
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL NARRATION AND HUME
Every historical narrative is dependent upon 
explanation, interpretation, appreciation.
Pieter Geyl
Statement of the Problem 
I can well imagine a historian legitimately asking 
a philosopher: "Why has there been a preoccupation with
historical narration among philosophers in the past ten 
years?"; or, "What could there possibly be of philosophical 
interest about the historian's use of narration?" I have 
already said that the contemporary philosopher of history 
is interested in the historian's language and writing as 
clues to the concepts which are characteristic of the his­
torian's activity. And with this preoccupation with lan­
guage in general, the philosopher who looks at history 
naturally becomes interested in historical narration, since 
this is the predominant form of writing that historians use. 
The philosopher's interest is evoked when he considers 
items such as the structure and elements of narrative form 
and the seriousness with which we are to attend to it, 
especially with regard to other questions (e.g., the nature
81
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of' historical explaiiat.ioiv) . The forni of writing is wha( 
provides the linguistic unity of the historian* s sonteiices. 
The fundamental problem underlying the topic of historical 
narration is one of determining the type and characteris­
tics of the unity which historical sentences display. As
Danto has remarked, "the chief difficulty. . . has to do
2with the concept of unity."
Perhaps at this early stage of our inquiry, the 
easiest way to characterize historical unities is by no­
ticing their assumed presence in the sentence-narrative 
distinction. Sentences are the constituent parts of a 
unified collection, which is labeled a narrative. But what 
is distinctive about that unified collection is not identi­
fiable with any given sentence in the narrative. Hence, the 
observance of the distinction. Nonetheless, that which 
unifies the collection is attributed to or identified with 
^  particular set or class of sentences or terms. The 
formal characteristics observable of a narrative (but not 
of its sentences individually) then act as clues to what 
this set or class of sentences must be like. It was a com­
mon mistake of earlier philosophers and historians to
Another philosophical question distinguished by its 
preoccupation with "form" is one raised by William Dray, 
Philosophy of Historv (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice—
Hall, Inc., 1964), 5: "When historians dn claim under­
standing, what form do their explanations take?" The 
latter italics are mine.
^Analytical Philosophy of History, p. 248.
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construct analyses by the reverse method, viz., attributing
sentential characteristics, like truth, to narratives. This
led to insurmountable difficulties, distortions, and con- 
3fusions. More recent philosophers (some more consciously 
than others) who have attempted to analyze historical 
unities by working with narrative form are in the following 
list. Some of these analyses (like Hempel's) are not deli­
berate attempts to analyze from the narrative form itself, 
but can be interpreted as such proposed analyses:
Collingwood's "interpolation,"
Danto's "narrative sentences,"
Dray's "calculation,"
Hempel's "general laws,"
Hume's "design/point of view,"
Mink's "synoptic judgment,"
Nowell—Smith's "summaries,"
Scriven's "diagnostic judgment,"
Walsh's "colligation."
Other questions, some of which are raised in this 
essay, concerning the historian's activity can be viewed as 
dovetailing into that of narration, _if we interpret the 
latter as a question of unity. Before going on I should 
like to consider an objection that could be made against my 
last statement. It might be said, "Of course, what you say 
may very well be true, but not all history takes the form 
of a narrative. There are 'analytical histories' besides
3
See Morton White's exposure of some of these prob­
lems in his "New Horizons in Philosophy," Adventures of the 
Mind /Second Seriej/, R. Thruelsen and J. Kobler, eds. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 593-602. The attribution
of truth to a narrative, in other words, amounts to attri­
buting a predicate of a member to its class, which is to 
commit the fallacy of composition.
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narrative histories. So, assuming the correctness of what 
you say here it is applicable to only a portion of history.” 
This objection does not in the least bother me, for "ana­
lytical histories," like Robert Fawtier's The Capetian
4
Kings of France, do exhibit a unity, and it is precisely 
this that I am interested in analyzing. The difference, 
which warrants the distinction between analytical and de­
scriptive histories, is to be found in the way the material 
is handled, and (as Fawtier suggests) not in totally dif­
ferent historical unities. The handling of the material 
does not markedly affect the presence or absence of a unity 
— not methodologically. The unity is determined prior to 
the writing in research and training. Presumably, if the 
criterion for narrative unity is the same as that for his­
torical unity (which is, I think, a fairly reasonable 
demand), then "analytical unity" would have to satisfy the 
same criterion. Hence, on this level, the distinction is 
not in order. Also, the meaning of "narrative" is much more 
narrow when such a distinction is made than its use here.
4
Trans., Lionel Butler and R. J . Adam (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1 9 6 0). Fawtier himself labels his work and 
makes essentially the same point I make below__about histor­
ical unities : "That the Capetians did this /i.e., have a
policy/ is a fair deduction from the present study, not a 
deceptive product of the analytical layout of the work; 
other accounts of Capetian history, strictly chronological 
in their arrangement, would yield the same conclusion."
P. 227; my italics. Hence, Fawtier's notion of "policy" 
would be an instance of what I take historical unities to 
be. My argument here is a brief reply to C. B. McCullagh, 
"Narrative and Explanation in History," Mind, LXXVIII (I9 6 9), 
2 5 6-2 6 1 , who argues for the difference between narrative and 
analytical histories.
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Both "types" of histories have stories to tell and what 
allows them to be classified together as histories is that 
they both do exhibit historical unities « It is this broader, 
more fundamental question which interests me.
Following is a list of what I conceive to be instances 
of historical unities (in addition to Fawtier's "policy"):
The Ancient World,
The Medieval Mind, ^
The Italian Renaissance,
The French Revolution,
Europe in the Seventeenth Century,
The American Civil War,
The Thirty Years War,
The Industrial Revolution,
The Fall of the Russian Monarchy,
England under the Tudors,
The Great Plains,
The Napoleonic Wars.
These sorts of expressions are numerous and usually appear 
as course and/or book titles. This occurrence is not in­
cidental to the understanding of historical reasoning. The 
function of these expressions in historical discourse is 
extremely complex, and displays some interesting features 
of historical epistemology. Expressions like "The French 
Revolution" can characterize historical narratives and rea­
soning. These narratives and reasoning can in turn be 
analyzed by means of the concept of historical unities. 
Narrative unities are specific attempts to characterize 
historical unities.
The problem of historical narration reduces to the 
question of the kind of unity which is exhibited by a
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narrative. Subsidiary questions pertaining to historicaI 
unities are ones of coherence, consistency, significance, 
etc. A sample of other questions is: How does the his­
torian achieve this? By what kinds of statements in the 
narrative, if any, is unity accomplished? Wliat is the role 
of narration in historical explanation? Typically, these 
questions show that an inquiry such as this one deals with 
the nature of historical reasoning.
The problem of historical unities has been a subject 
of much philosophical debate. Broadly speaking, the whole 
tradition of speculative or substantive philosophy of his­
tory has interpreted "unity" as a question of the meaning 
or pattern of the entire past. The speculative philosopher 
asks the questions: Does the world have a unity? or Does
the entire past have a unity? But the sort of question an 
analytic philosopher asks (one I am asking) is whether or 
not historical writing or discourse has a unity which plays 
a decisive role in historical epistemology. The analytical 
question differs only in temperament and scope; that is, 
analytical philosophers of history interpret the question 
as one which deals not with the past, but with historical 
writing or narratives. Also, as was suggested above,
"meaning" is construed as a question of logic or reasoning,
5
viz. the argumentative aspect of historical discourse.
^For more on the distinction between speculative or 
substantive and critical or analytical philosophy of
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I wish to make clear that my interpretation is not
to be identified with the Oakeshottean principle of "unity
6or continuity" of history. There is, of course, a simi­
larity in the fact that he was attempting to investigate 
the same aspect of writing that I am. But the similarity 
ends there, for his principle takes "unity" to be self- 
evident, and is used in such a way as to suggest that a com­
plete account of historical change is an alternative to an 
account of historical causation. If this is what is implied
7
by Oakeshott's principle, then my treatment of historical 
unities is markedly different; for it is not offered as an 
alternative to the notion of cause. Rather, the latter will 
be seen as an instance of the former. It is with such in­
stances that I attempt to make clear what is meant by "his­
torical unities." My preoccupation with "historical uni­
ties" has been stimulated by Danto's and Hume's treatments 
of the conception, the latter of whose ideas on the subject 
will be considered next.
history, see Walsh, Philosophy of History; An Introduction, 
ch. 1; and Danto, ch. I.
^See Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1933)i PP* TÎ2ff. Cri­
tically cited in Walsh, p. 194. For a more detailed dis­
cussion of Oakeshott, see J. W. Meiland, Scepticism and 
Historical Knowledge (New York: Random House, 1963), ch. 2.
7
I suspect that critics have been a bit unfair with 
him here, and are exceedingly generous in their inferences 
without careful license from Oakeshott's own reasoning.
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Hume's Principle and Its Argument 
The whole problem of historical narration is, accord­
ing to Hume, centered around the question of what consti-
g
tutes "a sufficient unity in the subject." The major 
principle which governs the model of historical narration 
is ;
P.: a sufficient unity in the subject.
Hume's general reasoning behind this principle involves two
premises; one concerns the nature of man (and was discussed
in some detail in the second chapter), and the other deals
with the nature of writing. These claims are sufficiently
interesting and informative that we look at their details.
They shall also be treated as criteria for historical and
narrative unity, respectively. The first reads:
As man is a reasonable being and is con­
tinually in pursuit of happiness, which 
he hopes to find in the gratification of 
some passion or affection, he seldom acts 
speaks or thinks without a purpose and 
intention. He has still some object in 
view; and however improper the means may 
sometimes be which he chooses for the attain­
ment of his end, he never loses view of an 
end, nor will he so much as throw away his
g
Inquiry, p. ^8. The major portion of the section 
from which this statement (and many others) is taken is 
section iii, "Of the Association of Ideas," which appeared 
originally in only three editions and is not usually re-. 
printed. This is perhaps a reason why no one has appre­
ciatively observed or analyzed Hume's models of historical 
discourse. The historical question as to why this part of 
this section was left out in the later editions I shall not 
attempt to answer, and does in no way affect what I say here.
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thoughts or reflections where he hopes 
not to reap any satisfaction from them.9
In a word, according to Hume, this is the concept of
10man as presupposed by historical studies, and this state­
ment is of utmost importance in understanding the Humean 
model of historical narration. What does this have to do 
with narration? A plausible answer would be that since 
this is the case (that man seldom loses view of an end), 
then all writing which deals with man must reflect this if 
it is to accurately depict the human predicament. One only 
has to take a glance at historical writing to find that the 
concept of man presupposed is that of an animal who has pur­
poses, desires, intentions, plans, etc., and that the major 
part of history is devoted to determining, examining, attri­
buting, and relating these characteristics of human (indi­
vidual and/or social) behavior in men of the past. Numerous 
examples of this can be seen from Hume's own historical 
writing. For instance, in discussing Charles II (£^. l677)i 
Hume narrates;
It is certain that this was the critical 
moment when the king both might with ease 
have preserved the balance of power in 
Europe, which it has since cost this island
9
Ibid., p. 33; my italics. Most, if not all, of the 
passages from the History cited in the second chapter of 
this essay illustrate this conception.
^^Patrick Gardiner has given us a useful phrase, "the 
concept of man as presupposed by historical studies," by the 
title of a Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture, dated 27 
February 1970. Cited in Philosophy, XLIV (1969), 263, 3^0.
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a great expense of blood and treasure to 
restore, and might by preserverance have 
at last regained, in some tolerable measure, 
after all past errors, the confidence of 
his people. This opportunity being neglected, 
the wound became incurable; and notwithstand­
ing his momentary appearances of vigour 
against France and popery, and their momen­
tary inclinations to rely on his faith; h^ 
was still believed to be at bottom engaged 
in the same interest, and they soon relapsed 
into distrust and jealousy. The secret 
memoirs of this reign, which have since been 
published,* prove, beyond a doubt, that the 
king had, at this time, concerted measures 
with France, and had no intention to enter 
into a war in favour of the allies. He 
had entertained no view, therefore, even 
when he pawned his ROYAL WORD to his people, - 
than to procure a grant of money; and he 
trusted that, while he eluded their expec­
tations, he could not afterwards want pre­
tences for palliating his conduct.
In this passage we find Hume talking about Charles' trust, 
pretences, interests and beliefs, and his subjects' incli­
nations, distrust, confidence, jealousy and expectations.
In short, Hume's discussion of Charles reflects his state­
ment about man in the first premise. One of the historian's
History, VI, 80. The italics are Hume's. His 
reference to the secret memoirs of the reign is documented 
by the following footnote:
*"Such as the letters, which passed betwixt Danby and 
Montague, the king's ambassador at Paris: Temple's Memoirs,
and his Letters. In these last, we see that the king neyer 
made any proposals of terms but what were advantageous to 
France, and the Prince of Orange believed them to have 
always been concerted with the French ambassador. Vol. i,
p. 4 3 9 .
In Sir John Dalrymple's Appendix, p. 103, it appears 
that the king had signed himself, without the participation 
of his ministers, a secret treaty with France, and had ob­
tained a pension on the promise of his neutrality: a fact
which renders his royal word, solemnly given to his sub­
jects, one of the most dishonourable and most scandalous 
acts that ever proceeded from a throne."
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tasks is, then, to determine the unity or design which lies 
behind seemingly diverse human behavior.
Hume's second premise in arguing for the principle
of narration or unity reads as follows;
In all compositions of genius, therefore, it 
is requisite that the writer have some plan 
or object; and though he may be hurried from 
this plan by the vehemence of thought, as in 
an ode, or drop it carelessly, as in an epistle 
or essay, there must appear some aim or inten­
tion in his first setting out, if not in the 
composition of the whole work. A production 
without a design would resemble more the rav­
ings of a madman than the sober efforts of 
genius and learning.
Hume becomes more specific about narrative compositions and
voices the fundamental problem of historical narration:
As this rule ^design/ admits of no exception, 
it follows that in narrative compositions the 
events or actions which the writer relates 
must be connected together by some bond or 
tie: They must be related to each other in
the imagination, and form a kind of unity which 
may bring them under one plan or view, and 
which may be the object or end of the writer 
in his first undertaking.
Now, according to Hume's premises, it would be reasonable 
to infer that for his discussion of Charles to be truly 
historical, "the object/s/ or end/s/ of the writer /^i.e., 
a historiar^ in his first undertaking" need be the same 
object(s) or end(s) that the individuals had or exhibited 
— either consciously or not— in the events under considera­
tion by that historian. If there is no correlation, then
^^Inquiry, p. 33» ^^Ibid. Hume's italics.
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the work is fiction. (This criterion for distinguishing 
history and fiction will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section.) What Hume is asserting in these two 
premises is a teleological view of the explanatory narrative 
in history, and has, in fact, made points similar, in a 
rudimentary form, to those of Professor W. H. Walsh. How­
ever, Hume's statements are in need of qualification, as 
with any straightforward teleological view.
If one looks upon history as merely a series of de­
liberate movements, he is confronted with an overly ra­
tionalistic and absurd theory, for he is faced with a flood 
of counter-examples. But in rejecting this extreme view, 
we should not also overlook the truth that men do sometimes 
pursue coherent policies and ideals. As Philip Bagby puts 
it: "Most, if not all, human action is motivated and we
shall be seriously limiting our possibilities of under­
letstanding it if we disregard this fact." An interesting
example of a teleological explanation in Hume's History is
seen in the following note, where he denied event-oriented
explanations as opposed to action-oriented explanations:
^The Earl of/ Murray could have no motive to 
commit that crime. The king, indeed, bore 
him some ill will; but the king himself was 
become so despicable, both from his own ill 
conduct, and the queen's aversion to him, that 
he could neither do good nor harm to anybody.
^^Culture and Historv (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1958), p. 62.
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To judge by the event in any case /.in history 
by a nonteleological procedur^e/ /s always ab­
surd, especially in the present. The king's 
murder, indeed, procured Murray the regency: 
but much more Mary's ill conduct and imprudence, 
which he could not possibly foresee, and which 
never would have happened had she been entirely
innocent.i5
The minimal interpretation I wish to give Hume's first pre­
mise, that man seldom acts without purpose or intent, is 
such a recognition of Bagby's observation. Walsh illu­
strates this important point with the following example. 
"The Nazis did, after all, plan to conquer Europe, and no
history of the years from 1933 to 19^5 could fail to men-
l6tion their plan." From the strength of this example, he
infers "A straightforward teleological explanation is thus
17entirely justified for some historical events."
An anti-teleologist might object by citing A. J. P. 
Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War as a counter­
example by which to refute Walsh's conclusion. For in­
stance, our anti-teleologist might offer the following 
passage:
Wlien war broke out in 1939, Germany had 1,450 
modern fighter planes and 800 bombers. Great 
Britain and France had 930 fighters and 1,300 
bombers. The Germans had 3,300 tanks ; Great 
Britain and France had 3,830. In each case 
Allied intelligence estimated German strength 
at more than twice the true figure. As usual.
^^History, III, 370; and David Hume: Philosophical
Historian, p. 191n. The italics are mine.
^^Op. cit., p. 6l. ^^Ibid.
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Hitler was thought to have planned and prepared 
for a great war. In fact, he had not.l"
But this will plainly not function as a counter-example.
For the teleological terminology is present in Taylor's
thesis: "Pretending to prepare for a great war and not in
fact doing it was an essential part of Hitler's political 
19strategy." Taylor is still looking at plans and policies; 
and to characterize philosophically his reasoning, he is 
assessing t^ what extent these were deliberate. From the 
standpoint of teleological explanation there is no essen­
tial difference between preparing and pretending to prepare : 
both verbs involve an assessment of intentions and ends.
Both designate acts which are characteristically teleolo-
20gical, and are what Danto labels as "project verbs." It
should be added that most anti—teleologists today are, as
B. T. Wilkins says, "usually hostile not to the concept of
ends (conceived as objects of human desires and intentions)
but to the concept of ends apart from human purposes and 
21desires." The latter concept is conspicuously absent in
l8The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 
U. K.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 19^3)> P* 19«
^^Ibid., p. l8 ; my italics. ^^Op. cit., pp. l6 lff.
21"Teleology in Kant's Philosophy of History," 
History and Theory, V.2 (I9 6 6 ), I8 3 . My italics. This 
exceptive idea is an old one which goes back at least as 
far as Francis Bacon: "The final cause rather corrupts
than advances the sciences, except such as have to do with 
human action," Second Book of Aphorisms, sec. ii, of The 
Great Instauration (1 6 2 0), reprinted in The Philosophy of
95
22Hume's writings.
Let us suppose that our anti-teleologist is not en­
tirely satisfied with the above argument. And, further, 
let us suppose that even dJT this example from Taylor could 
not be treated in a straightforward teleological manner, a 
"quasi—teleological" view or procedure could be taken—  
indeed, would have to be taken if we are to account for his­
torical unities, e.g., the origins of World War II. Walsh's 
observation helps explain this necessity:
The very fact that historians try to group 
historical events together under movements and 
general tendencies shows__that they hanker after 
some substitute for it /a teleological expla­
nation/. If they cannot think in plain teleo­
logical terms, they still use a procedure which
is semi-teleological. 2 5
Bagby makes substantially the same point:
Human actions and their products. . . we re­
gard habitually in the light of their intended 
effects. We even classify them in terms of 
these intentions rather than in _terms of their 
observable sensory qualities. /For example^
the 1 6 th and 17th Centuries, R. H. Popkin, ed. (New York: 
The Free Press, 19^6), p. IO6 . R. S. Peters echoes today 
the same claim in The Concept of Motivation (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1958), p. 8 : "Indeed to claim that we
are confronted with an action is ipso facto to rule out 
. . . mechanical explanations."
22For an explicit argument against such anthropormor- 
phism of nature and the concept of extra-human ends, see 
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, H. D. Aiken, 
ed. (New York: Hafner Publishing Co7\ 1948), Parts XI and
XII. For a discussion of this aspect of Hume's thought, 
see T. P. M. Solon and S. K. Wertz, "Hume's Argument from 
Evil," The Personalist. L.3 (1 9 6 9), 383-392.
23op. cit.
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A knife is something to cut with and a chair 
is something to sit in.24
A case in point is Taylor. He himself tells us the "form" 
or manner by which he groups events into general tenden­
cies. "My book has really little to do with Hitler. The 
vital question, it seems to me, concerns Great Britain and
25
France," i.e., their over-estimations, reactions, and 
blunders. But by inference, Taylor's book does have a 
great deal to do with Hitler; it dispels many popular, ac­
cepted views or myths which blame Hitler for everything. 
This line of reasoning illustrates how the first premise 
concerning the nature of man is depicted in the second pre­
mise which characterizes historical writing. Hume's idea 
of "design" is seen in Taylor's unifying questions.
Allow me again to quote some lines from Taylor, this 
time from his "conclusion," to show how historical and nar­
rative unity are achieved. Then we shall examine the at­
tempts to explain and analyze these. Taylor concludes his 
narrative with the following statements:
Such were the origins of the second World war, 
or rather of the war between the three Western 
Powers over the settlement of Versailles; 
a war which had been implicit since the moment 
when the first war ended. . . .  Though Hitler 
blundered in supposing that the two Western 
Powers would not go to war at all, his expec­
tation that they would not go to war seriously 
turned out to be correct. Great Britain and 
France did nothing to help the Poles, and little
^^Op. cit.; Bagby's italics. ^^Op. cit., p. 9-
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lo holp themselves. . . . His ^Hitler'^/ suc­
cess depended on the isolation of Europe fi'oni 
the rest of the world. He gratuitously de­
stroyed the source of this success. In 1941 
he attacked Soviet Russia and declared war on 
the United States, two World Powers who asked 
only to be left alone. In this way a real 
world war began.^6
I emphasized "implicit" in Taylor's first statement above 
because it seems to exhibit the quasi-teleological procedure 
typical of historians. But just what this procedure con­
sists of is debatable. Below I shall consider Hume's analy­
sis of this procedure and its contemporary analogues.
Characterization of Historical Unities
In the last section we saw Hume's principle and the
line of argument used to support it. These were admittedly
teleological in character. This interpretation of Hume is
further supported and illuminated by tracing his influences.
Pferhaps the most obvious influence upon Hume's reasoning is
Aristotle. Hume acknowledges that the teleological notion
27of unity of action is derived from Aristotle. But it 
should not be supposed that Hume adopted this notion un­
critically. Contrary to Antony Flow's opinion, Hume is not
simply attempting to apply his theory of the association of
28ideas to literary criticism. Rather, I find Hume doing
^^Op. cit., p. 3 3 6 ; my italics.
^^Inquiry, p. 34.
q O
Hime's Philosophy of Belief; A Study of His First 
'Inquiry' (New York; The Humanities Press, I96TT, p.
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two things. First, he is considerably extending Aristotle's 
notion of unity of action in conjunction with applying his 
theory of the association of ideas to history. Secondly, 
in this application he is attempting to distinguish history 
from fiction. I shall argue below that in doing these two 
things, Hume has in principle accomplished what Collingwood 
calls the constructive theory of history (which involves 
interpolation), and that he precedes Bradley in seeing that 
"the historian brings with him to the study of his authori­
ties a criterion of his own by reference to which the
29authorities themselves are judges."
Let us look at my first claim concerning Hume's ex­
tension of Aristotle. One of Hume's remarks that is in 
agreement with Aristotle on the principle of unity reads:
This connecting principle among the several 
events which form the subject of a poem or 
history may be very different according to 
the different designs of the poet or historian.
In the Rhetoric we find Aristotle characterizing narration
as consisting of two parts. One part is not provided by
the historian's craft, and that is the actions themselves,
of which the historian is in no sense author. Aristotle
makes essentially the same point linguistically: "Nobody
The Idea of History, p. 240; Collingwood contends 
that "It remains to be seen whether sixty years later, his 
^Bradley'^/ problem, which in the meantime I believe no 
English-speaking philosopher has discussed in print, can 
be advanced beyond the point at which he left it."
30Inquiry, p. 33.
99
can ’narrate’ what has not yet happened. If there is nar-
31ration at all, it will be of past events.” And the
second part or characteristic
. . . is provided by his art, namely, the proof 
(where proof is needed) that the actions were 
done, the description of their quality or their 
extent, or even all these three things to­
gether . 32
Hume’s statement above is an affirmation of this character­
istic; namely, that the historian designs or supplies the 
argument. For both Hume and Aristotle, unity implies 
structure and order. That the historian supplies this we 
have witnessed from Hume’s second premise and his statement 
above. For instance, it is Taylor— not Hitler— who saw 
where the latter’s blunders and successes lay, and Taylor 
finds that Hitler’s expectation was an accurate appraisal 
of the times. These sorts of statements are ones which pro­
vide unity, narratively speaking. They are part of the 
historian’s ’’design. ” With regard to Taylor, they speci­
fically aid in his argument that the second war had been 
implicit from the ending of the first war and his descrip- ' 
tion of how the second one began.
On the other hand, a historian uses these sorts of 
expressions for more than merely to provide narrative unity.
The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. l44$. This sense 
of narration parallels Hume’s use of the term; see, e.g.. 
Treatise, p. 430.
^^The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 1442.
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There is the claim that echoes Aristotle's t'ii'st charac­
teristic; namely that historians are not the authors of the 
actions, but that they are finding out what was the case or 
what actually happened. Hume's rephrasing of Aristotle's 
"unity of action" to "a sufficient unity in the subject" 
makes this clear. His choice of the preposition "in" 
emphasizes linguistically this second claim. Taylor is try­
ing to show (prove) that the unity of his thesis reflects 
the way events actually transpired.
One modern attempt to explain the relationship be­
tween these two characteristics (Hume's two premises) is 
Walsh's embodiment theory or metaphor. The way in which 
the historian (Taylor, in this case) is able to determine
successes or failures, etc. of plans or policies is that the
events that passed between the years 1933 and are writ­
ten about and explained by "pointing to ideas which they
—" "7 3 3
/the event^/ embody." In addition to this type of ex-
planation, the historian cites other events with which
these ideas are connected;
. . . Even though they know that many of the
agents concerned had little if any conscious 
awareness of the ideas in question. And their 
justification for doing this is the fact, al­
ready noted, that ideas can exert an influence 
on people's conduct even when they are not 
continuously before the minds of the persons 
who act on them.
^^Walsh, p. 6l.
^^Ibid. A good example of this is cited in Danto (ch. 
XII), p. 2&3: "The battle-cry shouted by soldiers at White
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Now then, how are these ideas exhibited or demon­
strated in historical writing? Walsh's proposal of how 
this is accomplished is as follows:
For it seems to me that in historical work of 
all kinds there is a single overriding aim: 
to build up an intelligible picture of the human 
past as a concrete whole, so that it comes 
alive for us in the same way as the lives of 
ourselves and our contemporaries. Different 
types of history contribute to this fundamental 
design in different ways, but I think that 
all historians do have it in m i n d . 35
The rudiments of this idea can be found in Hume, and it com­
prises one of the major features of his model of historical 
narration. We find Hume claiming that:
Not only in any limited portion of life a man's 
actions have a dependence on each other, but 
also during the whole period of his duration 
from the cradle to the grave; nor is it possible 
to strike off one link, however minute, in 
this regular chain without affecting the whole 
series of events which follow. The unity of 
action, therefore, which is to be found in 
biography or history differs from that of epic 
poetry, not in kind, but in d e g r e e . 3°
Perhaps there is only a difference in degree between history
and literature because they both have the "single overriding
aim" mentioned by Walsh above. Hume himself suggests that
Hill was 'Sancta Maria!' The battle-cry shouted, later, at 
Nordlingen, was 'Viva Espana'. Those who might have wit­
nessed these two battles would almost certainly not have 
seen the significance of these shouts. For the signifi­
cance lies in the contrast between them, a contrast which 
is significant to an historian who sees in them signs that 
'insensibly and rapidly, the Cross gave way to the flag'." 
My italics.
^^Op. cit., p. 64; my italics. ^^Inquiry, pp. 3^“5*
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periodization is one way in history by which a single over­
riding aim is accomplished. In his review of Robert Henry's 
History of Great Britain (1773), he remarks:
By this delicate and well fancied method ^of 
periodization/, the thread of the narration 
is preserved unbroken, and some degree of unity 
and order introduced into a portion of the 
history of Great Britain, which has perplexed 
the acuteness of our most philosophical and 
accomplished historians.37
I take Hume's remarks here to be good evidence that 
he is consciously extending Aristotle, since he seems to be 
using the idea of a unity of action as an organizing prin­
ciple for his association—of-ideas theory. He is obviously 
parting company with Aristotle when he acknowledges the 
analogy between history and literature. For in the Poetics, 
Aristotle makes a denial of Hume's assertion:
The construction of its /poetry'^/ stories 
should clearly be like that in a drama; they 
should be based on a single action, one that
David Hume : Philosophical Historian, p. 379* T.
R. Tholfsen, a recent historian of history, suggests that 
the period concept was developed in Hume's time. Indeed, 
what he says of Robertson is somewhat similar to my analysis 
of Hume: "Soon this new insight /treating political pheno­
mena in the context of a larger social whole/ came to be 
applied in the writing of history. . . .  In his History of 
England (1734), David Hume interrupts his narrative at sev­
eral points to include systematic descriptions of the con­
stitution, laws, and customs. William Robertson's famous 
account of medieval Europe, in the introduction to his His­
tory of Charles V (1769), assumes the existence of an all- 
embracing civilization in the period, characterized by an 
identifiable unity, common to all its components. Thus, 
out of the fusion between the new sense of diversity and 
the concept of civilization came the period concept, so 
fundamental to historical thinking." In Historical Think­
ing: An Introduction (New York: Harper and Row, 19&7),
pp. 9 8-9 9 ; my italics.
1.0}
;Lh a coinp.lolt' who.lo in itsoit', with a bogin- 
ning, iniddio, and end, so as to enable tlie 
work to produce its own proper pleasure with 
all the organic unity of a living creature.
Nor should one suppose that there is anything 
like them in our usual histories. A history 
has to deal not with one action, but with one 
period and all that happened in that to one 
or more persons, however disconnected the sev­
eral events may have been. Just as two events 
may take place at the same time, e.g. the sea- 
fight of Salamis and the battle with the Cartha­
ginians in Sicily, without converging to the 
same end, so too of two consecutive events one 
may sometimes come after the other with no one 
end as their common issue.3°
That Aristotle thought that history needed no such 
order and unity is perhaps not surprising since history 
had its substantial beginning about the time he was writing. 
And perhaps with the lapse of two thousand years and the 
attendant development of history, Hume saw grounds for dis­
agreeing with Aristotle on this point. As we noticed in 
the last two statements quoted from Hume, he felt that con­
nections are essential to historical writing and that 
Aristotle's admission of disconnected events should be re­
jected. Hume seems to be contending that there needs to be
some common issue or end for a narrative to be suitable as
39history. To take an example from Aristotle, it may per­
haps be true that Homer did not attempt to deal with the 
Trojan war in its entirety, even though it had a definite 
beginning and end, for it was too long or complicated a
^^Op. cit., p. l480.
39lbid.
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story to be taken under one view. Hume seems to be insist­
ing that this may be permissible for a poet like Homer, but 
will not do for a historian, in that the latter must at­
tempt to deal with the Trojan War in its entirety and ex­
plain it under one view. This is partially achieved by 
periodization; Hume sees unity of actions in a period, as 
is clear from his review. We also find Hume saying that:
An annalist or historian who should undertake 
to write the history of Europe during any cen­
tury would be influenced by the connection of 
contiguity in time or place. All events which 
happened in that portion of space and period 
of time are comprehended in his design, though 
in other respects different and unconnected.
They have still a species of unity amidst all 
their diversity.^0
So one of the essential characteristics of periodization is
that of the connection of contiguity in time and space
(place). Nor is this all; later in the same section Hume
remarks that:
We may conclude from the foregoing reasonings 
that as a certain unity is requisite in all 
productions, it cannot be wanting to history 
more than any other; that in history the con­
nection among several events which unites them 
into one body is the relation of cause and
effect.41
Thus the Aristotelian notion of unity which Hume borrows is
made precise by his association of ideas; that is to say
"the three connecting principles of all ideas are the rela-
42tions of resemblance, contiguity, and causation."
Inquiry, p. 34. Ibid., p. 3 8 .
42Ibid., p. 39; Hume's italics.
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Unfortunately, Hume's model is not as tidy as this.
He attributes the relation of cause and effect to literary 
compositions, which blurs any distinction history may have 
from literature. The major difficulty is one Hume shares 
with anyone who utilizes the analogy between literature and 
history; the negative features of the analogy need to be 
strong enough to allow for a criterion for distinguishing 
the two. Collingwood's major objection to the use of 
Aristotle in a discussion of this sort is that if the lat­
ter' s criterion of what is admissible in poetry is used as
the only criterion, then "It does not serve to discriminate
43
history from fiction." This point is well taken, for with 
just this criterion and no other, Collingwood is absolutely 
right in his criticism of Bradley. Bradley's application 
of Aristotle to history is different from Hume's. We have 
seen that Hume is interested in the notion of unity, whereas 
Bradley concentrates on admissibility. However, this does 
not exempt Hume from Collingwood's criticisms of Bradley, 
for what is considered admissible can be seen as part of 
what is meant by historical unities. Let us look at Brad­
ley's problem and his solution briefly, and then see if 
this applies to Hume.
Collingwood labels the sort of theory of history
44
that Bradley holds to as "the common—sense theory."
^^Op. cit., p. 2 3 9 . ^^Ibid., pp. 234-242.
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Historical truth, under this theory, is the agreement of the 
historian's statements with those he finds in his authori­
ties. So in a sense the historian is a believer; and the 
believed is a person whom he accepts as an authority. To 
know something historically, this person must be acquainted 
with an event and remember it. Hence, memory plays an im­
portant role along side that of authority. The historian 
believes what his authority remembers. To this degree 
truths in history come ready-made, and the historian simply 
accepts them. He is obliged not to tamper with them, muti­
late them, add to them, or contradict them. With the ac­
ceptance of this theory, Bradley faces the question of how 
it is possible for a historian to contradict an authority 
by admitting "This is what he records, but what really hap­
pened was this and not that." Bradley's solution to this 
problem is briefly:
. . . That our exper^ence_of the world teaches
us that some kinds ^types^/ of things happen 
and others do not; this experience, then, is 
the criterion which the historian brings to 
bear on the statements of his authorities.
In other words, if his authorities tell him that something
did happen which does not or could not happen according to
his experience, then the historian is obliged to discredit
or disbelieve the authorities. And conversely, if what
Ibid., p. 239; ray italics. For further details, 
see F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History, 
Lionel Rubinoff, ed. TChicago: Quadrangle Books, I9 6 8),
pp. 77-147
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they say can happen or does happen within the bounds of the 
historian's experience, then the authorities' remarks are 
acceptable, but are obviously not known to be true purely 
on that account.
We find obvious similarities between Bradley and 
Hume on this point when we look at the latter's essay "Of 
Miracles." "A wise man," (e.g., a good historian) says
46Hume, "proportions his belief to the evidence." Hume's 
estimation of our notion of evidence has a certain ring of 
the common—sense theory of history and an affinity to Brad­
ley's proposed solution of the problem. For instance:
The evidence, derived from witnesses and human 
testimony, is founded on past experience, so it 
varies with the experience, and is regarded 
either as a proof or a probability, accordingly 
a^ th_e conjunction between any particular kind 
/^type/ of object has been found jbo be constant 
or variable /.in human experience/. '
^^Inquiry, Section X, Part I, p. Il8 ; and David 
Hume : Philosophical Historian, p. 5 6 .
4?Inquiry, p. 120; and David Hume: Philosophical
Historian, p. 57* The latter pair of italics are mine. 
Traces in Hume's thinking of the common-sense theory of 
history are seen in a letter concerning the poems of Ossian 
where he speaks of the ground for historical assertions: 
"There proofs must not be arguments, but testimonies" in 
David Hume : Philosophical Historian, p. 409. An excellent
example of Hume's use of an admissibility criterion is seen 
in his essay on the poems: "I derive a new argument against
the antiquity of these poems, from the general tenor of the 
narrative. Where manners are represented in them, proba­
bility, or even possibility, are totally disregarded: but
in all other respects, the events are within the course of 
nature ; no giants, no monsters, no magic, no incredible 
feats of strength or activity. Every transaction is con­
formable to familiar experience." Ibid., p. 393.
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From this typical passage we find that although he makes a 
different explicit use of Aristotle, the Aristotelian cri­
terion of what is admissible in poetry is tacitly used by 
Hume. Now, since this is the case, we are faced with Col­
lingwood' s objections to Bradley and must examine the charge 
that the criterion will not serve to discriminate history 
from fiction. First, some concessions need to be made. 
Collingwood is undoubtedly correct in saying that it is a 
negative criterion. It can never tell us what actually did 
happen; we learn only that event ^  is a member of A, but 
nothing specific about Any prowess that the criterion
can boast of is in telling us what is not to be accepted; 
namely, not ^  if not _A. But what we want is "not ^  because 
it was " This much of Collingwood's argument must be ac­
cepted. However, the unqualified converse need not be ac­
cepted, for it does not follow from the criterion. Colling­
wood' s converse of the criterion is:
We are left to rely for that ^^what did happen/ 
on the sheer authority of our informant. We 
undertake, when we apply it, to believe every­
thing our informant tells us so long as it 
satisfies the merely negative criterion of 
being possible. This is not to turn the tables 
on our authorities; it is blindly to accept 
what they tell us. The critical attitude has 
not been achieved.
48Op. cit., p. 3 2 9 ; my italics. The foregoing re­
marks on Collingwood are based upon section 2, "The His­
torical Imagination," of the Epilegomena (Part V).
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The correct inference to be drawn from the criterion 
is what Aristotle called "converse by limitation." In 
short, we can be bound by what can or could happen, but 
this does not imply that we indiscriminately accept every­
thing that our authority tells us did happen. We do not 
accept anything that cannot or could not happen. But the 
fact that our authority does not violate the criterion is a 
good reason to accept some of what he said did happen, even 
though the determination of the ones which are to be ac­
cepted must come through additional criteria. Collingwood's
own example of the unacceptability of Suetonius because of
49
Tacitus acknowledges this. However, it must be granted 
that if this were the only criterion used, then Collingwood 
would be absolutely right in asserting that the statements 
of a historical novelist would just as well satisfy the cri­
terion as the statements of a historian, for further dis­
crimination is needed between historical and fictional 
sentences.
But before we go into this, I want to make good my 
claim concerning Hume's anticipation of Collingwood's con­
structionist theory of history. As I said earlier, Hume 
lapses into the common-sense theory of history and suffers 
its deficiencies. However, he seems to be aware of these 
and is attempting to go beyond them. And I think that in
^^Ibid., pp. 244—245- Cited in Chapter II of this
essay.
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large measure he achieves this. Collingwood thinks that 
there are two ways to go beyond what the historian's au­
thorities tell him: the critical and constructive ways.
He attributes the critical to Bradley, and above I tried to 
show briefly that Hume attempted a similar solution. How­
ever both solutions are inadequate, for they can still be 
posed from the standpoint of the common-sense theory of 
history, and they are not the only alternatives for explain­
ing how a historian can go beyond his authorities. With 
this recognition, Collingwood adds his constructionist 
thesis.
Con.i ecture Sentences 
A constructive history, Collingwood describes, is 
one where interpolation between the borrowed authoritative 
statements and statements implied by them is used. For 
example, suppose our authorities tell us that on a certain 
day Hitler was in Berlin and then on a later day in Munich. 
But those same authorities, for example two letters, ne­
glect to tell us anything of his journey from place to 
place. We may, nonetheless, legitimately infer or inter­
polate that such a journey did take p l a c e . S u c h  an in­
ference could be used, say, to refute a claim that during 
a certain month. Hitler stayed in Berlin without leaving.
more subtle instance of interpolation would be 
the Danto example I cited earlier in this chapter (nj4).
Ill
The fact that he left might in turn have other important 
consequences which would all be based on such an interpo­
lation. Collingwood makes two points about this aspect of 
historical reasoning. One is that interpolation is in no 
way arbitrary or merely fanciful. If we filled a narration 
of Hitler's doings with fanciful details such as the names 
of persons he met on the way and the conversations he had 
with them, then the narrative construction would be arbi­
trary. In fact, it would be the kind of construction which 
we find in historical novels. For in such a construction 
there is nothing necessitated by the evidence. Secondly, 
what is interpolated or inferred is essentially something 
imagined. In short, we find ourselves obliged to imagine 
Hitler as having traveled from Berlin to Munich when we 
learn from the letters that he was at different places at 
successive times. Before turning to Hume, I want for a 
moment to examine this point about imagination.
We observed earlier that Collingwood's major objec­
tion to Bradley (which would apply equally well to Hume) 
was his use of an admissibility criterion which allows for 
not only what did happen but also what can or could have 
happened. In a sense, Collingwood's interpolation thesis, 
which is an imaginative process of thinking, is but an in­
stance of reasoning from what could have happened to what 
did happen. We know with almost ^  priori certainty that 
Hitler must have traveled from Berlin to Munich if we have
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a letter written from each city. By what other way can we 
account for the letters? My point here is that given a 
certain kind or type of evidence, one can draw associated 
inferences from the type of the instance. In this case, 
successive times and different places provide a license for 
associating travel. So in a sense this aspect of Colling­
wood' s criterion utilizes a notion used by Bradley and Hume, 
and one to which he himself objected. Be this as it may, 
it is not my primary interest here.
Having discussed Collingwood's notion of interpola­
tion in constructive history, we have a context to show how 
Hume anticipated this idea and how it makes his extension 
of Aristotle seem more feasible in the area of history.
Hume states that:
The most usual species of connection among the 
different events which enter into any narrative 
composition is that of cause and effect; while 
the historian traces the series of actions ac­
cording to their natural order, remounts to 
their secret springs and principles, and de­
lineates their most remote consequences. He 
chooses for his subject a certain portion of 
that great chain of events which compose the 
history of mankind: each link in this chain
he endeavors to touch in his narration; some­
times unavoidable ignorance renders all his 
attempts fruitless; sometimes he supplies by 
conjecture what is wanting in knowledge; and 
always he is sensible that the more unbroken 
the chain is which he presents to his readers, 
the more perfect is his production. He sees 
that the knowledge of causes is not only the 
most satisfactory, this relation or connection 
being the strongest of all others, but also 
the most instructive; since it is by this
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knowledge alone we are enabled to control events 
and govern futurity.51
There are many points I wish to make concerning the con­
tents of this passage, but the major item I would like to 
stres ' here is the notion of conjecture and its analogue to 
Collingwood's idea of interpolation. The following example 
from the first volume of his History should make Hume's 
sense of "conjecture" clear and establish the analogue:
It appears more than probable, from the simili­
tude of language and manners, that Britain 
either was originally people, or was subdued, 
by the migration of inhabitants from Gaul, and 
Ireland from Britain: the position of the
several countries, is an additional reason 
that favours this conclusion. It appears also 
probable, that the migrations of that colony 
of Gauls or Celts, who peopled or subdued Ire­
land, was originally made from the northwest 
parts of Britain; and this conjecture (if it 
do not merit a higher name) is founded both 
on the Irish language, which is a very differ­
ent dialect from the Welsh and from the lan­
guage anciently spoken in South Britain, and 
on the vicinity of Lancashire, Cumberland,
Galloway, and Argyleshire, to that island.
These events, as they passed long before the 
age of history and records, must be known by 
reasoning alone, which in this case seems to be 
pretty satisfactory: Caesar and Tacitus, not
to mention ^  multitude of other Greek and Roman 
authors, were guided by like inferences. . . .
We may infer from two passages in Claudian, 
and from one in Orosius and another in Isidore, 
that the chief seat of these Scots was in Ire­
land. That some part of the Irish freebooters 
migrated back to the north-west parts of Bri­
tain, whence their ancestors had probably been 
derived in a more remote age, is positively 
asserted by Bede, and implied in Gildas; though
C 4
Inquiry, p. In the following discussion I
shall refer to this quoted paragraph as "the Inquiry pas­
sage."
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neither of these authors explain whether the 
Irish Scots made their settlements by force 
or consent, or by a mixture of both. I grant 
that neither Bede nor Gildas are Caesars or 
Tacituses; but such as they are, they remain 
the sole testimony on the subject, and there­
fore must be relied on for want of better. . . .
And in a word, it is clear, from the language 
of the two countries, that the Highlanders and 
the Irish are the same people.^2
To understand the necessity for conjectures or interpola­
tions, it is important that we appreciate the historian's 
inquisitive or interrogative procedure. It is not mis­
leading to use Francis Bacon's slogan "put nature to ques­
tion" to characterize the historian's activity— to put the
53past to question. A great many questions that interest 
historians are ones that demand inferences from and reason­
ing about the available evidence. Hume is a case in point. 
The History note is in response to the questions concerning
c 2
David Hume ; Philosophical Historian, pp. Il6n- 
ll?u. The italics are mine. In my discussion below I shall 
refer to this passage as "the History note." The uses of 
conjectures are numerous; see, e.g., ibid., pp. 9 6 , 104,
1 1 1 , 1 2 6 , 1 5 7 , 1 7 7 , 1 8 7-8 , 1 9 1 .
53Collingwood also makes use of Bacon's remark, al­
though my use is in a slightly different context; ojg^. cit. , 
p. 237* An excellent example of the historian's interroga­
tive procedure is Taylor's history; for instance, he tells 
us that "It was perfectly obvious that Germany would seek 
to become a Great Power again; obvious after 1933 that her 
domination would be of a peculiarly barbaric sort. Why did 
the victors not resist her? There are various answers: 
timidity; blindness; moral doubts; desire perhaps to turn 
German strength against Soviet Russia. But. whatever the 
answers, this seems to me the important question, and my 
book revolves round it, though also of course round the 
other question: why did they resist in the end?" 0^. cit., 
p. 9* Needless to say, these remarks are a form of "con— 
j ectures."
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the origin(s) of the ancient British inhabitants; to pro­
vide any suitable answer the historian is forced to inter­
polate or conjecture.
Another example (somewhat different from the above)
of conjectures in the form of questions which shows the
importance of the historian's imagination in reasoning is
seen in a note to volume five of the History;
What can be imagined to be the king's ^Charles 
I'^/ projects: To raise the Irish to arms, ^
suppose, and bring them over to England for 
his assistance. But is it not plain, that the 
king never intended to raise war in England?
Had that been his intention, would he have 
rendered the parliament perpetual? Does it 
not appear b^ the whole train of events, that 
the parliament forced him into the war?5^
A notable historian is one who makes conjectures with cau­
tion, i.e., one who stays within the limits of empirical 
possibilities in the form of inferences from the available 
evidence. The italicized phrase in Hume's last argumenta­
tive or leading question illustrates these limits, viz. 
probabilities and consistency. In short, the primary func­
tion of imagination in historical discourse is in the use 
of conjecture sentences.
One of the roles of the historical imagination in 
conjectures is to provide contrast, which brings out the 
significance or importance of information or a sequence of 
events. This can be observed in the following passage in
^^History, V, 526; and David Hume: Philosophical
Historian, p. 35in. The italics are mine.
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which Hume is discussing the plight of the Jews in Medieval 
England:
It is easy to imagine how precarious their 
state must have been under an indigent prince, 
somewhat restrained in his tyranny over his 
native subjects, but who possessed an unlimited 
authority over the Jews, the sole proprietors 
money in the kingdom, and hated on account of 
their riches, their religion, and their usury; 
yet will our ideas scarcely come up to the ex­
tortions which in fact we find to have been 
practised upon them. In the year 1241, twenty 
thousand marks were exacted from them,* two 
years after, money was again extorted; and one 
Jew alone, Aaron of York, was obliged to pay 
a^ova four thousand marks:* in 1250, Henry 
/^ IIJC/ renewed his oppressions; and the same 
Aaron was condemned to pay him thirty thousand 
marks upon an accusation of forgery:* the 
high penalty imposed upon him, and which, it 
seems, he was thought able to pay, is rather 
a presumption of his innocence than of his 
guilt. In 1255> the king demanded eight thou­
sand marks from the Jews, and threatened to 
hang them if they refused compliance.55
Hume's idea of historical reasoning as comparison is perhaps 
best seen in passages like this one. It is through com­
parison that a historian comes to appreciate differences 
that may otherwise be missed, and which may, in turn, lead 
to interpretations and explanations. If these differences 
are seen to affect human life, they become significant 
enough to narrate, to be remembered. Hume obviously thought 
this to be the case with the Jews in Medieval England. 
However, what is of utmost interest to us is the method of
David Hume: Philosophical Historian, p. 122; my
italics. Hume's documentation (indicated by asterisks) is 
from Matthew of Paris, Chronica Majora. For other instances 
like this one, see pp. 124 and 127»
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comparison and contrast in historical reasoning that is 
exhibited in this passage. It is another instance of the 
diverse use of conjecture sentences in history. In fact, 
this is the whole point; the comparison is conjectural or 
imaginative. This use of conjecture sentences demands a 
pattern from the reader rather than an explicit statement 
of one from the historian himself. The intelligibility and 
significance is supplied in part by the reader. Hume asks 
the reader to place himself in the position of the Jew and 
to imagine what it must have been like. This imagined and 
no doubt understated identification becomes the basis for 
the comparison with the facts which are far more shocking 
than ordinarily one would imagine. (Thus the effect of the 
comparison.) This use of imagination in history by way of 
conjectures in effect creates a much more realistic under­
standing than would be possible without it.
As Meiland suggests, the fact that a historian uses 
his imagination in the way that Hume does in no way dictates 
that his work is to be immediately classified as historical 
fiction. It would be a non sequitur to conclude that those 
"histories" which contain dialogues or even imaginary con­
versations are to be classified as historical fiction rather 
than as histories simply because most histories do not con­
tain them. A historian can obviously use such devices to 
aid in conveying his interpretation of a historical figure 
or period. (In the second chapter of this essay, we saw
118
another example of this in Hume's discussion of the execu­
tion of Queen Anne.) However, Hume's narration differs from 
historical fiction by being largely if not entirely based 
on evidence (documents), whereas, accourding to Meiland's 
criterion, much of historical fiction has no basis at all 
in the e v i d e n c e . C o n t r a r y  to Meiland, historical fiction 
is based on general evidence (i.e., dates, events, general 
situations), but it may intentionally deviate from evidence 
for the purpose of being more interesting fiction. History 
and fiction perhaps have in common the technique of con­
jecture sentences. Historical conjectures, however, are 
distinguished by their reliance on historical documents. 
These documents provide inferential control, whereas in 
fiction this kind of control is absent.
But this in itself will not do either. The primary 
mode of a history is not dialogue, whereas in a work like 
Truman Capote's In Cold Blood the primary mode is charac­
terization and dialogue. This is Capote's way of present­
ing the facts. This further distinction needs to be made, 
for Capote's work is an example in which documentation does 
not, by itself, serve to distinguish the two, as Meiland
Meiland, p. 197* Meiland cites the Melian dia­
logue in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War as an 
example of a historian's use of dialogue. This points out 
that there is a long tradition behind this type of history. 
Hume would obviously fit into this tradition. Indeed, he 
even says "The Peloponnesian war is a proper subject for 
history," in the Inquiry, p. 3 8 .
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says it can. But neither can history and literature be 
distinguished strictly in terms of their form, for in many 
cases they share the same form (i.e., narration). Since 
they can share the same form, which may include a dialogue, 
they cannot be distinguished on that basis alone. They are 
to be distinguished materially rather than formally. And 
this requires us to look at each work or history separately. 
In short, such decisions as these are ^  posteriori and not 
ei priori.
In addition to the variety of applications of the 
idea of conjecture to history (like that of contrast and 
comparison), the sense in which Hume uses the term "con­
jecture" makes it clear that he has in mind something akin 
to Collingwood's "interpolation." His parenthetical remark 
in the History note, "if it ^"conjectured,/ do not merit a 
higher name," clearly suggests that we cannot attribute 
today's generally accepted usage of the term to Hume. For 
historians generally do not conjecture in the sense of 
merely guessing or of inferring from defective evidence. 
"Conjectures," in this sense, would not lead to a proba­
bility or to a probable statement of what happened. What 
Hume means by his parenthetical remark is, rather, that 
conjectures are inferences from established, legitimate 
evidence as opposed to defective or questionable evidence. 
Perhaps we can clarify this more if we use one of Hume's 
distinctions.
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The distinction itself is explicitly used in his
History, and is perhaps best made in a note in the Inquiry;
To conform our language more to common use, we 
ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, 
proofs, and probabilities ; by proofs meaning 
such arguments from experience as leave no 
room for doubt or opposition.57
Hume's sense of "proof" is reflected in his use of "prove"
from the passage (quoted earlier) that discusses Charles
II:
The secret memoirs of this reign, which have 
since been published, prove, beyond a doubt, 
that the king had, at this time, concerted 
measures with France, and had no intention to 
enter into a war in favour of the allies.
And from the History note, we find several uses of "proba­
ble" in the context of his idea of conjecture in history. 
This use implies that for Hume conjecture was more than 
mere guessing or fantasizing. Indeed, the class of conjec­
ture sentences in historical discourse has as a distin­
guishing characteristic probabilities as opposed to proofs.
However, the most significant mark seems to lie in 
inference or reasoning from the common background of know­
ledge which is presupposed by the evidence and/or the per­
iod. For example, in the History note Hume uses "lin­
guistics" as a basis to establish his historical inferences
^ Op. cit., p. 69n. Hume's italics. By "demonstra­
tions" he is, of course, referring to deductive arguments. 
By "proof" Hume is suggesting that these "arguments" (at 
times he refers to them as testimonies) are not immediately 
open to a further judgment or examination, whereas "pro­
babilities" are, because they are liable to error.
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where no explicit evidence can be brought forth to answer 
a historian's probing question. (See also the note above 
on the projects of Charles I for an example of "chain ^or 
train-typ^/ inference.") Collingwood would fully agree with 
Hume's remark in volume five of the History in which he sug­
gests that "it seems the duty of an historian to point out 
the proper inferences and conclusions" from his materials. 
These inferences are in response to historical questions.
But their function includes more than this; they legiti­
mately fill the gaps in the hard data, and they comprise 
the soft data. With these two sorts of data we are now in 
the position to make the notion of narrative unity clearer.
In the Inquiry passage, one notices that the notion 
of unity lies beneath Hume's notion of conjecture:
Sometimes he /the historian/ supplies by con­
jecture what is wanting in knowledge; and 
always he i^ sensible that the more unbroken 
the j/causal/ chain is which he presents to 
his readers, the more perfect is his produc­
tion.
Gaps presuppose _a unity. How could he speak of there being 
gaps without having reference to some sort of unity? This 
is the assumption behind Hume's link-chain metaphor for 
historical causation. With the idea of conjecture or "soft 
data" we have, along with the hard data, an explanation of 
the wherewithal of narrative unity.
^ History, V, 426. It is fairly safe for us to read 
"proper" as "probable" (or at least as part of its meaning) 
in this statement.
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It is interesting to note here that Hume was not
alone during the eighteenth century in seeing the importance
of conjecture sentences in history. Kant had the main idea
behind conjectures, although he did not develop the idea to
account for a type (aspect) of historical discourse as Hume
did. In a short essay entitled "Conjectural Beginning of
Human History" (I7 8 6 ), Kant begins his discussion with
these pregnant remarks:
It is surely permissible to insert here and 
there conjectures into the progression of an 
historical account, in order to fill gaps in 
the record. For what precedes the gaps (the 
remote cause) and what follows them (the ef­
fect) give a fairly reliable clue to the dis­
covery of the intermediate causes, which are 
to make the transition intelligible. But to 
originate an historical account from conjec­
tures alone would seem to be not much better 
than to draft a novel. Indeed, this could not 
be called a conjectural history but rather a 
mere piece of fiction.59
Kant's distinction is one similar to that found in Hume's
account of conjectures. There are "pure or irresponsible
conjectures" which parallel the sense we mentioned earlier
as denoting falsely contrived conclusions from defective
evidence. Or in the case of fiction they are imagined,
along with the evidence. The writer is the author of the
actions, in the sense that the account originates from his
conjectures. On the other hand, responsible conjectures
are causally connected or are those which are in a causal
^^Immanuel Kant on History, L« W. Beck, ed. (Indian­
apolis: Bobbs—Merrill, I9 6 3 ), 53* Kant's italics.
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context. Like Kant, Hume suggests that not any gap can be 
filled in this manner, but only those which satisfy the con­
necting principles of the association of ideas (viz., re­
semblance, contiguity, and causation). As Kant phrases it:
If I were to attempt to fill this gap— which 
presumably encompasses a great space of time 
— there might be for the reader too many con­
jectures and too few probabilities.
In Hume's idiom, the principle of contiguity would be vio­
lated, and hence, the conjecture would be unacceptable.
One cannot accurately conjecture whole segments in a chain; 
only the links. In other words, actions are conjectured, 
but large-scale events (e.g., American Civil War) and periods 
are not. Conjectures on a Toynbeean level of history (his­
tory of civilizations or universal histories) would be 
deemed inappropriate. These sorts of conjectures, as Kant 
would say, "cannot make too high a claim on one's assent. 
Those which are suitable for history are those in which the 
intermediate causes (as Kant refers to them) are implied 
from the remote cause and the effect. Conjectures have, 
then, a dyadic or polar relation to evidence. Kant's lan­
guage, however, suggests more of a linear progression than 
does Hume's.
G^Ibid., p. 3 4 . 
G^Ibid., p. 5 3 .
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Logical form: (evidence conjecture evidence) unity
Kant's idiom: (remote cause)*^(intermediate cause)—>(effect) 
Hume's idiom: (proof) ( ■ (probability) < •> (proof)
I have here graphically represented a mutually dependent 
relation in Hume's idiom from suggestions in some of his re­
marks. For instance, . . all /^diverse actions ar^/ en­
gaged in one common scene, and each action is strongly
62connected with the whole.’
So in those cases in which we have some evidence,
but lack that evidence which from our own experience we
know must have been, we conjecture the missing link in the
chain. As Passmore suggests:
Hume would reply /to the sample-producing cri­
terion/ that we are entitled to refer to un­
experienced entities— even to logically unex­
perienced entities— if they are causally con­
nected with what we do in fact experience.°3
The reasoning behind Hume's inference license is his theory
Inquiry, p. 3 6 ; my italics. The immediate context 
of this remark is in reference to literature; however, with 
the strong analogy between history and literature, it would 
equally apply to histories. This is further evidenced by 
our previous discussion.
^^John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sonsl 1961), pi 88. The demand for a 
sample of something inferred is the criterion that Passmore 
is referring to, i.e., the idea that a demand of samples is 
a substitute for argument. He is arguing for "causal extra­
polations" which has an obvious affinity to Collingwood's 
interpolations and to Hume's conjectures. However, I would 
question Passmore's comment that Hume allows logically unex­
perienced entities, for Hume does hold to a consistency cri­
terion of experience. (Although I must admit that I am not 
at all sure what Passmore means by a "logically unexper­
ienced entity.")
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of conjectures. In fact, this is one of the many procedures 
that Hume used in writing the History of England. Further­
more, it was probably the researching and writing of the 
History that led to such a theory for history in the first 
place.
Unities Reconsidered 
The idea of conjecture helps us to see what narra­
tive unity consists of, and what the relationship is be­
tween an unbroken causal chain and a narrative completeness. 
What has been said about unities thus far will be recon­
sidered in light of conjectures. When Hume says in the 
History note that;
These events, as they passed long before the 
age of history and records, must be known by 
reasoning alone, which in this case seems to 
be pretty satisfactory: Caesar and Tacitus,
not to mention a multitude of other Greek and 
Roman authors, were guided by like inferences,
he is suggesting that this is done by the majority of his­
torians. Indeed, Collingwood may be seen as generalizing 
Hume's claim about conjectures to all historians, and has 
identified this process of reasoning as essential to his- 
tory. However, Hume does not think that this process is 
peculiar to history, but that it is embedded in human rea­
soning or practical reasoning itself. Although Hume does 
not mention conjecture, it is clear that this idea is
64
Op. cit., e.g., p. 241.
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tacitly employed in those sections of the Inquiry in which 
he discusses the nature of inference and reasoning. For 
instance :
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem 
to be founded on the relation of cause and 
effect. By means of that relation alone we 
can go beyond the evidence of our memory and 
senses. If you were to ask a man why he be­
lieves any matter of fact which is absent, for 
instance, that his friend is in the country 
or in France, he would give you a reason, and 
this reason would be some other fact: as a
letter received from him or knowledge of his 
former resolutions and promises. A man find­
ing a watch or any other machine in a desert 
island would conclude that there had once been 
men in that island. All our reasonings con­
cerning fact are of the same nature. And 
here it is constantly supposed that there is 
a connection between the present fact and that 
which is inferred from it. Were there nothing 
to bind them together, the inference would be 
entirely precarious. The hearing of an articu­
late voice and rational discourse in the dark 
assures us of the presence of some person.
Why? Because these are the effects of the 
human make and fabric, and closely connected 
with it.°5
Hume is saying that these connections or associations which 
we contribute to the situation from our background of com­
mon knowledge form unities, and from these we make sense 
out of disparate or isolated events. The historian who 
fills the gaps in his narrative account by conjecture 
sentences is employing the same process of reasoning as the 
practical man who reasons from present, available evidence
5E.* cit. , p. 4l. The first two italicized words are 
Hume's. This argument is another example of causal rea­
soning from absence; see my criticism of Warnock in Chap­
ter II.
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to what is now absent. The conjectures are of the same 
type whether they are of a person or an entire civilization. 
Hume's example of a man finding a man-made object like a 
watch on an island and concluding that there had once been 
men on that island is an excellent illustration of histor­
ical inference or reasoning.
Right in line with Hume's characterization of inference 
and reasoning is Collingwood's example :
If we look out over the sea and perceive a 
ship, and five minutes later look again and 
perceive it in a different place, we find 
ourselves obliged to imagine it as having oc­
cupied intermediate positions when we were 
not looking.
My point here is that we have a part-whole or instance-type 
inference. We presuppose a uniformity of events, actions 
or behavior which makes such an inference possible. When 
Hume says that "the Irish Scots made their settlements by 
force or consent, or by a mixture of both" in the History 
note, these alternatives are imagined (in Collingwood's 
sense) empirical possibilities by which evidence is to be 
grouped. The answer to Hume's historical inquiry about the 
Irish Scots would have to be one of these three alterna­
tives. And this is admittedly reasoning from types or 
wholes. The upshot of this is that Collingwood's analysis 
of historical imagination uses an admissibility criterion 
of empirical possibilities which is akin to Hume's. To 
clarify this let me give further examples.
^^Op. cit.
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A commander's dispatches may claim a victory; 
the historian, reading them in a critical 
spirit, will ask: "If it was a victory, why^_
was it not followed up in this or that way?"
Here we have an appeal to meaning; our understanding of
what a victory consists of leads us to think along certain
lines of thought, viz. "in this or that way." Robert
Fawtier's idea of "policy" functions much the same way in 
68his narrative. An association of meanings are built up 
and reasoned from, and these usually take the form of tem­
poral wholes or historical unities. It is generally 
thought that empiricism, and Hume's empiricism in particu­
lar, does not account for this dimension of human exper-
69ience and reasoning. However if we ask the typical 
Humean question of the origin of our idea of unity, we find
some interesting remarks in the Treatise that are along 
this line. For example, the passage below partially ex­
plains Hume's idea of the components of historical con­
struction and imagination. And we could equally substitute
^ *7
Collingwood, op^ . eft., p. 237; my italics.
68The Capetian Kings of France, Epilogue.
69E.g., William James, "On Some Hegelians," in The Will 
to Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy, p. 2 ? ^  
More recently, Peter Winch has made a similar claim in The 
Idea of a_ Social Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1958),
p. 124: "Hume overlooked the fact that 'the idea we form
of an object' does not just consist of elements drawn from 
our observation of that object in isolation, but includes 
the idea of connections between it and other objects." In 
addition to our account of Hume's reasoning thus far, the 
passage below from the Treatise on concept—formation makes 
the verity of Winch's statement rather doubtful.
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"England" for "Rome" to get some idea of Hume's own theory
of concept-formation in history, which was probably utilized
in his History of England.
'Tis this latter principle j/judgmenjt/ which 
peoples the world, and bring us acquainted with 
such existences, as by their removal in time 
and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses 
and memory. By_means of it I paint the universe 
/whole or unit^/ in my imagination, and fix my 
attention on any part of it I please. I form 
an idea of ROME, which I neither see nor remem­
ber; but which is connected with such impressions 
as I remember to have received from the con­
versation and books of travellers and histor­
ians. This idea of ROME I place in a certain 
situation on the idea of any object, which I 
call the globe. I join to it the conception 
of a particular government, and religion, and 
manners. I look backward and consider its first 
foundation; its several revolutions, successes, 
and misfortunes. All this, and every thing 
else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; 
tho' by their force and settled order, arising 
from custom and the relation of cause and 
effect, they distinguish themselves from the 
other ideas which are merely the offspring of
the imagination.70
Admittedly there is an element of the common—sense 
theory of history voiced by Hume here. However, the rudi­
ments of an interesting epistemological position concerning 
history can be observed. Hume is breaking further away 
from the common-sense theory of history when he says that 
the formation of a historical idea, like Rome, is neither 
seen nor remembered. But such an idea is connected with 
data from other historians. At this point Hume sounds much
^^Treatise, p. 108; my italics. Hereafter I shall re­
fer to this passage as "the Treatise passage."
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I i.ko Co.LI i.uKwood, who i n qna.l i.ry Ing ( ho bankrup(;cy ol' i lu'
common-souse theory says:
Yet the common-sense theory may claim a quali­
fied and relative truth. The historian, gen­
erally speaking, works at a subject which 
others have studied before him. In proportion 
as he is more of a novice, either in this par­
ticular subject or in history as a whole, his 
forerunners are, relatively to his incompetence, 
authoritative; . . . As he becomes more and 
more master of his craft and his subject, they 
become less and less his authorities.7^
It seems to me that this is the most plausible answer to 
the Humean question concerning the origin of historical 
unities. Namely, that this is how historical unities are 
formed by historians and non-historians alike; that a con­
ception or idea of a period or event is a cumulative one. 
It is one that is built up over generations of historians. 
Their ideas have an important role in historical episte—
mology in that one historian judges the work of another
72from just such a conception as he himself works from. 
William Dray comes the closest to voicing this idea— the 
idea of the role of cumulative unitary conceptions in his­
tory. In speaking of G. M. Young's Victorian England: 
Portrait of an Age, he says;
Its subject is defined by reference to the 
reign of Queen Victoria. It is quite possible, 
of course, that Young decided to write his
^^Collingwood, 0£. cit., p. 2 3 8 .
7^E.g., Pieter Geyl, Debates with Historians (New York; 
Meridian Books, I9 5 8 ), ch. IX; "The National State and the 
Writers of Netherlands History," is a good example of this.
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history because he saw some kind of unity in 
the period. But having selected this subject, 
he is bound to convey to us only as much of 
this unity as a balanced "portrait" of the 
period w a r r a n t s T h e  p_oint is even clearer 
in the case of ^Carlton/ Hayes. For in his 
case, the very title of his book, A Genera­
tion of Materialism may arouse the expectation 
that his history will have a thematic unity, 
as the exploration of the manifestations of a 
certain frame of mind or outlook. To think, 
however, that Hayes begins with the topic,
"The Materialistic Generation of the Nineteenth 
Century," is to get the logical force of what 
he is" telling us all wrong. "A Generation of 
Materialism" is not the specification of the 
subject of his enquiry; it is his considered 
description-cum-assessment of it in a nutshell.
He does not begin by setting himself the pro­
blem of describing something which stands out 
as a social unity. He begins, rather, by look­
ing for unity in his period.'3
Both Hume and Dray make important points on unitary 
conceptions. On the one hand, Hume's idea that unitary 
conceptions are cumulative in nature is essentially a cor­
rect description of concept formation, although the details 
are rather crude. On the other hand. Dray has emphasized 
that a historian looks for these in his research with no 
guarantee of finding them, instead of beginning his re­
search with them topically. Rather, they emerge from the 
historian's research. Hume's account supplements Dray's 
in suggesting that one must know how to look for them. In 
other words, the attitude of the historian, that of "look­
ing for," is one which is developed from other historians.
73iiThe Historian's Problem of Selection," reprinted 
in Ideas of History, R. H. Nash, ed. (New York: E. P. Dut­
ton and Co., I9 6 9 ), II, 223-224. Dray's italics.
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These conceptions, also, have an explanatory character to 
them. There is the historian's belief that in finding a 
unitary conception he has found an explanation or a means 
of formulating one. There is an idea of completeness in
74
the notion of explanation— historical or otherwise.
Fawtier's "policy," which we looked at earlier, exemplifies 
the idea of a cumulative, unitary conception in history.
As Dray tacitly suggests, the balance of a narrative stems 
from the unity and from what the period itself warrants, 
in that the period indicates a prior establishment of evi­
dence. And as Hume suggests, the role of the historian's, 
imagination in this process is in the selecting, placing, 
joining, and/or connecting of that evidence. The History 
note and the Treatise passage suggest that Hume would have 
fully agreed with Collingwood when the latter says of the 
imagination:
It is this activity which, bridging the gaps 
between what our authorities tell us, gives 
the historical narrative or description its 
continuity.75
The notion of continuity in history does not appear 
in Hume's writings under that name, but is observed in 
other locutions besides the obvious one, "unity." In Hume's 
idiom, we find that expressions like "invariableness" and
74For a recent discussion of this, see Nicholas 
Rescher, Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press,
1 9 7 0), Part I, sec. 9*
^^Op. cit., p. 241.
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"uninterruptedness" convey the idea of continuity. For in­
stance, in the History we notice Hume's use of the concept;
We come now to mention some English Affairs 
which we left behind us, that we might not 
interrupt our narrative of the events in Scot­
land, which form so material a part of the 
present reign.?"
Here the notion of uninterruptedness is explicitly used in 
reference to historical narratives. And perhaps the Humean 
terminology has its best application to historical narra­
tives. For example, the success or fruitfulness of these 
ideas and the Humean idiom is seen in a recent discussion 
of history as narrative by A. R. Louch:
His ^the historian'^/ object is to lay out a 
continuum of events related in such a way as 
to meet the condition of narrative smoothness.
These connections are not causal or statistical.
The condition is met instead when one sees 
a narrative constructed out of adjacent descrip­
tions which closely resemble one another, and 
when one is entitled to assume thaj^ there is 
some persisting thing or process /referent for 
Hume's "object" and unity/ to which this se­
quence of closely resembling descriptions 
applies.
It can also be seen why it has often been 
claimed that the historian must deal in the 
unique and the unrepeated. The historian is 
speking to discover p  chain of similarities 
/Hume's link-chain metaphor as unity/ that 
will exhibit the evolution of an historical 
feature or process; he is not presuming simi­
larities (e.g., all revolution-type events) 
in order to discover other factors constantly 
associated with them.??
^^History. III, 490; my italics.
^"^"History as Narrative," History and Theory, VIII. 1 
(1 9 6 9 ), 57; my italics. Louch's point is similar to Dray's 
on unity.
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To see how this idiom actually functions, we need to do
some interpolating or conjecturing ourselves, for Hume's
account is incomplete and consists mainly of suggestions.
By supplementing Hume's remarks on historical reasoning
and concepts with parts of his discussion of the concept of
mind, we can construct what I shall call Hume's "bundle
theory of historical events."
To do this, one of the first things we need to do is
to make the link-chain metaphor (which appears so frequently
in Hume's writings) explicit. Here we find Professor A. R.
Hall's discussion of the metaphor helpful as a starting
point. He comments that:
The chain-linking, or if you prefer it the­
matic, plan of history has great attractions, 
but because it is impossible at the same time 
to pursue sufficient lateral or cross-sectional 
studies it must remain liable to the danger 
of Whiggism, that is to say the writing of 
history as the story of an ascent to a splen­
did and virtuous climax. How can you construct 
a chain without appealing to the idea of con­
tinuity? But then how does the historian 
determine what enters into the continuum, if 
not by its evident contribution to the climax 
whither the chain leads?7°
These questions, stating "the historian's dilemma," make 
up a rhetorical defense of a limited use of the thematic 
or chain-linking plan of history. One of the possible ob­
jections to Hume's use of the link-chain metaphor in
^^"Can the History of Science be History?," British 
Journal of the History of Science, IV.15 (I9 6 9 ), 216-217.
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talking about unity and causality in history is that the 
links in a chain are equally important; there is no one 
link more important than the others. Hume sometimes tends 
to talk this way. However, such an interpretation of the 
causal metaphor is to read it too literally. For such a 
reading would overlook the order of the links. And as we 
have already seen, Hume thinks that the historian, as well 
as the continuum of events, contributes to this end. In 
detail:
We always follow the succession of time in 
placing our ideas, and from the consideration 
of any object pass more easily to that, which 
follows immediately after it, than to that 
which went before it. We may learn this, 
among other instances, from the order, which 
is always observed in historical narrations.
/My italics^/Nothing but an absolute neces­
sity can oblige an historian to break the 
order of time, and in his narration give the 
precedence to an event, which was in reality 
posterior to another.79
So as a partial answer to the question as to which links go 
where in the chain, Hume says that they must follow a tem­
poral order; that is to say they must be chronological in 
some sense.
Another possible objection to or weakness in the link- 
chain metaphor is stated by Hall: "A more refined histor­
ical examination will sometimes divide and distinguish where
80simple historical chains bind and unite." Hall is think­
ing of only one chain; but multiple chains, which take the
^^Treatise, p. 430. ^^Op. cit., p. 216.
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form of historical movements, are possible. In this case, 
Hall's claims for the impossibility of lateral and longi­
tudinal studies and necessary liability collapse, for they 
hold logically only under a single chain. However, as is 
seen in the following passage, Hume takes into account a 
procedure such as Hall describes:
On the other hand, we may trace the succession 
of time by a like succession of ideas, and con­
ceiving first one moment, along with the object 
then existent, imagine afterwards a change in 
the time without any variation or interruption 
in the object; in which case it gives us the 
idea of unity.
As Hume says, "one single object /^e.g.,"The Great Plainsj]7
conveys the idea of unity," and this is the case, according
to his argument, because of
. . . The invariableness and uninterrupted-
ness of any object, thro' a suppos'd varia­
tion of time, by which the mind can trace it 
in the different periods of its existence, 
without any break of the view, and without 
being oblig'd to form the idea of multipli­
city or number . "2
The historian's dilemma that Hall cited can be seen 
in Hume's idea of proportion or in what Dray referred to 
as a "balance" in the historian's portrait. On the one 
hand, "we must measure the greatness ^significance of the 
part not absolutely, but by its proportion to the
Treatise, p. 201; Hume's italics.
32Treatise, pp. 200-201, respectively. The reference 
to point of view by Hume in the last passage will be dis­
cussed in the next chapter (IV).
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whole ^chain/." And, on the other hand, he adds the con­
verse of this on the same page: to . . break or inter­
rupt the continuity of its l&n object'^/ actions not ac­
cording to their real ^i.e., absolut^/ greatness, but ac­
cording to their proportion to each other y/the links/^.
As Hall observes, in practice this procedure as conveyed
by the metaphor can be dangerous, for "chains also divide
84what should be united." But Hume qualifies his last 
statement, and we can see some allowance for Hall's criti­
cism in the following remark:
We may induce the imagination to advance a 
step further; and that is, by producing a re­
ference of the parts to each other, and a 
combination to some common end or purpose.
A ship, of which a considerable part has been 
chang'd by frequent reparations, is still 
consider'd as the same."5
Analogously, this would probably be Hume's view of 
historical figures and events; of the former, he would say, 
"Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still 
connected by the relation of c a u s a t i o n . O f  those his­
torical events which have no common end or causal relation, 
Hume has little to say:
All the disputes /historical disagreements 
perhaps?/ concerning the identity of con­
nected objects are merely verbal, except so 
far as the relation of parts gives rise to . 
some fiction or imaginary principle of union. '
^^Ibid., p. 2Ô1; Hume's italics. ^^Op. cit.
®^Treatise, p. 257. ®^Ibid., p. 261.
0*7 — — —
Ibid., p. 2 6 2 ; my italics.
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Hume's exceptive clause is important, since it seems to 
make some allowance for theories in history. This imagi­
nary principle of union forms a theory or a chain, and when 
viewed
in this_respect, I cannot compare the soul 
^"mind^ more properly to any thing than to a 
republic or commonwealth, in which the several 
members are united by the reciprocal ties of 
government and subordination, and give rise 
to other persons, who propagate the same re­
public in the incessant changes of its parts.
And as the same individual republic may not 
only change its members, but also its laws and 
constitutions; in like manner the same person 
may vary his character and disposition, as 
well as his impressions and ideas, without 
losing his identity. Whatever changes he en­
dures, his several parts are still connected 
by the relation of causation.®®
It is revealing that Hume's analysis here is based on an 
analogy of the concept of mind to that of historical treat­
ments of social individuals— for example, a republic. This, 
in effect, shows that our conjecture here about historical 
events and Hume's theory of mind are appropriate to each 
other.
With these remarks from the Treatise and ones we 
discussed from the Inquiry earlier in this chapter, we are 
now in the position to determine roughly what the Humean 
analysis of historical entities consists of. To explain 
is to resort to the event under consideration. If an ex­
planation of an event is given, the event becomes a string
®®Ibid., p. 261.
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or. a chain of (lessor-scale) events. Some of these chains 
of events make up what we regard as a history of one 
(larger-scale) event : e.g., chains would be the manners, 
religion, politics, etc. of a people. The unity of an 
event is a unity of history. (Hume's own historical writ­
ings testify to this besides his philosophy.) To use Ber­
trand Russell's analogy:
. . . It is like the unity of a tune, which 
takes time to play, and does not exist whole 
in any one moment;
and.
If a tune takes five minutes to play, we do 
not conceive of it as a single thing which 
exists throughout that time, but as a series 
of notes, so related as to form a unity.®9
In the case of a tune, the unity is aesthetic, but in the 
case of a historical event, it is causal. The causal re­
lation is a relation of order for Hume, and to talk about 
relations one needs relata or objects of the relation. 
(Obviously, there must be relations of something; there are 
not merely relations.) Hume's idea of links /relataT" in a 
chain ^relatioi^ metaphorically conveys this; perceptions
and/or objects "are link'd together by the relation of
90cause and effect."^
^An Outline of Philosophy (New York: Meridian Books,
1 9 2 7), p. lié and p. 118 respectively. I am indebted to 
Russell's discussion of unity and its relationship to phy­
sical events in developing my own discussion here. Rus­
sell's own analysis (which he labels as "Humean") follows 
Hume's point for point except that Russell does not gener­
alize to historical events.
90Treatise, p. 2Ô1; my italics.
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In history we refer to given events within periods
as relata. Russell calls them the "neighborhood" of the 
91given event. That those events have some relationship 
to another specified by a historian is what Russell means 
by saying that they are neighboring events. Neighboring 
events for Hume are those which satisfy directly or indi­
rectly the relations of causation, resemblance, and conti­
guity. Causation as the unity for history lies in some 
observed law of succession from one event to the next. An 
event at one moment is succeeded by an event at a neigh­
boring moment, which can be proved or conjectured from the 
earlier event. This enables the historian to construct a 
string or a chain of events, each growing out of a slightly 
earlier event to an "intrinsic law" (meaning isolatable 
among the events themselves). Outside influences are con­
sidered and thought of as affecting these events only be­
cause they form a part of the neighborhood. Hence a string 
or chain of events connected in this way by an approximate 
intrinsic law of development is a historical event, period 
or figure. This is what is meant by saying that the unity 
of a historical event is causal. A chain for Hume is a se­
quence which is causal and contiguous in place and time, 
and it is "unity" to which the chain metaphor refers.
Hence, Hume's principle, "a sufficient unity in the
^^Op. cit., p. 1 1 6 . Its meaning here loosely paral­
lels its use in graph theory.
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subject," exists when there are given enough linlcs for a 
chain to be possible, and when conjectures fill the gaps 
between links to complete the chain. For the reader of 
Hume, this sounds familiar; for mind likewise yields to a 
similar analysis and resolves into a series of events.
The bundle theory portrays a historical event as nothing 
but a collection of (lessor) events to which we give a 
special name (e.g., "French Revolution") because they are ' 
found together. What is characteristic of a collection is, 
as we have seen, an association of ideas. So a thematic 
plan in history is a chain of similarities that are deter­
mined by the association of ideas. Hume's search for the 
appropriate conception of unity for historical discourse 
was facilitated by the link-chain metaphor.
Conjectures are, above all, inferences to unifying 
92grounds; for example, a nation (England for Hume), a war 
(Peolponnesian War for Thucydides and World War II for 
Taylor), a man (Hitler for Taylor and Henry VIII, e.g., 
for Hume), etc. Periods also function in this way. All 
that falls within the same strecth of time (Hume's resem­
blance and contiguity principles) constitutes a period.
92Paul Weiss is one of the few philosophers who has 
appreciated the importance of this type of inference in 
historical reasoning, and I am indebted to some of his sug­
gestive remarks in my discussion here. However, his pre­
sentation of historical unities is markedly different from 
mine. See his History: Written and Lived (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1962), pp. 77» 88, 
106-109, 147-148.
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What is relevant or significant to both the beginning and 
end of a period or a chain is its common factor.. The com­
mon factor is the unity of the period; for example, in 
Fawtier’s history, the Capetian Kings' "policy” constitutes 
a chain of similar links.
We find Hume's chain metaphor also employed in con­
junction with his theory of conjectures; for instance:
Having once acquired this notion of causation 
from the memory, we can extend the same chain 
of causes, and consequently the identity of 
our persons beyond our memory, and can compre­
hend times, and circumstances, and actions,
wHich we have entirely forgot, but suppose
/^conjecturez /n general to have existed.93
A historical figure, for example, is constructed on incom­
plete evidence. Historians, like most writers, want if at 
possible a unified man. We know from our own experience 
that Henry VIII was a man who lived and breathed like we 
do, who had a personality, a somewhat consistent behavior,
etc. These conceptions are formed, according to Hume, in
94the same way that we form an idea of Rome. One tries to 
harmonize diverse elements into what is fundamental to a
man, period, or war. This is where the idea of a common
factor comes into the picture. Hume saw that some sort of 
unity must be methodologically presupposed, if there are
^Treatise, p. 262; my italics. This is perhaps the 
best summational statement of his theory of historical 
discourse.
^^Ibid., p. 108. Cited earlier in this chapter.
143
to be gaps of which it is the purpose of conjecture sen­
tences in historical discourse to fill. The real cause of 
an event or the real Hitler, etc., needs to be conjectured 
because our idea of what constitutes a real war or a real 
man is unitary or unified, i.e., a single conception. But 
we do not have available such a conception. This idea of 
unified conceptions comes, as Walsh suggests, from our 
experience of the present as a "concrete w h o l e . F o r  
instance, the meaning I have in mind here is something like: 
"It is easy to dismiss the false Hitler, but the true one 
can only be conjectured." In other words, Hume in his 
theory of conjectures is breaking away from the common- 
sense theory of history in which truth comes ready-made 
from an authority and is simply accepted. This theory is 
inherently weak, for something or someone's account has to 
become authoritative, or be established as reliable, before 
it can be an authority. (The question of why something or 
someone is considered authoritative has no suitable answer.) 
Truths in history are then conjectures or inferences; the 
historian, so to speak, makes truths; he does not just find 
them. They are fashioned by conjecture.
It may be tempting to label Hume's approach as 
"Whiggish" (Hall's term), but such a temptation should be 
resisted. Nonetheless, the charge of Whiggism is perhaps
95'Op. cit. , p. 64.
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the crucial objection to Hume's model of historical narra­
tion. That is to say, history is represented as leading up 
to a grand and virtuous climax, as the Whig historians were
96accused of doing. For example, there is the historical
illustration that all the events, say, of England were
leading to constitutional monarchy, the perfect form of
government. (Hume has been sometimes accused of being
guilty of this in the History.) This aspect of grandness
or splendidness is central to Whiggism; as Bagby puts it:
/A/ way in which the artistic preoccupation 
of historians distort their subject-matter 
is due to the necessity which most of them 
feel of giving a sort of dramatic unity to 
the incidents with which they deal. A his­
torian will usually organize his work around 
some compelling theme, the conflict between two 
leaders, two nations, two factions or two op­
posing systems of thought. His choice of 
what facts are relevant is very largely de­
termined by this need for unity; it is ex­
pressed in a thousand diverse modes of shading
and emphasis.97
There can be no doubt that this was done by past his­
torians and is still done by present ones. But the tendency 
to identify all thematic histories or the thematic mode of 
writing in history as Whiggish is mistaken, for Whiggism 
is an extreme form of thematic history. Just because a 
history is thematic, we cannot ^  priori label it as
See Walsh, p. 199; Hall, p. 2l6; and Herbert Butter­
field, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co., 193l)«
^^Op. cit., p. 43.
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Whiggish. We do distinguish between selection and distor­
tion, appropriate themes and compelling ones, a conclusion 
and a virtuous climax. For example, Taylor's account ob­
viously leads up to a certain result or climax, viz. the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Likewise, Fawtier's 
account leads to a certain result— the full legal and pol­
itical expression of policies by the Capetian Kings. Surely 
we do not label these histories as Whiggish; at least not 
for these reasons. These are legitimate historical proce­
dures, and like most procedures, they can be misapplied of 
misused. The difference here between Whiggish and thematic 
histories is material rather than formal. Both display 
unities, but one is illustrating a thesis which becomes a 
dramatic unity, whereas the other is tracing and developing 
argumentatively the emergence of some trend or movement.
It may very well be the case that the events in England 
were leading to constitutional monarchy. Many historians 
do agree with this and write in this fashion. A thesis 
such as this becomes Whiggish when the value judgment is 
conjoined and is reflected in the writing to the point 
that a historian would say: "Constitutional monarchy is
the perfect form of government and the English have achieved 
perfection in the realm of politics." The histories which 
fall into these categories can be determined without much 
difficulty. To rule out all thematic histories as Whiggish 
is to overlook the important teleological dimension of
l46
of historical writing and that history which is represented 
as a series of problems confronted by the various agents 
concerned can be a constructive tool in providing historical
98explanations.
In short, there is no doubt that a model for thema­
tic histories, such as Hume's, can lead to a distortion of
facts, but it does not, as Bagby suggests, necessarily
99lead to such a distortion. Thematic histories do not 
imply or entail Whiggism, although Whiggism certainly 
implies a thematic history. Hume's emphasis upon and treat­
ment of unity is not simply dramatic or literary; for, as 
we have argued, one of the central features of his argument 
is that historical figures and periods display unity. His 
model is an argument that there are such things as themes 
and movements. This is the minimal interpretation that I 
wish to defend. Indeed, it was the bankruptcy of English 
historical writing that led Hume to rewrite English his-
t o r y . l O O
One of Hume's points is that any history will exhibit 
a unity by displaying causal, similar, and temporal
98See Walsh's Appendix B on historical causation.
99on. cit.
^^^See, e.g., Letters of David Hume to William 
Strahan, G. B. Hill, ed. TOxford: The Clarendon Press,
1 8 8 8), passim; and for a recent study, see Leo Braudy, Nar­
rative Form in History and Fiction; Hume, Fielding, and 
Gibbon (Princeton: The University Press, 1970) who has cov­
ered historiography from a literary perspective, and has 
made some interesting points about Hume's History.
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connections, and by periodization references. The coher­
ence of a historical narrative is thought of in terms of 
these unifying principles. Conjecture sentences contribute, 
as we have seen, to this end also. So Hume goes far beyond 
the Aristotelian identification of the dramatic with unity. 
He finds unity displayed on many levels, notably in teleo­
logical human behavior and in reasoning as the grounds for 
various connecting principles. Hume's model shows that he 
obviously thought that thematic history was superior to de­
scriptive histories for these reasons. But "unity" as a 
historical theme is in need of a qualification. If some
such unity were not found, this would not imply that the
101historian has lost a grip on his subject, but that his 
work is descriptive rather than thematic.
What I have tried to show in this chapter is that 
Hume's model of historical narration displays some important 
features of historical writing and the reasoning behind it 
(some of it admittedly hypothetical), and that some notable 
histories can be analyzed in terms of this model. There 
are some notable deficiencies in his model and I have not 
dwelled on these for obvious reasons. What is worthwhile 
about Hume ' s model is that it does, _in principle, achieve 
a constructionist theory of history and has some remarkable 
parallels with some of the details of Collingwood's idea 
of history.
101Dray, 0£. cit., p. 224.
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For us to explore more fully what the order, plan, 
or unity of historical reasoning and writing are concep­
tually, we must turn to the notion of point of view in 
history. This will be our preoccupation in the next chap­
ter (IV).
CHAPTER IV
POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY AND HUME
A comprehension of the United States to-day, an 
understanding of the rise and progress of the 
forces which have made it what it is, demands 
that we should rework our history from the new 
points of view afforded by the present.
Frederick Jackson Turner
Introductory Remarks
In his Napoleon; For and Against, Pieter Geyl makes
use of the notion of point of view in these statements:
From the point of view which I indicated, jtoo, 
even though one can accept his /Lefebvre's/ 
presentation most of the time, there will still 
be a good deal to say about his appreciation 
and his interpretation;
and.
I say this ^ i .e., that history can reach no 
unchallegeable conclusions on so many-sided 
a character/ with some emphasis, for Professor 
Romein, in his inaugural lecture at Amsterdam, 
dâd take precisely this point of view. . .
/The historian's/ point of view. . . is deter­
mined by the circumstances of his time and by 
his own preconceptions. . . .  In other words 
we cannot see the past in a single, communi­
cable picture except from a point of view, 
which implies a choice, a personal perspec­
tive.!
^Olive Renier, trans. (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1949), p. 449, and p. 15, respectively.
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The use of the notion of point of view is not restricted to
Geyl. The phrase "point of view" and its abbreviated form,
"view," appears frequently in historical writing. For
example, Arthur Schlesinger has entitled one of his books
New Viewpoints in American History and Jesse Lemisch's
"The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up" suggests
something indicative of point of view in its title. Lemisch,
for instance, says: "^S. Morison admired the 'codfish
aristocracy,' and he looked at colonial Massachusetts
2
largely from their point of view." When historians like 
these talk about "point of view," what do they have in 
mind? What role is played by the notion of point of view 
in historical epistemology? What is the/a historical point 
of view, or the/a historian's point of view? These are but 
a few questions which arise from reflecting on statements 
such as the above. And to answer these questions it will 
be helpful to look at what philosophers have had to say 
about the notion.
Point of view is an idea which has received quite a 
bit of attention from contemporary philosophers. For in­
stance, in the field of ethics Kurt Baier, Paul Taylor,
2
In Towards ^  New Past; Dissenting Essays in American 
History, Barton J. Bernstein, ed. (Vintage Books ed.; New 
York: Random House, I9 6 7 ), P* 4. Bernstein's Introduction
contains numerous instances of the notion of point of view 
in addition to most of the other essays in this volume. I 
am indebted to Bernstein for the Turner and Schlesinger 
references to point of view.
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and G. J. Warnock have suggested some accounts of it. Jon 
Moline has recently given a general analysis of the concept, 
But it is principally W. H. Walsh and Karl Popper who have 
discussed it at some length in reference to history. We 
shall look at the specific discussions of these men in a 
moment, but first let us direct our attention to Hume. For 
it is primarily his model in which we are presently in­
terested.
Hume's Model
To my knowledge, Hume was the first major writer to 
explicitly utilize the notion of point of view to any great 
extent, and much of what he says hinges upon the idea. In 
his essay "Of the Study of History," he offers the follow­
ing definition for classifying history with other human 
endeavors : "History. . . places the objects in their true
3
point of view." This statement suggests that the notion 
of point of view is of central importance to the under­
standing of history. However, most instances of the con­
cept's use in the context of history do not directly 
utilize the phrase "point of view." This can lead to 
problems in properly identifying Hume's use. Fortunately, 
there are other locutions for the same notion which are 
reasonably clear in Hume's writings. For instance, the 
word "light" is clearly used to mean point of view, as may
3
^David Hume; Philosophical Historian, p. 39; my 
italics. The meaning of "true" in Hume's definition is 
discussed in the next section.
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be seen in the following passage from the History;
The great increase of monasteries, if matters 
be considered in a^ political light, will ap­
pear the radical inconvenience of the Catholic 
religion; and every other disadvantage attend­
ing that communion seems to have an inseparable 
connexion with these religious institutions.-
The reasoning here is conditioned by the point of view. If 
the conditional clause were absent from Hume's statement, 
the assertion would be taken from context and thereby be 
considered false— if not absurd; for the increase of monas­
teries does (or did) not appear as a "radical" inconven­
ience to Catholicism. So the clause seems to act as a 
context-indicator. Other passages suggest this analysis
of its use. For instance in his essay "Of the Populousness 
«
of Ancient Nations," Hume says:
The question, therefore, concerning the popu­
lousness of ancient and modern times, being 
allowed of great importance, it will be requi­
site, if we would bring it to some determina­
tion, to compare both the domestic and politi- 
cal situation of these two periods, in order 
to judge of the facts by their moral causes; 
which is the first VIEW in which we proposed 
to consider them.5
Considering something implies a viewpoint. The same idea
of viewpoint is attributed to others by Hume, under the
locution "light," as is seen later in the same essay:
There are commonly compensations in every 
human condition: and though these compensa­
tions be not always perfectly equal, yet they
^History, III, 122; my italics.
5Pavid Hume: Philosophical Historian, p. 8l. Hume's
italics and my capitalization.
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serve, at least, to restrain the prevailing 
principle. To compare them and estimate their 
influence, is indeed difficult, even where they 
take place in the same age, and in neighbour­
ing countries: But where several ages have
intervened, and only scattered lights are af­
forded us by ancient authors ; what can we do 
but amuse ourselves by talking pro and con, 
on an interesting subject, and thereby cor- g 
recting all hasty and violent determinations?
We also find "light" and "view" used by Hume to mean
"point of view" in the second Enquiry where he remarks that:
The more we vary our views of human life, and 
the newer and more unusual the lights are in 
which we survey it, the origin here assigned 
for the virtue of justice is real and satis­
factory.?
There are a great many more uses of the notion in Hume, but 
these examples suffice to show that he uses the concept in 
discussing various subjects, and that it is central to the 
Humean idiom. His use of point of view in characterizing 
history is not accidental, but is an idea which he fre­
quently employs.
Now, if this is the case, what does Hume mean by "point 
of view?" In other words, to what extent does he understand 
the notion? Is it a piece of technical jargon or just a 
convenient expression? Does he provide some sort of analysis
Ibid., p. 9 0 . The last pair of italics are Hume's, 
the idea of "neighborhood," as we saw in the last chapter 
(III), is of central importance to the notion of historical 
comparison. Perhaps, part of the meaning of "true point of 
view" in Hume's characterization of history is a viewpoint 
which takes into account an event's "neighborhood," i.e., 
the contiguous context.
7
Op. cit., p. 23; my italics.
1^4
of its meaning? If not, are we able to construct an analy­
sis from the hints and details he gives us? Fortunately, 
Hume himself does provide us with some answers to these 
questions, which in turn should shed some light on his use 
of the notion in connection with history. In the second 
Enquiry, we find the following description of "the taking 
of a point of view."
When a man denominates another his enemy, his 
rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is 
understood to speak the language of self-love, 
and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, 
and arising from his particular circumstances 
and situation. But when he bestows on any man 
the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, 
he then speaks another language, and expresses 
sentiments, in which he expects all his audience 
are to concur with him. He must here, there­
fore, depart from his private and particular 
situation, and must choose a point of view, 
common to him with others; he must move some
universal principle of the human frame, and
touch a string to which all mankind have an 
accord and symphony.®
From the substance of this observation about the difference 
in language, can we suppose that this would be true of his­
tories? Geyl said that a historian's point of view implies 
a choice, a personal perspective. Does Geyl have in mind
more than just the psychological truism that a personal per­
spective is analytically necessary because a historian is a 
person? This question is unanswerable in terms of what 
Geyl has left us to work with, but 1 think there is more
®Ibid., pp. 110-111,
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involved than a truism. I think this because Hume's above
account of a point of view in terms of language (or of what
is reflected in one's language) suggests something more
than truisms, i.e., an analytical approach to the notion of
point of view. A contemporary historian who has clearly
appreciated this is Bernard Bailyn: "Much could be said
about this question of wôrd—choices as they relate to the
historian's stance : the distance he assumes from the
10reader and from his subject." In detail:
The choice of words is crucial if only because 
it affects the way in which the historian 
handles the problem of distance. . . .  His 
effort is to keep the reader's mind constantly 
and evenly focused on the historical situa­
tion, not on his own; and his success in this 
can depend to a considerable extent on the 
kinds of words he chooses. An excessively sub­
jective or connotative word can suddenly dis­
locate the author in relation to his reader 
and his subject by injecting the author's 
personality and forcing the reader to jump 
from one world to another. This, for example, 
explains the jarring effect of the single 
word A. L. Rowse uses to modify the final 
noun in this characteristic sentence about 
the English Puritans: "Leicester was on their
9
In his treatment of point of view, Walsh at times 
seems to suggest no more than a truism; see pp. 97ff. For 
an extended, detailed treatment of Walsh's application of 
the idea of point of view to history, see my Reasoning and 
Disagreement in History (unpublished M. A. thesis; Fort 
Worth: Texas Christian University, 1 9 6 6). Some of the
material in this chapter was first worked out in that the­
sis; however, what is presented here is markedly different 
from its earlier form.
10"The Problems of the Working Historian: A Comment,"
Philosophy and History: A Symposium, Sidney Hook, ed. (New
York: The University Press, 1965), p. 100; my italics.
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side, and kept in with them, and spoke their
somewhat nauseating language."H
Professor Bailyn's point is well taken; and in in­
stances such as the one he cited, his observation is unde- 
batable. But if this rule is generalized, there may be 
exceptions. Under the Humean model, the exceptions are 
those instances in which the significance of an event or a 
series of events is disclosed only by reference to the 
reader's general knowledge, to the present, or to some 
later event(s). For example, there is Hume's discussion of 
the Jews in Medieval England which I cited and discussed in 
Chapter III. Is it not part of the historian's task in pre­
sentation to absorb or involve the reader in the world of 
the past? Surely this involvement or absorption is not 
one of isolation from the present, or at least not com­
pletely. Part of what is meant by saying that a history is 
meaningful is that it has some relationship to the present. 
That is to say, some aspect of our present world is ac­
counted for historically— we understand how it arose his­
torically from its origins and how it developed. Bailyn's 
historiographical rule is, of course, in reference to exces­
sive instances. However, for the sake of argument it is 
instructive to take his rule unequivocally. For example, 
this rule might be applied to some of Professor J. H. Plumb's 
sentences in his England in the Eighteenth Century in which
^^Ibid., pp. 99-100; Bailyn's italics.
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he makes such statements as;
^John/ Wesley's superstitions were those of 
his uneducated audiences. He produced a lit­
tle book on physic which was on sale at all 
meeting-houses. It is an absurd, fantastic 
compilation of uncritical folk-lore.
On the one hand, "absurd" and "fantastic" are subjective 
words in that they connote personal judgments in the same 
way that "nauseating" does in Rowse's sentence. On the 
other hand, Plumb's sentence (like Hume's example about the 
plight of the Jews in Medieval England) is not exclusively 
subjective in that there are objective standards which are 
applicable to the usage of his words. The adjectives mod­
ifying "compilation" can, in some sense, be verified or 
proven appropriate by evidence found in the compilation.
But "nauseating" is exclusively a subjective word in the 
sense that its job is to refer to inner states which are 
unverifiable and not amenable to objective criteria. The 
observation of the difference between these two classes of 
words is important, for they could be blurred in the appli­
cation of Bailyn's rule. Its unrestricted employment would 
or could lead to rather uninteresting histories. My point 
here about the historian'ë language is that Hume's descrip­
tion of point of view coincides with the minimal objective 
referring capacity necessary for terms in a historical nar­
rative. The overt, excessive or exclusively subjective
^^(Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1950), p.
9 6 ; my italics.
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reference of words is one element that we would (along with
Bailyn) supposedly find absent in the/a historical point of
view. We find in a further characterization of point of
view by Hume this absence of the exclusively subjective:
It is necessary for us, in our calm judgements 
and discourse concerning the characters of men, 
to neglect all these /personal or subj ectiyeZ 
differences, and render our sentiments more 
public and social. Besides, that we ourselves 
often change our situation in this particular, 
we every day meet with persons who are in a 
situation different from us, and who could 
never converse with us were we to remain con­
stantly in that position and point of view, 
which is peculiar to ourselves. The inter­
course of sentiments, therefore, in society and 
conversation, makes us form some general unal­
terable standard by which we may approve or 
disapprove of characters and manners.^3
The suggestion I see in Hume's emphasis upon lan­
guage in discussing point of view is that those subjec­
tively referring terms do in fact, as Geyl says, imply a 
choice, a personal perspective, but they also imply some 
connection to the evidence. The class of historical terms 
we have been discussing reflects a double aspect in its 
referential capacity. This important point is perhaps 
most admirably put by Professor Walsh:
Nor need this admission /a Geylian on_e/ lead 
to the conclusion that all history is irretriev­
ably biased; the proper inference is only that 
it is all written from a particular point of
l^Enquiry, p. 64. Perhaps what Hume means by "unal­
terable" in the last sentence is "enough unchangeableness 
to allow for consistency by whatever standard is used."
What else minimally could be meant by "standard" in the 
sense of a criterion? See my discussion of such terms as 
"constancy" in Chapter II of this essay.
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view. The point of view colours the account 
the historian gives, or if you like slants it, 
but it does not (or should not) decide its 
details. Given that what really matters in 
history the fate of the common man, there 
can still be true and false answers to the 
question how the common man fared at parti­
cular times.14
Hume's choice of "true" in his characterization of history
as the placing of "the objects in their true point of view"
makes it clear that more is implied by the notion of point
of view than prejudice or irretrievable bias. In fact,
what Hume probably had in mind by "true" can perhaps be
best understood in lieu of his discussion of prejudice in
"Of the Standard of Taste" where he makes further use of
the notion of point of view. He says:
To enable a critic _£e.g., a historian/ the 
more fully to execute this underjtaking /i,e. , 
critical assessment or appraisaiy, he must pre­
serve his mind free from all prejudice, and 
allow nothing to enter into his consideration, 
but the very object which is submitted to his 
examination. We may observe, that every work 
of art, in order to produce its due effect on 
the mind, must be surveyed in a certain point 
of view, and cannot be fully relished by per­
sons whose situation, real or imaginary, is not 
conformable to that which is required by the 
performance. . . .  In like manner, when any 
work is addressed to the public, though 1 
should have a friendship or enmity with the 
author, 1 must depart from this situation, 
and, considering myself as a man in general, 
forget, if possible, my individual being, and 
my peculiar circumstances. A person influ­
enced by prejudice complies not with this 
condition, but obstinately maintains his na­
tural position, without placing himself in
i ^ "Historical Causation," in his Philosophy of His­
tory: An Introduction, p. 195; Walsh's italics.
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that point of view which the performance sup­
poses. If the work be addressed to persons of 
a different age or nation, he makes no allow­
ance for their peculiar views and prejudices; 
but, full of the manners of his own age and 
country, rashly condemns what seemed admirable 
in the eyes of those for whom alone the dis­
course was calculated. If the work be executed 
for the public, he never sufficiently enlarges 
his comprehension, or forgets his interest as 
a friend or enemy, as a rival or commentator.
By this means his sentiments are perverted.^5
Hume is suggesting in this passage that the purpose 
of point of view is to remove prejudice— not to produce it. 
Placing oneself in that point of view which the action or 
the* event supposes is a condition for true assessments or 
appraisals of evidence or of another's work, i.e., objec­
tivity. Moreover, Hume's idea of audience— "when any work 
is addressed to the public"— has an important corollary 
with the first passage from the second Enquiry which 1 
cited earlier. That is, as Walsh says:
. . . each historian approaches his task of 
reconstituting and comprehending the past with 
his own ideas about what sorts of things in 
it are intrinsically important, ideas with 
which he must presume some sympathy in his 
readers.
Also, one might add to this statement that there is a back­
ground of common knowledge presupposed and appealed to by 
the historian. He presumes that his reader's sympathy is
Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, J . W. 
Lenz, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., I9 6 5 ), pp.
14-15; Hume's italics.
^^Op. cit., pp. 194-195.
l6l
directed toward this common knowledge as well as toward his 
value judgments or judgments of importance. These types of 
judgments in history are tied to point of view; as Teggart 
puts it:
The contemporary historian does not include 
every detail which may have come to his know^ 
ledge; he presents only such matters as, from 
his point of view, are of importance.^7
Point of view supplies the connections among events; it 
makes importance possible in history.
In Hume's model, then, historical terms take on their 
objective referring capacity when the historian's personal 
idiosyncrasies are suspended and his judgment becomes more 
general or comprehensive. In other words, his judgment 
must represent a "span," just as the events are represented 
by a temporal span or chain. This becomes obvious when we 
pose the question: How are chains constructed or where do
they come from?— From the historian's point of view. The 
chains are an expression of the point of view. Hume's 
stipulation in the second Enquiry that the contents of 
point of view move "some universal principle of the human 
frame" is akin to Walsh's idea that sympathy must be in­
volved. This meaning of "sympathy" is semi-technical, 
though, in the sense that it involves a methodological com­
mitment to a shared or common background of knowledge.
Part of the content of a historian's point of view is this
^^Theory and Processes of History, pp. 18-19-
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presumed knowledge and affinity with his readers. And the 
historian's narrative implies a point of view. As Hume 
says, "every kind of composition. . . is nothing but a 
chain of propositions and reasonings. The "chain" is 
Hume's metaphor for point of view. He thought that design 
or point of view was essential and valuable not only to 
history, but to all reasoning. As he said in the first 
Inquiry;
In all abstract reasonings there is one point 
of view which, if we can happily hit, we shall 
go further toward illustrating the subject 
than by all the eloquence and copious expres­
sion in the world. This point of view we 
should endeavor to reach, and reserve the flow­
ers of rhetoric for subjects which are more 
adapted to them.
To make the notion of point of view and Hume's model 
of it more precise, we need to turn to the contemporary 
discussion of it. The next section will be concerned with 
this.
18Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays, p. I6 .
^^Op. cit., p. 8 9 • In his Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, George Berkeley provides a 
good explanation as to why Hume thought history is abstract 
reasoning: "Unity, I know, some will have to be a simple
or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into 
the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word 
'unity' I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not 
miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most
familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accom­
pany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways 
of sensation and reflection. To say no more, it is an 
abstract idea." Sec. 13; Berkeley's italics. Reprinted in 
l6th-Century Philosophy, L. W. Beck, ed. (New York: The
Free Press, I9 6 6 ), p. 57»
163
Corollaries and Analogues
Some interesting implications in Hume's model can
be drawn out if we examine an idea which is held central
to the analysis of the concept— that of an arbitrator. For
instance, Kurt Baier, who first developed the idea of a
point of view in ethics during this century, observed that
"by 'the moral point of view' we mean a point of view which
furnishes a court of arbitration for conflicts of inter- 
20ests." Paul Taylor further developed the notion of a 
point of view by characterizing it as a cross-cultural con­
cept and spelling out what "court of arbitration" means:
Taking a certain point of view is nothing but 
adopting certain canons of_reasoning /rules 
of relevance and inferenc_e/ as the framework 
within which value judgments are to be justi­
fied; the canons of reasoning define the point 
of view . 21
Jon Moline has supplied further precision in analyzing what
the content of Taylor's "framework" consists of.
22Professor Moline's paper, along with the material 
just cited, is consistent with Hume's rudimentary model.
The Moral Point of View (Abridged ed.; New York: 
Random House, 19^5)i P* 96; his italics. Baier first de­
veloped (more than likely independently of Hume) the con­
cept of the moral point of view in "The Point of View of 
Morality," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXIII 
(1954), 104-135.
2 i
Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., I9 6I), p. IO9 .
22"On Points of View," American Philosophical Quar­
terly, V.3 (1 9 6 8), 1 9 1- 1 9 8. I am much indebted to Moline's 
analysis in my discussion of the concept of point of view 
in this section.
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In my discussion these papers serve the function of making 
Hume's model more definite. For instance, the remarks by 
Baier and Taylor make it possible for us to see why Hume 
thought that a general framework or standard was needed to 
rationally converse; for a point of view allows for the 
initial agreement which later enables one to dis-agree. 
Moline, following Taylor, identifies "point of view" with 
canons of reasoning, i.e., rules of inference and relevance, 
in that three principal types of claims are made in using 
the expression "point of view." The first type is what 
Moline calls "comprehension claims." These are generally 
made in explanatory contexts and constantly appear in his­
torical discourse. Simple understanding of what another is 
saying is involved in claims of this type, and Hume's 
characterization of "point of view" in the second Enquiry 
covers uses of this sort. An example of this type is illu­
strated by Hume's remark about monasteries in which he 
added the conditional clause, that "from a political light" 
the monasteries appeared as an inconvenience.
Moline labels the second type of claims as "size 
claims." These claims involve the breadth or narrowness of 
the scope of the point of view. It is here where we begin 
to speak of "point of view" as rules of inference. When we 
speak of selective historical narratives, or of a histor­
ian's point of view as being selective, we begin to make 
size claims. For instance, when a Marxist historian asserts
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that "all history is the history of class struggle," his 
claim is one of size or is a comment on selection. Since 
it is a remark on selection, it is a historical interpre­
tation. As we noticed with Walsh, these points of view and 
their respective claims are not of themselves true or false. 
But whether particular events are class struggles can be 
pronounced as true or false. Karl Popper's discussion of 
"point of view" covers mainly those uses involving size 
claims. However, his analysis contains additional elements 
which are in need of clarification. He says:
For undoubtedly there can be no history with­
out a point of view; like the natural sciences, 
history must be selective unless it is to be 
choked by a flood of poor and unrelated ma­
terial. The attempt to follow causal chains 
into the remote past would not help in the 
least, for every concrete effect with which 
we might start has a great number of different 
partial causes; that is to say, initial con­
ditions are very complex, and most of them 
have little interest for us.23
Popper's point about selectivity makes it obvious that he 
is talking about size claims. However, his remark about 
"causal chains" is not the proper inference from his ini­
tial point or statement. For a much stronger inference 
follows concerning the relationship between causal chains 
and points of view. How are causal chains constructed? 
Where do they come from? They derive from the point of 
view that is presupposed when a principle, such as a
^^"Situational Logic in History," in The Poverty of 
Historicism, p. I5 0 . Popper's italics.
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causal one, is used. Under the Humean model, causal effi­
cacy is an abstraction, a connection supplied by reasoning; 
it is not given as the events are given, for example, in 
a chronology. The attempt follow a "causal chain" 
would be fruitless, for point of view, as we have seen from 
Moline, is also a comprehension claim. To follow is to 
understand the connections argued for among events. Causal 
chains imply the use— either tacitly or overtly— of a point 
of view. As Popper says, points of view are "centres of
interest" or foci of the historian. They are not subject
2^to validation as is that which falls under their radius.
To use Wittgenstein's graphic depiction of the situation, 
it would be like the eye trying to see itself or to place 
itself in its visual field.
eye V visual field
24Ibid., pp. 150— 1 5 1* Moline also capitalizes on the 
notion of foci; op^ . cit. , p. 195: "Taking a point of view,
then, is like picking up and looking through a lens con­
structed for a particular purpose and having a particular 
focal length and field of vision. Some objects will be in 
focus (relevant) and others will simply be excluded from 
view (irrelevant)." As we shall see below, just as laws of 
optics govern whether or not a particular purpose and field 
are achieved, there are, as Taylor says, rules which gov­
ern relevance and irrelevance.
^^See his Notebooks, 19l4-19l6, G. H. von Wright and 
G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1 9 6 1 ), p. 8 0 .
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The eye is, so to speak, the historian's point of view. It 
is what makes possible the connections and inferences from 
the data. To see the data is an achievement, where looking 
at it is not.^^ For a historian to focus his interests 
towards data is an achievement in the sense that he is 
doing something; that is, he is interpreting. For instance, 
when Turner says that "we should rework our history from 
the new points of view afforded by the present" he is pro­
bably making not only comprehension and size claims, but 
also "irrelevance claims" (Moline's term).
The irrelevance claims which stem from point of view 
are in some ways the most important and debatable, for his­
torical controversies seem to revolve around these. A 
good example of an irrelevant claim in history comes from a 
chapter in the history of American history. For numerous 
years, the English Navigation Laws were cited as one of the 
causes for the American Revolution. The reasoning behind 
this causal assertion was that the laws were severe re­
strictions on colonial trade. It seemed quite plausible to 
men of an age of freer trade that the colonial Americans 
revolted to break out of these restrictions. Finally after 
such notable historians as Louis Hacker and George Ban­
croft had embraced this conjecture, 0. M. Dickerson, in
This distinction is from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept 
of Mind (New York; Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. l^Of., 
passim.
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The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (I9 5 I),
showed that there were virtually no objections to the laws
in the colonial literature. Benjamin Franklin had even
suggested that the colonial legislatures endorse the laws
27as a show of loyalty. In short, Dickerson showed that 
the Navigation Acts were irrelevant to the causal assessment 
of the American Revolution.
To talk adequately about point of view, we need to 
add a corollary to Moline's classification— that is, "rele­
vance claims." These are akin to the comprehension claims 
in that coming to understand something from a point of 
view is to see some things as relevant. An instance of 
this is Collingwood's example of a critical historian as-
28sessing whether or not a battle was a victory. From our 
understanding of what a victory is, we know that such-and- 
such or that this—and-that was the case. The disjunction 
of alternatives here constitutes the relevant claims, if 
the event was indeed a victory. As Paul Taylor said, the 
point of view defines the rules of relevance in addition 
to the rules of inference. The former rules enforce the 
relevance claims that the historian makes in his narrative.
27This example is taken from C. N. Degler's contri­
bution, "Do Historians Use Covering Laws?" in Philosophy 
and History; A Symposium, pp. 207—208. The context of 
his example is the subject of general laws, which I shall 
discuss in the next chapter (V).
28Op. cit., p. 237* This example was discussed in 
Chapter III.
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29Revising Moline's criterion of relevance for claims, we 
have this (near-tautological) characteristic: given a con­
sideration C, it is relevant from a point of view P only to 
the extent that ignoring C leads selectivity to become dis­
tortion under P , since C is held to be characteristic of P. 
The other claims presented can be phrased in terms of C and 
P also. However, criteria such as this one can only specify 
comprehension, size, relevance, and irrelevance in general 
terms, since they are formulated on the basis of concepts. 
More specific analysis must be done empirically or in 
terms of individual cases. This is perhaps best left to 
the historian rather than to the philosopher, since a tho­
rough knowledge of history is needed to assess the details.
One of the things that our investigation of point 
of view thus far makes clear is that when Hume speaks of 
a "point of view common. . . with others" he is drawing to 
our attention the idea that point of view is a standard.
That is to say, point of view enables the historian to 
perform certain tasks by referring to certain authorities 
or established evidence. But it is also like making assump­
tions in an argument, from which one can generate conclu­
sions. (The analogy here between deductive arguments and 
the role of point of view in historical discourse will be 
discussed in Chapter V.) The historian's assumptions are
29On. cit., pp. 196-197*
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generally located in the concept of "point of view"; and it 
is this that makes conjecture sentences and cumulative ideas 
in history possible, and shows how vital they are in his­
torical knowledge. A historian assumes that if another 
historian agrees or shares his point of view, then he is 
expected to have and pursue similar aims, to use only cer­
tain criteria for evaluating evidence to reach those aims, 
to share the same idea of relevance and importance, and to 
make similar factual assumptions. Also, the converse of 
this is true: if one historian shares or has these charac­
teristics in common with other historians, then we expect 
him to share or have the same point of view. This may very 
well be the content of Hume's notion of sympathy; that is, 
if we share the same point of view, the above character­
istics tend to be present and vice versa. As Moline puts 
it:
Adopting or taking the same point of view will 
in fact consist in adopting and sharing the 
same assumptions, criteria, interests, goals, 
and judgments of relevance and irrelevance.
To say that two people have the same point 
of view is to say that they tend to share
these . 30
In the Humean idiom and its respective model, this tendency
or disposition to share reciprocally point of view and its
characteristics is known as sympathy. So when Walsh says
that the historian mus.t presume that his readers have some
31sympathy with the ideas which he uses, we would interpret
30lbid. . p. 195. 31pp. cit., p. 195.
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this under the present model as the taking or sharing o(' 
the same point of view, and this would entail the above 
characteristics.
Some examples and analogies may perhaps make this 
somewhat clearer. An example which Moline uses is that of 
a detective. This brings to mind Collingwood's parallel 
between a detective's reasoning and that of a historian. 
Wlien a detective adopts a criminal's point of view, this 
tacitly useful intellectual exercise of a question-answer 
sort is usually designed to uncover weaknesses in a crimi­
nal's offenses and the victim's defenses. Like the his­
torian, the detective asks, "Now if I were a criminal who 
wanted to do such-and-such and not be caught, how would I 
do X?" In this sort of interrogative procedure one takes 
the standpoint of the agent. And Hume's classification of 
history as a discipline which places past objects in their 
true point of view seems to show that he had such a pro­
cedure and role in mind for point of view in history. A 
quick glance at the History of England shows that the ma­
jority of sentences in Hume's narrative are of this sort 
when he is dealing specifically with human actions. So, 
to achieve or to place "the objects funder investigation/ 
in their true point of view" is to see what factual assump­
tions are made, what standards were in force at the time, 
etc., and to take these into account when assessing a man, 
event, or a period. In short, a historical world of the
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kind Bailyn was talking about is created by the historian 
by considering, assessing, and presenting these sorts of 
things. Rarely, if ever, are the historian's own standards 
and assumptions the same as those with which he is dealing, 
and this is the reason for "a more common point of view."
If it is shown that a historian relies too much on his own 
perspective, his work is thought of as "bad history" exem­
plifying the use of a non-historical procedure. (See Hume's 
remarks on prejudice.) An example of this is the reasoning 
behind the causal primacy of the English Navigation Laws 
for explaining the conditions which led to the outbreak of 
the American Revolution. Another example is, at times,
Hume's own History. (A possible exception here, of course, 
is contemporary history which has its own special problems.)
Possibly one of the things that Geyl meant by saying 
that historical narratives are dependent upon interpreta­
tion and appreciation is that the point of view is embedded 
in the historian's language and it, the point of view, must 
be understood, if the narrative as a whole is to be fully 
understood. An explicit point of view makes the morpho­
logical rules which govern the narrative apparent, and 
hence, the connections or associations (as Hume calls them) 
are made clear. Then what we look for is the confirmation 
of the structure or point of view by the data from within 
and without the narrative. The better histories written 
today are ones that anticipate confirmation and objections.
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32and arguemntatively build these into the narrative. This 
may have the sound of a deductive procedure to it, but as 
Passmore says, this is unavoidable, for "in the completed 
book. . . I lay all my cards on the table." So, "all the 
passages are quoted as if they had equal confirmatory 
value. That explains why the interpretation has an hoc 
air." And:
Yet at the same time my inquiry, as I conduct 
it, is not a^ hoc. Why? Because what happens 
is something like this: an int_erpr;etation is
suggested by certain passages /_sa^/ in Hume; 
that interpretation is then confirmed by pas­
sages I had not previously so much as noticed, 
which the proposed interpretation serves to 
illuminate. Or I discover that passages which 
I previously could not understand now make 
sense.
What we have operating here, which is probably at 
the source of the confusion, are two "orders" of knowing. 
The formation of an interpretation is an approximation of 
the order of learning. Yet when the interpretation is
34written, a narrative reflects the order of understanding,
32For example, William Carroll Bark, Origins of the 
Medieval World (Garden City, N. J .: Doubleday and Co.,
1 9 5 8), see chs. 1, 2, and 5* The idea of anticipation is 
a common one used by philosophers of history; for example, 
see Dray, Hempel, and McCullagh.
33"The Objectivity of History," in Philosophical 
Analysis and History, p. 8?«
34I am indebted to Professor Carlton Berenda for 
bringing this distinction to my attention. It is seen on 
the first page in Aristotle's Physics, and in our own 
time Ernest Nagel has frequently used it in his writings 
on the philosophy of science.
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by the way in which the material is presented. It is here 
where Hume is particularly helpful in understanding concept- 
formation in history. His models are predominant ones that 
reflect the order of learning, or the historian in the pro­
cess of coming to know. This distinction is of particular 
importance in the model we are here discussing. The role 
of the notion of point of view in historical epistemology is 
one of the order of understanding. When a historian dis­
plays his point of view, this no doubt has a deductive _a 
priori flair to it. But this appears so only from the 
order of learning. From the order of understanding, the 
point of view exhibited furnishes the idea of deductive 
completeness which is essential to the logical structure of 
explanation.
Passmore has made an important analogical point 
which bears repeating in this context. And that is that 
historical problems and procedures are more like a certain 
type of problem or procedure in applied science than in 
pure science (e.g., p h y s i c s ) . T h e  historian typically 
asks; "Why did that particular monarchy collapse?" in 
wanting to know what the situation was on a particular oc­
casion; just as an engineer typically asks: "Why did that
particular bridge collapse?" (One could also ask how a 
particular bridge or monarchy was built.) Both the
35|tThe Objectivity of History," pp. 8$-8 6 . The exam­
ple which follows is adopted from Passmore's discussion.
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engineer and the historian solve their problems by con­
structing models. The engineer builds a scale model in 
which the structures and details are isomorphic; the model 
represents the original in every detail, the only differ­
ence, being, of course, its size. Then the model is tested 
in the type of environment the original was in. Approxi­
mate stresses and strains are provided to see if the weight 
and force of winds overloaded the structure causing its 
collapse. Now, what makes historical problems analogous to 
this one is that they are typically applied ones. That is 
to say, the point of view is applied in the case of the 
historian's problem. Obviously the historian does not 
build scale models, for he has neither all the evidence nor 
an identity or isomorphism between himself and the past.
But there is a sense of "model" which makes the analogy 
suitable for our purposes. That is, the models that his­
torians construct— narratives— are analogue models.
The crucial difference between a scale model and an 
analogue model is that the latter's construction is guided 
by the more abstract aim of reproducing the structure of 
the o r i g i n a l . T h e  structure is suggested by the present 
state of the art and data available. The selection of 
data for the narrative by the historian completes the 
structure. This parallels Hume's idea of design in the
g
See the literature on models cited in Chapter I 
(n9); especially. Black, p. 222.
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Inquiry which was discussed in Chapter III. The historian 
is faced with the problem of presentation. He solves his 
original problem, i.e., the historical one, by construct­
ing a model or a narrative. He hopes to show that together 
the structure and the data he selects are (and were) suf­
ficient to show the collapse of the monarchy in France— a 
model which draws attention to the stresses and strains 
which are relevant to that collapse.
The question which naturally arises at this point, 
and one which Passmore raises, is that of the testability 
of historical narratives. Are there tests for these? 
Passmore says no. His reasoning goes something like this: 
if we admit the idea of model for narrative, then the sig­
nificant disanalogy is that there are no such tests as there 
are for the engineer's model. However, if we draw a dis­
tinction between scale and analogue models, we can see that 
history in some sense shares characteristics of both of 
these models. The hard data of a narrative seems to ap­
proximate the identity in detail which is necessary for 
scale models. And the identification of structure by point 
of view tries to capture the same detail that the scale 
model exhibits by conjectures. Hence, the use of soft data 
or conjectures seems to approximate what we call an ana­
logue model. It is at this point where 1 think there is a 
"test" in some sense; that is, one of falsifiability. But 
to answer adequately the question of testability of
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historical "models" or narratives by way of falsifiability, 
we must first turn to the analogy between deductive argu­
ments and historical discourse which will be the subject 
of the next and final chapter.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The sole end of Logic is to explain the prin­
ciples and operations of our reasoning faculty.
David Hume
It would seem the height of presumption to rule 
• • • out ^  priori just in order to make
historical explanations conform to modus ponens.
P. J. Dietl
The Analogy between Logic and History 
In this concluding chapter, 1 shall systematically 
relate the results of the preceding chapters by exploring 
an analogy between deductive arguments and historical disr- 
course. Using logic in this way will enable us to see more 
clearly the interrelationships among the models and to 
integrate them into a general theory. The beginnings of 
the analogy are clearly seen in Carl Hempel's "The Function 
of General Laws in History." Hempel tacitly used (and 
later explicitly used)^ the modus ponens argument as a 
model for the mode of inference for causal explanations.
See, e.g., his "Reasons and Covering Laws in His­
torical Explanation," in Philosophy and History; A Sym­
posium, pp. 1 4 3-1 6 3 , especially p. l44.
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There were and are many who follow in Hempel's footsteps.
However, it was principally Professor Arthur Danto who
made considerable advance in extending and in arguing for
the credibility of logic as an appropriate analogy for his-
2
torical discourse. Since this is the case, it may well be 
advisable to look at some of the motivations behind such an 
analysis as this before I begin mine.
Danto has faced the very same problem that Hume 
faced in the first Inquiry over specifying what we mean by 
a unified collection of parts. Danto suggests, as Hume 
does, that a characteristic of history is that it organizes 
the past into temporal wholes, e.g., periods and major 
events or figures. The difficulty in specifying what these 
wholes or unities are and in trying to provide a suitable 
analysis of this characteristic of history has to do with 
the concept of unity. Danto has seen this, and in Chapter 
III we observed Hume struggling with the notion of unity 
both in the Treatise and in the first Inquiry. The motiva­
tion behind Danto's analysis is, then, to find a suitable 
way of talking about how the concept of unity applies to 
narration. He writes:
It seems to me we can make a beginning towards 
specifying a criterion of narrative unity by 
taking seriously the suggestion that a narrative
2Analytical Philosophy of History, pp. 248-2^6. See 
also pp. 2031 208-209, 2 1 3 > 2 1 9 > and 22 6 for other uses of 
the analogy. I am greatly indebted to Danto's analysis 
which has served as a stimulus for me to explore this new 
ground.
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and a deductive argument might constitute
alternative forms of explanation.3
Upon this insight is based a number of corollaries. First, 
certain formal fallacies in deduction might have analogues 
in narratives. This means that -we might be able to find a 
number of conditions that an argument would fail to satisfy 
which would render the narrative "invalid.” Secondly, 
these conditions would, then, be the necessary conditions 
for a valid argument, and by analogy, these necessary con­
ditions would constitute the criteria (or a part of them) 
for a "valid" narrative. Danto is obviously much more in­
terested in the negative components of the analogy than in 
its positive ones, for he wants to argue for alternative 
forms of explanation. I have no quarrel with this; in fact, 
I have taken this as a suggestion to look into deductive 
arguments other than modus ponens for the purpose of find­
ing alternatives to it. We will look at Danto's specific 
complaints about the model in a moment.
Unity is partially achieved in history, as elsewhere, 
by the fact that there are regularities in human experience 
and events. These regularities in the human domain are a 
set of dispositions (actions) which make up the principles 
of human nature. These principles, in turn, are the deter­
minations needed for explanations of human actions. So 
explanations rest upon the notion of general law. All this
^Ibid., p. 248; Danto's italics.
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we have seen in Chapter II. The rudiments of Hume's model 
here are clearly present in Hempel's discussion, and he 
himself sees that his analysis is a Humean one. The mode 
of inference represented in logic by the modus ponens argu­
ment is commonly used to display the order of inferences 
discussed just above. It is;
(1) (x) Fx3Gx,
(2) Pa,
(3) Ga.
Line (l) represents an expression of some general law, e.g., 
"(influential) ideas travel along trade routes," either 
tacitly or overtly stated. Line (2) paraphrases the ini­
tial conditions, and line (3) is a statement that an event 
(a) of a kind G will ensue, if there is the conjunction 
(simultaneiously) of lines (l) and (2). In a sense, we 
predict Ga in reading a historical narrative if we en­
counter ^Tx) (Px3 Gxjy & Fa; or, if you like, we anticipate 
Ga. Following Hempel, Professor.Danto further develops 
the analogy by using the same model for interpretation; he 
extends the modus ponens argument to narratives (as I 
illustrated in the sentence immediately above). Hempel's 
analysis is restricted to sentences— most of which need to 
be treated elliptically if the model is to work. Hempel 
can only talk about unity by treating certain statements
L
"The Function of General Laws in History," see 
especially section 7«4.
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elliptically, and these statements would form, under his 
use of the modus ponens model, narrative unity. So for 
Hempel, we have the following criterion: those sentences
in a historian's narrative that are explanatory ones must 
conform to the causal interpretation of the modus ponens 
model if it is to be a "valid" narrative. I shall call 
this "Hempel-valid." In short, Hempel's notion of validity 
supplies what he would call "a sufficient unity in the 
subject." Here we have one contemporary formal interpre­
tation of Hume's principle (P) which I discussed in its 
initial form in Chapter III.
There is an interesting point that can be made about 
the anti-Humean and anti-Hempelian theorists. This is 
that, according to them, these models are far too rigorous 
and out of place in discussions of history. For we can 
see from Hempel's formulations of "validity" that what 
counts as sufficient for the achievement of unity is really 
not too demanding at all on narratives. The only logical 
demands are those placed on a set of given sentences within 
the narrative, and these are minimal usually in number. 
Danto's dissatisfaction with the Hempel-valid interpreta­
tion of the modus ponens argument is that Ga follows by 
logic alone from (x) fx O  Gx and Fa, whereas Fa-Ga is a 
change, and it is this change that we want an explanation 
for. In detail, "these changes are not always covered by 
general laws, although the connection between these changes
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and some assigned cause for the change typically is covered
5
by general law." It is here where Danto spots a weakness 
in the analogy. The significant negative analogy is that 
the Hempel-valid interpretation cannot account for his­
torical change. Also, it is easily seen that the notion of 
narrative under this interpretation suffers greatly from 
the over—emphasis upon sentence structure. So Danto scraps 
this interpretation of validity and replaces it with one 
that has narratives specifically in mind. This consti­
tutes a subtle shift in the modus ponens morphology.
Danto's analogy is based upon the following inter-
g
prêtâtions. Suppose that we replace Fa with Fb. This
would be a violation of one of the rules in natural deduc­
tion, and the entailment relation between the premises and 
the conclusion Ga would no longer be present. Likewise, 
if we replace Ga with Gb our new conclusion would no 
longer be entailed by (x) Fx 3  Gx and Fa. Furthermore, if 
we replace Fa and Ga with Fb and Gb, then we would surely 
have logical entailment between the premises and the con­
clusion. But we would also have the paraphrasing of a 
different historical change (assuming, for the moment, that 
one can account for historical change under the Hempel-valid 
interpretation). Logically speaking, we want the same
^Ibid., p. 249; Danto's italics.
^Ibid. The following discussion is based upon pp.
249-251.
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bound variables to be replaced by the same individual con­
stants throughout. Danto speaks of the narrative analogue 
as the unity of subject. So from a logical point of view, 
a narrative requires one object or a continuous subject.
This parallels Hume's idea in the Treatise that: "One
7single object conveys the idea of unity."
A second feature in Danto's analogy explains why 
only a few things have been selected for narrative explana­
tion. That is, we do not explain events as such, but 
rather events under a certain restriction. Once the de­
scription is chosen, the event must be thoroughly explained 
relative to or under that description. This parallels a 
situation in logical theory with respect to predicates.
That is to say, no predicate which is not antecedently con­
tained in the premises can appear in the conclusion of a 
deductive argument. For example, let us suppose that our 
conclusion is Ga & Ha. In this case, the conclusion sat­
isfies the necessary condition that a narrative have a unity 
of subject, but it also contains an extra piece of informa­
tion, i.e., Ha. In history, if we run across a "conclusion" 
that expresses Ha without having appeared earlier in the 
narrative, it would be quite natural for us to feel that 
there is a gap in the story or account for which there is 
no explanation. Here we would have the flaw of both
^Op. cit., p. 200,
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narrative completeness and deductive completeness for ex­
planation. It is just as important in history as in 
logic that once we choose a description or a set of pre­
mises, we explain the event in terms of that description 
or prove an argument on the basis of the sequential merit 
of those premises.
A corollary to this last feature is that we reverse 
the situation. That is, instead of adding a predicate to 
the conclusion, we a<.<d an additional premise Ea. The sit­
uation is somewhat different now in that a valid deduction 
can still be made, the only difference being that Ea would 
not contribute to the logical work. As Danto says, it 
would be "deductively inert." However, if we make elegance 
a rule of deduction as Danto does, then we can tidy up our 
analogy by requiring that a valid deduction should contain 
only those sentences required for inferring the conclusion. 
The narrative analogue would be this: an "invalid" nar­
rative is one which contains events or episodes which fail 
to contribute to the action or the explanation. It should 
be emphasized that we are talking about the explanatory 
aspect of narratives at this point. Danto sums up his 
discussion of the analogy between deductive arguments and 
historical narratives in the following way:
On the basis of these analogies, then, we can,
I think, state some of the necessary conditions 
for narrative unity. Thus, if N is a narra­
tive, then N lacks unity unless (A) N is about 
the same subject, (B) N adequately explains
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the change in that subject which is covered by 
the explanandum, and (C) N contains only so 
much information as is required by (B) and 
no more. I do not say these are the only 
criteria for unity, and there may be other 
criteria for a satisfactory piece of historical 
writing which may even conflict with some of 
these, for instance, (C).°
So here in capsule form we have a notion of valid as ap­
plied to narratives in history which I shall call "Danto- 
valid." Thus far we are able to see that Danto-valid 
narratives imply Hempel-valid ones for the following rea­
sons. First, he uses the modus ponens model to make his 
three "logico-aesthetic" points. Secqnd, his interpreta­
tion applies only to the explanatory aspect of narratives. 
Both of these notions of validity presuppose Hume’s prin­
ciple (P). But his model of a valid narrative (as we shall 
see later) differs in certain respects. However, Danto’s 
conception of historical validity goes considerably beyond 
Hempel’s in that the negative analogies begin to play a 
decisive role in the analogy between deductive arguments 
and history. I shall now present these and then try to 
develop the analogy in ways to show that in principle the 
analogy with suitable models can be a more powerful tool 
for philosophy of history than hitherto suggested.
The analogues just given are the positive analogies 
in Danto’s analysis. Narratives which satisfy these neces­
sary conditions, he calls "atomic narratives." One of the
^Ibid., p. 251.
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negative analogies we have already seen: no account of
historical change. A second one is that the individual 
constant "a" may have gone through a sequence of changes, 
and these need to be noted to account for the larger change, 
Danto labels accounts that explain changes within changes 
as "molecular narratives." A student of logic is quick to 
notice that Danto's choice of words for the distinction 
parallels the two basic kinds of sentences in the senten­
tial calculus. And it is within this sentence—oriented 
morphology that possible replies can be forthcoming. Up to 
this point, the above, in summary, is the present state of 
the analogy. However, from what Morton White and others 
have said about the sentence-narrative distinction, it is 
only natural that we talk about valid narratives, since
9
truth is only applicable to sentences. And sentences have 
a relationship to the narrative as does truth to validity. 
With this in mind, some refinements can be made of the 
model.
My first suggestion in making the analogy more cred­
ible is to change the model to the respective complexity of 
the subject to which the analogy is applied. This can be 
done essentially in two ways: first, move from a simple
argument form to an actual argument instance; and secondly, 
to provide another interpretation of its basic components.
9
See the first section of Chapter III,
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The modus ponens model expanded to one which uses additional 
modes of inference is seen in the following schemata:
1. (x) Px =) Gx
2. Fa
3. Pa =) Ga
4. Ga
5• Pa & Ga
6. O x )  Px & Gx 
There are several advantages in this extended model. For 
instance, line 3 has an interpretation which handles Danto's 
main complaint that Pa-Ga is a change. All universally 
quantified statements in a given narrative are expressions 
either overtly or tacitly of general laws. If a given law 
is suggested to the historian to explain an event or a 
series of events, then this law must be expressed in terms 
of the subject-matter. For example, there may be some gen­
eral law about revolutions; namely, "in any given situation, 
if there is political discontent and economic distress 
coupled with poverty and injustice, a revolution will occur." 
This would be an expression of (x) Px 3  Gx. Pa O  Ga in 
line 3 would be applied to a specific event, a, and become 
something of a "historical law." That is, the change that 
occurs from Fa to Ga is accounted for by Pa O  Ga. It is a 
commonplace in quantification theory that any given quanti­
fied expression must be instantiated before the rules of 
inference in prepositional logic can be applied to it. So
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actually from the way in which Danto has set up the modus 
ponens model his simplified version would not work! Hence, 
if the model is to be further used, this additional line 
needs to be included. And the Hempel model survives 
Danto's first criticism.
Now, what about lines 5 and 6? Doubtless there are 
numerous interpretations that can be given to these, and I 
shall suggest various avenues of interpretation. However, 
one in particular which I am interested in making in con­
nection with Danto's other objection is as follows: We can
interpret the connector as the linear ordering or pre­
sentation of that change which occurs from lines 2 to 4.
This is also trivially suggested by the alphabetical or­
dering of the predicate symbols "F" and "G". Given this 
interpretation of line $, it is not difficult to come up 
with the interpretation needed for line 6. Professor
Morton White's idea of every historical narration having
10an implied chronology works nicely here. In other words, 
for a narrative to be a historical one the sentences con­
tained within it are usually arranged in a chronological 
fashion, as is represented by Fa & Ga. There must be some 
implied chronology for those events which are narrated.
The analogue in quantification theory is that the statement 
in line 5 must be generalized in respect to a bound variable
^^Foundations of Historical Knowledge, ch. VI.
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in order to be a proposition or an assertion, and not 
simply a propositional function. In short, the statement 
must be quantified. At this point in our interpretation we 
can see that Danto's use of the analogy does not need to 
lead to alternative forms of explanation, but that these 
forms can be complimentary ones if we broaden our outlook 
to include more in the historian's reasoning than the 
narrative. That is, we can include the notion of point of 
view in history to overcome some of the cited weaknesses 
in the analogy. It is here that I think if we are to find 
a notion of validity in history, it will be in the rela­
tion between point of view and the narrative. With this in 
mind, we can make the following reinterpretations of the 
modus ponens part of the model.
Line 1, (x) Fx 3  Gx, we might say is an expression 
of the historian's point of view. The point of view which 
generally is an expression of a general law is to be in­
cluded both for the sake of deductive completeness, which is 
demanded of explanations, and of "narrative completeness" 
which is characteristic of historical explanations. Essen­
tially what I take the expression "narrative completeness" 
to mean is the substance of Hume's governing principle for 
his models of historical discourse; that is, a sufficient 
unity in the subject. For our present model in the analogy 
to have deductive completeness, there needs to be some 
generalization with respect to any instantiation within the
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model. Also, our closures of (x) and O x )  help complete 
our interpretation by representing that characteristic of 
history which Hume and Danto noticed of historians organiz­
ing their data within temporal wholes to form historical 
wholes or unities. The closure property of "(x)" of a 
quan ifier can be interpreted as a period, and the respec­
tive predicates within the scope of the quantifier would 
denote the point of view. The '*(^x)" and its closure 
effect denote an implied chronology within the domain of 
the (x), of which the narrative is a part.
Another possible interpretation of this analogy is 
that in logic we know with what we are starting— the 
premises— and where we want to arrive— the conclusion—  
and that there is a given set of rules for constructing a 
derivation. Once several lines in a proof are started, one 
can anticipate further developments, such as a crucial use 
of the distribution rule, or of the addition rule. Likewise, 
notable historical narratives are generally ones in which 
we are able, as intelligent and sympathetic readers, to 
anticipate a major outcome or lessor outcomes from the way 
in which the historian has developed his material. That is, 
given what the historian has said thus far, it was quite 
likely to happen this way. In other words, for the narra­
tive to be complete or have a sufficient unity, it must 
describe a sufficient number of conditions which the 
reader's general knowledge of the period tells him must
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have existed for the particular change being described to
11have taken place as it did.
Having developed the analogy this far, we should see 
how credible A. J. P. Taylor's The Origins of The Second 
World War looks in logical form. In line 1, (x) Fx ID Gix, 
we have a point of view about wars which contains the fol­
lowing general law: "wars pursued from a victor-defeated
policy and settlements based upon this type of thinking 
lead to other wars." Line 2, Fa, denotes the given data 
with which the historian has to work. These will become 
the conditions for Ga. That is, "a" is a specific war 
which did happen and "F" is the property of "a" which dip­
lomats and negotiators definitely pursued indicated by Fx. 
Line 3, Fa O  Ga, is an expression of Taylor's synoptic 
judgment: "The Second World War was implicit in the First
World War." Line 4, Ga, represents the outbreak of the 
Second World War. Line 5» Fa & Ga, is the narrated chron­
ology of events which shows that lines 2 through 4 are 
indeed the case. Line 6, O x )  Fx & Gx, is the quantified 
paraphrase of the implicit or implied chronology of the 
narrative (5)* From this interpretative model, there are 
some other remarks on historical methodology that can be 
made on behalf of the analogy. Line 3» Fa O  Ga, asserts
1 1McCullagh, p. 2 6 0 . The same identical point is 
made in Danto; see pp. 2511 254, and 255, which McCullagh 
accuses Danto of not making.
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the connection between Fa-Ga and records the historical 
change that Danto was looking for in Hempel's model. Lines 
5 and 6 which express chain-inferences are the justification 
for the asserted connection in line 3; they are the sequen­
tial merits or the fertility of the hypothesis of line 3 »
Pa Z) Ga. So in a sense the justification of line 3 by 
lines 3 and 6 is not covered by a general law. These repre­
sent chronological and temporal ordering. Professor Alan 
Donagan has made a remark about scientifically acceptable
general statements which is particularly helpful in my re-
12formulation of the modus ponens model. All scientifically 
acceptable general statements are those which go beyond per­
sonal or particular conditions. This is obviously taking 
into account intervening variables and permitting inter- 
subjective verifiability of the cognitive content of those 
statements. So looking at lines 1 through 3i we see that 
this is why (x) Fx Z3 Gx is needed along with Fa 3  Ga;
Fa Ga is not adequate by itself. For the quantified ex­
pression of it is desired both in logical theory and in 
scientific methodology (which includes history). Also,
(x) Fx Gx and Fa ZD Ga, together handle the semi—teleolog- 
ical or colligating type procedures of the historian. They 
are expressions of organizational concepts for the events 
or data, Fa and Ga, with which the historians have to work.
12"The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered," in Philo­
sophical Analysis and History, p. 153*
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Turning to Dante's second objection to the Hompoi-
valid interpretation, which is his notion of a molecular
narrative, we find the following criticism:
To begin with, it may be argued that, just 
as we must refer to several changes, and hence 
several causes, in order to account for a 
large 'molecular' change, so, in a deductive 
argument, we may need several distinct pre­
mises in order to derive a conclusion, no single 
one of which by itself entails the conclusion.
Thus, thinking of condition (B) above, we could 
not, for example, deduce Ha from just the two 
premises Fa and (x) (Fx D  Gx). But by adding 
a further premiss, we can complete the argu­
ment validly. According to Hempel's model 
the added premiss must either be a general 
law or a statement of another required ini­
tial condition or both. Now suppose we add 
the general law (x) (GbcZD Hx). This would do 
the trick, but the fact is we can in such a 
case eliminate the two general laws in favour 
of another one, for since we can validly de­
rive p 3  r from p O  q and q 3  r , the two laws 
collapse into one— (x) (Fx ID Hx). But such 
an elimination cannot obviously be made in 
every valid narrative.^3
Danto's point about elimination in valid narratives is not 
obvious when we consider the class of sentences which ex­
press synoptic conclusions. For one of the roles of a 
synoptic conclusion in a valid historical narrative is to 
assert that there exists a connection between beginning and 
end. So in a sense we can analogously think of synoptic 
conclusions as expressions of an elimination procedure.
The collapsing of the two laws by Hypothetical Syllogism 
into one, (x) Fx 3  Hx, can be a valid elimination only if
^^Op. cit., p. 253; Danto's italics.
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we know the premises that allow for it or lead to it.
”(x) Fx 13 Hx" by itself would obviously not suggest any­
thing. But if it appears in a valid narrative, it would 
violate the principle of unity unless it were a sub-conclu­
sion or a part of a given sequence. The whole chain of 
inferences which led to such an expression as (x) Gix Ü> Hx 
would be the sequence of changes. Also Danto entertains 
another possibility in connection with molecular narra­
tives. This is that we add additional sufficient condi­
tions and initial conditions to an argument. We would 
have expressions which look like (x) /TFx  & Gix) Z3 Ik/ and 
the additional premise Ga. Here we have neither Fa nor 
Ga alone which would entail the conclusion. The general 
law would require their conjunction, and as Danto sees it, 
this would be analogous to the case of a narrative that 
would require more than one cause to account for a large- 
scale change. Indeed, such a formulation as this of a 
general law or a point of view would perhaps be the best 
representation of most historical narratives, in that the 
conjunction of the antecedent would represent the chrono­
logical and temporal ordering of events, which would be 
thought of as conditions only by the presence of a synoptic 
judgment.
Before turning specifically to Hume in terms of this 
model, one further comment needs to be made on point of 
view. As we have seen in the last two chapters (III and
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IV) points of view are very similar to deductive procedures. 
They serve as a kind of inference-license and are not them­
selves true or false, but are more like a propositional 
function in that they allow for initial ordering of data.
The narrative form for presentation, as Passmore has re­
minded us, has an a^ hoc, deductive flair to it. So ac­
tually, the analogy to deductive arguments and history, 
upon analysis, is more credible and suitable for philosoph­
ical discussions of history than we would first think.
(This will become even more obvious in the next section.) 
Summing up, we see that the deficiencies that Danto sees 
in the analogy are mainly due to an essentially incomplete 
argument form as a model. Some of the crucial deficien­
cies can be overcome by extending the argument and the 
scope of the interpretation beyond its present employment.
The models that 1 have discussed in the preceding 
chapters of this essay that can be found in Hume's writings 
in varying detail are particularly amenable to an analysis 
such as the ones given by the aid of the analogy. The 
Humean notion of "validity'* for narration would be his 
principle: a sufficient unity in the subject. The various
necessary conditions listed below constitute the criteria 
or general theory for a valid, explanatory narrative in 
history. The general theory is:
(a) sufficient unity in the subject;
(b) teleological explanations of human actions (events);
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(c) conjecture sentences, that is, probabilistic 
statements inferred from "proofs" (Hume's term for well- 
established evidence);
(d) "design" or point of view by the historian 
embedded in the narrative by way of (b) and (c) to achieve 
(a).
The Humean idea of history is the set (a) through 
(d) as is discussed in Chapter II. The concept of (d) is 
analyzed in Chapter IV. Criteria (a) through (c) are dis­
cussed in Chapter III. Under the present interpretative 
scheme of the analogy, we find a teleological explanation 
of Fa provided both by (x) Fx ZD Gx and Fa O  Ga. The justi­
fication of Ga from the preceding lines in the proof is 
by (c). Furthermore, the conjunction of Fa & Ga has its 
justification by (c) and (b), which form the basis for 
Hume's causal link—chain metaphor. Hume's association of 
ideas— the principles of resemblance, contiguity and 
causation— are the "rules of inference" for lines 3 through 
5 from lines 1 and 2 which are given as premises. This 
was discussed in Chapter III. The principles of human 
nature are interpreted in Chapter II as empirical general­
izations from everyday life and the sciences which make up 
line 1. These principles are essential to any form of ex­
planation, according to the Humean stance (scheme). A 
"valid" but not necessarily "sound" narrative is conceived 
of as one that satisfies all the lines in the revised model.
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and not just the modus ponens part of the model which the 
Hempel and Danto interpretations suggest.
What support is there for interpreting Hume this 
way? First, the appellations, "proofs" and "conjectures" 
show that Hume was interpreting history from an analogy 
with the logic of his own day. Second, the idea of design 
or point of view and the causal link-chain metaphor suggest 
that Hume thought of historical comparison as essentially 
a definite line of reasoning exemplified by a series of 
propositions. The role of the type of regularities and 
generalization in history provide a mode of inference 
which is essential to history. There, too, is Hume's 
realization that inductive arguments are invalid for his­
tory, since one begins with a set of regularities which 
is his point of view, and the whole question of confirma­
tion evolves around point of view and data. In other 
words, the relationship between point of view and data is 
not one indicative of the generalizing which takes place 
in inductive arguments. Points of view which are from 
common experience and which are formed inductively do not 
have the same role. Viewpoints are more akin to charac­
teristics of deductive arguments (e.g., assumptions to 
infer conclusions with, rules of inference and relevance) 
which define the canons of reasoning, etc. Hume's own 
language suggests that he had in mind by "embellishing" 
and "illustrating" something other than inductive arguments
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and historical discourse than to other possible logical 
assimilations.
Hume's position as illustrated by the analogy in
this section is not without its difficulties. His emphasis
upon the role of point of view in historical epistemology
can lead to the complete untestability of historical
narratives if its role is pushed to extremes. For as Karl
Popper warns us about Hume's repetitive thesis:
For any given finite group or set of things, 
however variously they may be chosen, we can, 
with a little ingenuity, find always points 
of view such that all the things belonging to 
that set are similar (or partially equal) if 
considered from one of these points of view; 
which means that anything can be said to be a 
'repetition'of anything, if only we adopt the 
appropriate point of view. This shows how naive 
it is to look upon repetition as something 
ultimate, or given.
Popper's point here is an excellent one, and Hume's doc­
trine of the primacy of repetitions is perhaps the major 
instructive error in his argument. In addition to Hume's 
emphasis upon temporal and psychological primacy of repe­
titions in experience, he was probably impressed with 
continuities in history. The latter is the corollary of 
Hume's error with which we are interested here. The his­
torian' s search for continuities has always been a virtue
1 4From appendix *x in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(tiew York: Harper and Row, I9 6 5 ) , p. 422. In the discussion
of Popper which follows, I confine myself to the argument 
he puts forth in this appendix.
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15and a vice. As Popper writes: "Generally, similarity,
and with it repetition, always presuppose the adoption of 
^  point of view. A n d  the historian who looks for fea­
tures or structures has a point of view which controls much 
of his investigation in addition to his presentation, 
whether or not he is aware of it.
Is there anything that can be said on behalf of Hume 
in response to Popper's argument? I think so. First, the 
context and direction of Popper's argument is physical 
theory. So when he says that one can always find points 
of view with a little ingenuity, he is mainly talking 
about ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses in natural science, and 
not about history. If Popper is talking about this set of 
hypotheses, then Hume and the historians would be the first 
to agree. Second, to look upon repetition as something 
ultimate or given can only be done from those structural 
properties of the world which are themselves given in points 
of view. And that points of view in this sense can be 
generated."with a little ingenuity" is based upon the assump­
tion that there is a sufficient amount of intelligence, 
rather than just capacity, displayed to generate and see 
these structural properties. Popper's argument about
15For more on continuities as the main danger in the 
method of the historian, see, e.g., Passmore, "The Idea of 
a History of Philosophy," pp. 2^ff»
16Op. cit., p. 421; Popper's italics.
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which comes first, the point of view or the repetitive 
experience, is based upon a confusion of the order of un­
derstanding with the order of learning. His reductio ad 
absurdum argument below has its respective counter—argument 
by distinguishing the "orders" which he collapses to 
develop the paradox:
If similarity and repetition presuppose the 
adoption of a point of view, or an interest, 
or an expectation, it is logically necessary 
that points of view, or interests, or expecta­
tions, are logically prior, as well as tempo­
rally (or causally or psychologically) prior, 
to repetition. But this result destroys both 
the doctrines of the logical and of the temporal 
primacy of repetitions.^7
Popper's argument is based upon an equivocation of the word
"prior." The "logically prior" refers to the order of
understanding, and from my analysis in the last chapter (IV),
the logical priority is the only priority which is to be
assigned to it. However, the temporal priority is another
matter. In history, this would be tantamount to "prejudice"
(in Hume's sense of the term). One does not have just
(x) Fx O  Gx given, but ^Tx) (Fx CP Gx) & F ^  given. The
consideration of data. Fa, leads us to decide whether or
not we need to instantiate a general law in the point of
view to supply the necessary connections for Fa-Ga. That
could conceivably be done with any number of general laws,
and their logical form need not conform to " Z) . "
^^Ibid., p. 422; my italics,
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Besides equivalences to this form, there are others equally 
fruitful, as we shall see in the next section. Expectation 
of Ga demands two lines under the revised model; one needs 
both (x) Fx 3  Gx and Fa Ga, the latter of which is not 
just suggested by point of view, but also by Fa. What 
specifically does this have to do with the historian and 
philosophy of history? I think a great deal, for the repe­
titive problem is the generalized problem of historical 
continuity. As I see it Hume's major contribution was 
dealing with historical continuity. All of the models I 
have discussed in this essay were designed with this in 
mind. It is a problem to which philosophers of history 
should pay more attention than they have. Many other ques­
tions, such as historical truth and objectivity, depend 
upon answers to this problem. It is here that our analogy 
weakens and logic becomes bare. Here Hume resists the 
logical outcome of his model by Hempel and Danto. As 
Morton White succinctly puts it:
What I have opposed is the idea that there is 
some clear inner logical core of the notion 
of explanation which may be analyzed without 
attention to what are sometimes dismissed as 
merely psychological or merely pragmatic over­
tones, and I have also opposed the even more 
questionable idea that we must give up our 
ordinary linguistic habits, allegedly because 
they are remnants of stone-age thinking. In 
a sense I have adopted a quasi-Humean approach 
to the problem, arguing that reference to 
more than law is required when we come to 
analyze an explanatory deductive argument and 
a singular explanatory statement, and that 
that extra something may well be custom. But
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it should be noticed that because custom may 
lead us to call some laws explanatory and others 
not, we need to know the way in which custom 
works— in other words, why it dignifies some 
laws by calling them explanatory. Moreover, 
if it is custom that decides, custom may decide 
differently in different cultures.
As we have seen from Chapters II through IV, these prag­
matic elements are in Hume's models, so much of what anti- 
Humean theorists call for is there. The general law 
"disappears" in the model as the lines in the proof pro­
gress downward towards the implied chronology. The "extra 
something called custom" (as White says) is the set of the 
rules of inference and relevance from the point of view.
The notion of point of view in the Humean general theory 
is what adds the pragmatic dimension to his idea of his­
tory. The question as to what grounds can be regarded as 
a generalization or as a general law that is explanatory 
cannot be, as White says, answered by focusing on the 
logical syntax. It is semantics, if anything, that will 
supply our answers. This type of inquiry leads us to prag­
matic considerations— into sociology and anthropology— to 
the point where Hume ended and rested his foundations for 
history. That is, to distinguish the explanatory and non- 
explanatory leads us finally to the questions: "To whom is
X explanatory?" In a sense, all explanatory narratives in 
history are ad hominem arguments in that they ultimately
^^Op. cit., p. 77; White's italics.
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appeal to questions of this sort, if we want definite 
answers— empirical answers. So with Popper's warning and 
my logico-pragmatism, we can make this final comment on 
the modus ponens model.
Any point of view used in history for explanatory 
purposes in the form of (x) Fx Z) Gx must have its corre­
sponding, implied chronology (3 x) Fx & Gx. The priority 
question raised by Popper is based upon restrictions running 
both ways in the model. The pragmatic dimension is seen 
in the existential quantifier, ( 3 x). When one questions 
these grounds, then it is Hume's and White's approach that 
needs to be taken. My final solution on semantic and 
syntactical levels to Popper's criticism as applied to 
history will be the subject of the next section.
Another Function of General Laws in History 
Almost thirty years after the appearance of Profes­
sor Hempel's influential article, "The Function of General 
Laws in History," most of the discussion of general laws 
has centered around the positive, overt use of them in his­
torical writing. This use is set up normally by employing 
the modus ponens argument as an aid, which we explored in 
the last section:
(x) Fx O  Gx
Fa
Ga
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Danto and many others follow this procedure using modus 
ponens as the guide. The anti-Hempelians have at times 
taken the line of argument that there exists a class of 
historical narratives which do not exhibit this logical 
structure for general laws. In this section, I shall show 
that we can make both concessions. That is to say, we can 
agree with the anti-Hempelians that there are such his­
tories. And at the same time, we can agree with the 
Hempelians that there is (and has to be) some function of 
general laws for there to be an explanation, viz. a log­
ical structure for the mode of inference. How? Change the 
logical model of the covering laws debate. By using the 
modus tollens argument as the model, we can have the best 
of all possible worlds (at least within the restrictions of 
this long controversy). Let us look at an example.
Carl N. Degler, a practicing historian, at the New 
York University Symposium of Philosophy and History in 
1 9 6 2 , argued against Hempel's thesis by producing a counter­
example; and concluded that,at best, general laws were only
used part of the time— that some historical writing does 
19not use them. Hence, Hempel has a limited thesis, and, 
by implication, general laws are not essential to explana­
tion in history. Degler's counter-example is this. There 
are such notable historians as Lewis Hacker and George
19Hook, ed., op. cit,
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Bancroft who have used general laws (as Degler calls them) 
such as "the English Navigation Laws led the colonial 
Americans to their revolution in order to break away from 
these restrictions." This general law was challenged by 
0. M. Dickerson who showed that there were virtually no 
objections to the laws in colonial literature. However, 
Degler and other anti-Hempelians are mistaken to think 
that there is not a function of general laws here. Log­
ically, there is a very important function; that of falsi- 
fiability. Schematically, we have this model:
/Jt O  p) &-£^/D-t 
Following Karl Popper’s scheme for the falsifying mode of 
inference as the modus tollens of classical logic, we can
set up the following model for a class of historical nar- 
20ratives. Let p be an inference (conclusion) from some 
general law, t. We may then symbolize the relation of 
derivability of p from t by "t 3  p" which may be read:
"p (an instance) follows from t." Given the relation of 
derivability and the assumption -p, we can infer —t ; that 
is, we regard t as falsified. So we have an expression of 
the sort "if p is derivable from t, and if p is false, then 
t also is false." Historical narratives which satisfy this 
model I call "Popper-valid."
^^Op. cit., p. 76.
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Now Degler admits that historians like Bancroft use 
general laws of the form which we noticed earlier concern­
ing the Navigation Laws. However, Degler is mistaken in
thinking that they are not used in the case of Dickerson.
Dickerson's conclusion, —t , is that the particular general 
law used does not follow from the premises, this is ellip­
tical in Dickerson's narrative. He simply shows the con­
junction (t 3  p) & —p, and lets the reader infer the ob­
vious conclusion. But this means only that t will not work, 
He is trying to refute t, so general laws are used to that 
extent. As Marc Bloch suggested, this is a legitimate type 
of historical narrative in that what is not the case is
easier to decide in history than what is the case or 
21truth. So the Hempelians can admit the class of histor­
ies like these that the anti-Hempelians insist upon, and 
the anti-Hempelians will have to admit the Hempelian's 
point that the historian's model(s) of inference are amen­
able to logical structure, and consequently, to logical 
analysis.
My point is that the class of histories that are 
used to counter the modus ponens model of general laws will 
not lead to the conclusion that there are no general laws 
or no use of them. Rather, these are amenable to the same
The Historian's Craft, Peter Putnam, trans. (New 
York: Random House, 1953T1 see also H. S. Hughes, History
as Art and as Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1964),
pp. léff.
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requirements that Hempelians place on the other model. So 
from the approach and the results in this chapter vre see 
that there are at least two basic classes of historical 
narratives; modus ponens histories and modus tollens his­
tories. The function of many of the modus tollens histor­
ies is to make explicit the assumed general regularities 
that are either tacitly or overtly stated in modus ponens 
histories (such as Dickerson has done) in order to refute 
them. Looking at Hume's History of England we find numer­
ous examples of each type of historical procedure that 
exhibits the logical structure of asserting and falsifying 
modes of inference.
Also, the falsifying mode of inference represented 
by modus tollens gives the historian a limited procedure 
for testing points of view and expressions of general laws. 
In a way, Hume's adaption of the Aristotelian admissibility 
criterion (which Bradley and Collingwood also used) is an 
early anticipation and expression of the falsifiability 
criterion as a testing procedure of historical theses and 
narratives.
There has been very little exploration of the analogy 
between deductive arguments and history and it is hoped 
that this chapter has contributed some to its development.
It seems to me that before philosophers of history throw 
the analogy overboard, it needs to be worked out in more 
detail and from a more detached perspective. Perhaps my
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suggestions in this chapter will help achieve that end and 
direct the attention of philosophers of history to a classi­
fication of the various modes of inferences which are used 
in history. It should also be evident from my examination 
of Hume that he is an excellent source to begin with.
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